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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The unstable performance of the world coffee economy has been a 
subject of controversy. The coffee literature describes coffee cycles of 
eight, ten, twenty or more years, invariably attaching 'cobweb' explanations 
to them. There are too many postulated cycles to fit just one description. 
The lack of precise descriptions of the fluctuations in coffee production and 
prices presents a great obstacle to effective stabilization policies. 
The purpose of this research is to study the behavioral characteristics 
of the long and intermediate cyclic movements generated by the world coffee 
system. In particular, this study establishes conditions under which 
stability could be attained. 
This thesis presents evidence that the behavior of the world coffee 
economy displays three different types of cyclic movement: 
(1) A long cycle of around thirty two years in duration, intertwined with a 
sequence of harmonic cycles of shorter period, about sixteen, eight and 
four respectively. These cycles originate in the Coffee Production Sector. 
This sector contains a long chain of time delays whose effect is to shape the 
major cycle of 32 years. The research shows that the abandonment of older 
trees when prices fall, causes the existence of a lagged harmonic of 
sixteen years; in turn, the tendency of the farmers to upgrade their 
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cultivation procedures w h e n prices are high, causes the appearance of other 
harmonic of eight years. 
(2) A n intermediate range cycle of around six years in duration. This cycle 
originates in the Coffee T r a d e Sector. 
(3) T w o short-term m o v e m e n t s ; one of about two years, i.e. the biological cycle 
of the coffee tree; the other with a period of m o r e than three years in duration. 
T h e three year cycle appears to produce far m o r e influence on behavior than 
the two year cycle. This research does not study the nature of these two 
shor1>-term m o v e m e n t s . 
T h e 32 year composite price w a v e exhibits unstable performance. This 
research s h o w s that the long delays contained in the coffee production sector, 
together with a tendency of the system to accumulate obsolete capacity and a 
poorly conceived supply policy are m a j o r causes of the unstable performance of 
world coffee prices, output and stocks. This thesis presents evidence that a 
supply policy based on exportable production plus or less whatever is required 
to maintain a target level of stocks is a counter stabilization policy. 
T h e research s h o w s that the implementation of International Coffee 
A g r e e m e n t s to enforce a system of export quotas does not stabilize the long run 
performance of coffee prices and output. Similarly, the establishment of an 
International Buffer Stock to control world prices does not render the intended 
price stabilization. 
T h e research suggests, on the other hand, a m a j o r change in the supply 
policy of the producer nations to generate stable price patterns. T h e n e w policy 
3 
requires a departure of the traditionally entrenched mechanisms which establish 
the amount supplied at the market place. Thus, the quantity supplied should 
depend on the annual consumption rate (at the end consumer level) not on annual 
exportable production; secondly, producers should use a very slow stock adjust­
ing mechanism to achieve their inventory target. 
The six year coffee cycle is caused by a too rapid inventory adjustment 
policy at the trade and distribution sectors. Preliminary research on the behavior 
of both hedgers and speculators in the coffee future market indicates that this 
market is a major cause of the unstability exhibited by this type of movement. 
Nevertheless, the operation of a future market brings benefits to traders and 
users of the commodity. A hedger who routinely maintains a short position is 
able to operate his business with lower inventory investment than the user who 
does not trade futures in the market. 
Figure I-1 presents a summary of the feedback dynamics model constructed 
in this research to simulate the world coffee economy. 
Figure I-1. Summary of World Coffee Model. 
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CHAPTER II 
DESCRIPTION OF THE WORLD COFFEE ECONOMY 
The first part of this chapter describes the behavior and main character­
istics of the world coffee economy. The last two sections briefly summarize 
the policies most frequently used by producers in their efforts to stabilize world 
prices. 
A. World Coffee Dynamics: Cycles and Oversupply 
The world coffee market exhibits unstable performance. World prices 
and output show long cyclic behavior and wide short-term fluctuations (Figures 
II-1 and II-2). The pattern of prices displays a complex wave of varying period 
and amplitude; the stronger peaks, however, seem to repeat at intervals of 
twenty or thirty years. During a period of rising prices, productive capacity 
expands and output tends to increase. Several years later stocks rise, reach a 
maximum and prices fall. Despite the reduced coffee income to individual growers, 
planted capacity is not rapidly corrected to meet consumer needs; it takes about 
ten years of low prices to reduce the growth in production, a period during which 
inventories are built up as much as the equivalent of a year of world usage. 
When prices fall, farmers reduce planting rates, abandon a portion of the 
trees or uproot a fraction of the older, low yield plants. Output then tends to fall. 
Furthermore, the large producers, acting independently or jointly, restrain 
Figures II-1, II-2. Behavior of the World Coffee Economy. 
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exports and destroy large quantities of stocks, much of which is of poor quality 
after four years of storage. The reduction in output and the destruction of stocks 
tends to deplete inventories. Stocks and prices move oppositely, in general 
(Figure II-1). 
Stocks of green coffee tend to rise fast, reach a plateau, and then fall at 
a lower rate. Therefore total world output tends to be more sensitive to a rise 
than to a fall in prices. The time to build maximal stocks lasts about eight or 
ten years, a period longer than the five years the coffee tree requires to mature 
and produce. Thus when prices fall and planting rates decay, the removal of 
obsolete capacity is not accomplished in the same proportion, and the stock of 
trees may continue to grow. hi fact, output tends to peak about eight years later 
than prices, generally when prices have already reached low values. 
Consumption of green coffee does not grow at the same rate as exportable 
production and does not exhibit such severe oscillations. Demand for coffee is 
unresponsive to world prices except at extremely low or high price levels. Coffee 
consumption is more sensitive to population growth, availability of substitute 
drinks and consumer tastes than to price movements. 
Most authors regard the long years required to adjust productive capacity 
to consumer needs together with the low sensitivity of output to price changes as 
the major cause of the unstable performance of the world coffee industry. If 
the world coffee market were competitive enough with a large number of producers 
and buyers, if producers were free enough to enter and leave the market as they 
please with no government intervention, and if accumulation of inventories were 
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to play no role in establishing price, then the cyclical unstability of coffee could 
be explained as the direct interplay of supply and demand, as hypothesized by the 
cobweb model. Unfortunately, few if any of the cobweb assumptions hold for the 
coffee industry [43] , and an explanation of the unstable performance of the coffee 
industry requires the development of a more complete model. To construct such 
a model is the main object of this research. 
B. Brief Description of the Characteristics of Coffee Production 
1. Productive Cycle of the Coffee Tree 
The coffee plant requires from four to six years to mature and transform 
into a productive tree. Thereafter, the yield of the tree increases rapidly until 
the tree is about ten years old, stays at a maximum for several years and then 
gradually declines. By the time the tree is forty years old, its annual yield is 
roughly one third of its maximum annual yield. It is not unusual to find trees 
one hundred years old still producing but their yield is very low. 
Figure II 3 shows a yield pa, ttern frequently found in certain regions of 
Brazil [l] and in general typical of world coffee production. Although the yield 
of the coffee tree is primarily determined by the age of the tree, several other 
factors affect the pattern shown in the figure. First, the tree is subject to a 
biological cycle that causes alternating years of high and low yield. Second, 
the different types of seeds produce different age-specific yield patterns ^ 
^There are three main types of coffee seeds: Milds, produced in Columbia 
and Central America; Arabics, produced in Brazil; and Robustas, produced 
in Africa. In turn, there are several varieties within each one of these groups 
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Third, the returns per hectare depend upon the type of soil and fertilizer used. 
This is particularly true in the case of the older plants. Fourth, trees with 
adequate shading and proper cultivation procedures tend to produce higher annual 
yields. Finally, recurrent but unpredictable frost and droughts have a strong 
impact on production levels. 
All of these factors, amont others, affect the yield pattern of coffee. 
Nevertheless, the pattern exhibited in Figure II-3 appears to be, on the average, 
a proper description of the productive life cycle of the coffee tree. 
2. Technological Innovations, Obsolescence and Abandonment of Coffee Trees 
Technological innovations tend to shorten the delay required to reach 
maximum productivity and to increase the yield generally. As these innovations 
are implemented and new trees are planted, the oldest trees rapidly become a 
burden as their cost per yield becomes several times higher than the cost per 
yield of the new trees. Low yield trees are obsoleted capacity; when prices are 
low, a fraction of them should be removed if the farmer wants to maximize his 
profit. 
In the coffee industry, obsolete capacity is not rapidly removed. The cost 
of uprooting a tree is generally very high, as well as the cost of capital and 
fertilizer required to prepare the land for one of the alternative crops the farmer 
could produce instead. Also, frequent year-to-year wide fluctuations in both 
output and prices act as a deterrent to uproot excess capacity, which the farmer 
keeps on the assumption that it provides a safety stock of trees from which addi­
tional output could be obtained, in case prices reach high levels, hi several 
10 
Yield Bags/Tree/Year 
Age of the Tree 
Figure II-3. Productive Cycle. 
areas of the world where coffee is harvested in small family plots, coffee land 
is shared with other crops which account for almost 30% of the farmer's income. 
This farmer cannot use his family labor to uproot trees because he needs that 
labor to harvest the remaining trees and the other crops. During a period of 
depressed prices farmers have tended to abandon obsolete capacity rather than 
remove low yield trees. In Brazil, for instance, abandonment rates have been 
11 
as high as 50% of the total capacity during some years. 
The accumulation of obsolete capacity in the world coffee industry is one 
of the reasons which explains why under a period with declining prices a rapid 
contraction of capacity and output is rarely achieved. 
3. Government Interventions 
Government interventions in the coffee industry are also responsible for 
the accumulation of excess and obsolete capacity. The fact that nearly 50% of 
the countries' foreign incomes comes from coffee exports is one of the reasons 
that m o t i v a t e s g o v e r n m e n t s t o maintain and enlarge coffee plantations. 
As it is shown in Figure II-4, the cost and demand for imported manu­
factured capital goods (required to achieve sustained economic growth in the 
producing nations) have been rising at a much faster rate than the price and 
usage of coffee. While the price of an imported truck in 1960 was equivalent to 
60 bags of green coffee (1 bag = 132 lb), by 1969 the equivalent price for almost 
the same truck was 90 bags, an increase of 50%. Other products have shown a 
larger price increase. A tractor costing 165 bags in 1960 cost 316 bags by 1969 
and much more during the 1970s, an increase of more than 100%. Over the 
same period of time foreign coffee income remained constant at around the two 
billion dollar annually [13, p. 146]. 
A natural reaction to the above situation has been to enlarge the coffee 
plantations, to upgrade the yields per tree and to increase output to fund a large 
portion of the producer's industrial growth. It is understandable, then, that 
governments create special incentives to regulate the productive capacity of the 
/ Spread Between U. S. Export Value and Coffee Import Value 1957-1959=: 100 
120 • • -• - • . - . 
1900 59 60 CI 62 63 64 65 6C 67 63 69 
The unit v.-iluc index lor U. S i.-xporls rose 16.4 per cent from 1960 to 1969. !n the same period, the annual codec 
import price inde*. dropped by 2.6 per cent. U S Ccaanmcni 0 ! Conrrcrcr 
Figure II-4. Spread Between U. S. Export Value and Coffee Import Value. 
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farmer and at the same time fail to provide incentives for upgrading or reclamation. 
4. Coffee: A Labor Intensive Crop 
Coffee growing requires extensive use of human labor. It is also relatively 
easy to cultivate and can be harvested with lower operating costs than most other 
alternative crops. Since substitutive crops to provide foreign earnings normally 
require higher capital investments and use less labor per hectare, export diver­
sification programs turn out to be difficult and costly to implement. Labor is 
the major obstacle, as governments will have to find ways to use the displaced 
labor. Consequently, while entry into coffee activity during periods of high 
prices is attractive, switching to other activities under adverse price periods is 
very difficult. Therefore, capacity in the coffee industry tends to accumulate 
when prices rise, but can not be reduced in the same proportion when prices fall. 
C. Early Stabilization Efforts 
1. Valorization and Liquidation Policies 
Attempts to control world coffee prices have existed at least since 1907 
when Brazil, with 80% of the total world output, established the so-called valori­
zation scheme. This was a scheme to regulate the flow of coffee to the market 
at one preestablished rate estimated to stabilize the price at a desired level. 
During periods of abundant crops, a substantial portion of the output was kept 
off the market to maintain a nationally-owned buffer stock from which experts 
were to be released when there was a short crop. 
The above strategy implied, of course, increasing government controls 
of the country's distribution channels, and Brazil financed the construction of 
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several warehouses and offered price incentives and cash credits to farmers who 
sold their product to the government. The effects of the valorization policy on 
price stability are not clear. Rowe[24, p. 124-129] indicated that the price 
increase over the period was more the result of a genuine tendency for supplies 
at the source to fall short of an increasing demand than due to the valorization 
program itself. 
Valorization operated until 1930, when the economic crisis of that year 
and the low demand broke the effective control of the coffee regulatory scheme. 
During this and the following years, the total world coffee output was unusually 
high and stocks continued to increase. Brazil could neither finance the additional 
storage required nor buy enough coffee to maintain the price, with the result that 
prices fell from 24£ at the end of 1929 to only 9^ per pound during 1931. These 
developments marked the end of the valorization scheme. 
The depressed world economy during the thirties excluded the possibility 
of reestablishing the valorization program. In 1932 Brazil initiated a liquidation 
policy to remove most of its obsolete capacity. This program offered limited 
benefit due to the lack of funds to finance a rapid and substantial capacity reduc­
tion, and also due to the long years which it would take to see an effective 
reduction in output. 
2. Post-World-War-II Stabilization Efforts: The International Coffee 
Agreements (ICAs) 
Although the liquidation program has helped to initiate a curbing for the 
increasing output, the world economic recovery created a period of abnormally 
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increasing output, the world economic recovery created a period of abnormally 
high demand for coffee. World stocks were rapidly depleted and prices quoted 
at high levels, near 55£ a pound by the end of 1949. The price recovery brought 
an end to the Brazilian efforts to reduce capacity and stimulated new planting 
in several other areas, mostly in Africa. Although prices continued to increase 
up to 90£ a pound in 1954 (due also to a severe frost in Brazil), the excess 
capacity accumulated during the fifties later caused a fall in prices. By 1958 
prices had already been reduced to less than 50£ a pound. 
These developments created conditions to establish joint regulatory 
agreements among Brazil, Colombia and other Latin American countries. These 
countries met at Mexico City in 1957, and implemented a policy of export quotas 
and stock retention; Brazil and Colombia were responsible for most of the program. 
In 1959 France, Portugal, Britain and Belgium (on behalf of their African colonies) 
promised to cut exports in accordance with the Mexico agreement. 
Despite these efforts the general price level continued to deteriorate. 
By 1962 prices had dropped to 32£ a pound, while little or nothing was done to 
reduce obsolete capacity. This was the situation when the United Nations Coffee 
Conference met in July 1962 with the assistance of 36 exporting countries and 22 
consuming nations, including the United States. These nations signed a new 
International Coffee Agreement (ICA) for a period of five years, after which 
period a new conference would be called. 
Rowe [24, p. 187] has briefly summarized the main aims of the agreement 
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in the following way: 
1. To ensure by a comprehensive and centralized control of exports, 
backed up by supervision and regulation of imports, that the gene­
ral level of coffee prices does not decline below the level of 1962, 
and that real export earnings should progressively increase. 
2. To promote the consumption of coffee (importing members to have 
no financial obligations), and to work for the removal of obstacles 
to consumption (e.g. import tariffs, quotas etc.). 
3. To adjust production to demand within the lifetime of the agreement. 
4. To establish a policy 'relative to' stocks, which producing members 
'shall endeavor by all means within their power to implement'. . . . 
See also Geer [ 13, p. 190-310]. 
To achieve these goals, the agreement established a quota mechanism 
to regulate the members' exports and effectively limited the exports from non-
member nations by providing for certificates of origin to be honored by consuming 
members. 
Six years later, during 1968, the same countries met again to sign and 
review the 1962 agreement. Fundamental aspects were essentially preserved, 
but the new regulations established a mechanism to maintain selective margins 
2) 
among the different types of coffee. This new agreement was in operation 
until September of 1973. At that time, producers and consumer nations failed 
to reach a compromise on the price policy of the International Coffee Agreement. 
Hence, producers formed separate groups and the larger producers adopted a 
new scheme to withhold coffee from the world market. By November of 1975 
2) . 
Geer [13, Chapter IV].claimed that enforcement of selective margins has a 
positive effect on short-term price stability. 
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a new 6-year agreement was signed, similar to the previous ones, with the par­
ticipation of most of the producer nations and the backing of the United States. 
D. The ICAs and the Stability of World Coffee Prices 
The effectiveness of the ICAs is a subject of current controversy in the 
world coffee market. Many authors regard the system of export quotas and 
the companion price regulations as an effective way to reduce short-term 
price fluctuations [24] , [25], [13]. Other authors claim that the operation of 
ICAs has maintained artificial prices above the price level which would result 
had prices been allowed to float free in the market [24], [28]. This thesis 
presents evidence that a system of export quotas conditioned to world price 
developments does not stabilize the long run cycles exhibited by the World 
Coffee Market. (See Chapter IX on World Coffee Policy.) The research 
postulates that the International Coffee Agreement per se, is a consequence 
of a coffee cycle of about six years, a cycle originated by the Trade and 
Distribution sector of the World Coffee System (See Chapter VI). Furthermore, 
the fact that ICAs tend to be signed by producers when prices fall, and tend to 
gain consumers' support five or six years later when prices rise, provides a 
good reason to explain the recurrent signature of ICAs at intervals of about 
five or six years. 
Similarly, this thesis shows that the World Coffee system has the ten-
3 
dency to accumulate excess (obsolete) capacity every 32 years. Systems of 
3 / 1 In fact, Chapters IV and V describe a major cycle of about 32 years, inter­
twined with minor cycles of about 16 and 8 years respectively. All of these 
cycles originate in the World Coffee Production Sector of the model used in 
this research. 
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export quotas like those in the ICAs do not have the proper mechanisms to control 
and reduce the accumulated coffee acreage. Even if these types of controls had 
been functioning over a substantial period of years, the world coffee market 
would have exhibited its characteristic long-run unstable performance. This 




This research studies the world coffee economy within the context of 
feedback dynamics (Forrester [57] ), an area of control theory specifically 
designed to study large-scale dynamical systems. The chapter contains three 
major sections. The first one reviews two studies on the dynamics of commodity 
behavior; the second section explains the reasons to build a dynamic model of 
the world coffee economy, and the third briefly describes the methodological 
process followed in this research. 
A. Previous Research on Commodity Feedback Dynamics 
Two major studies on agricultural commodity behavior have previously 
used Feedback Dynamics concepts. One, "The Dynamics of the World Cocoa 
Market" by F. H. Weymar presents a conceptual feedback structure to describe 
the operation of the distribution and trade sectors of the cocoa industry, and then 
applies several econometric procedures to develop certain relations between in­
ventory performance and price. The other study, "The Dynamic Commodity 
Cycle Model (DCCM)' by D. C. Meadows describes a generic model for the per­
formance of producers and consumers within a competitive market. The DCCM 
has been generally accepted as a more complete and basic model than the well-
known cobweb model. This section shortly reviews these two important pieces 
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of commodity research. 
Weymar [45] has extended previous developments by Working [46] , 
Cootner [38] , Brennan [36], and others, on commodity price theory, and has 
presented evidence that both short- and medium-term price movements are 
related to changes in inventories. Weymar's model represents behavior as 
generated by the interplay of several feedback structures that link inventories, 
stocks and expected prices with current price formation, production and con­
sumption (Figure III-l), and purports to explain both short- and intermediate-
term behavior. The model does not include Weymar's model feedback structures 
in the production of cocoa. 
Weymar transforms the postulated feedback loops into a set of first order 
difference equations; then after casting the model as linear in parameters he 
applied well-known statistical procedures to estimate the values of the parameters 
involved and runs simulation studies on several properties of the behavior of the 
cocoa system under exogenous disturbances, such as response to a high frequency 
noisy pattern on consumption and the effect of a crop failure [45, p. 136] . 
Weymar has noted that while the static framework of classical microeco-
nomic theory may provide rather adequate explanation to the long run behavior 
of some particular commodities, it does not serve as a basis to explain shorter 
price movements. He has indicated that direct application of the assumptions 
made by microeconomic theory, when coupled with the high short-term price 
^Meadows' DC CM was originally tested on the hog and poultry industries 
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Figure III-1. Weymar's Model. 
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inelasticity of both supply and demand, does not drive the system toward a short-
term price equilibrium. In this case, the schedules reflecting supply and demand 
are in theory parallel, which means that the short-term equilibrium price is 
either nonexistent or indeterminate. Furthermore, as the underlying assumptions 
of microeconomic theory overlook most intertemporal relations, the traditional 
cobweb model is not a good representation of the mechanics of price behavior. 
In particular, the cobweb model assumes instantaneous production rates and 
excludes the influence of expectations about the future on the current price 
formation. Also, the same model implies that all supply at any point in time is 
either consumed or wasted, and gives no consideration of the role played by 
stocks. 
Weymar presents evidence that price expectations, price past performance 
and inventories are key elements to explain intermediate price movements. These 
concepts are related through the theory of supply of storage. This theory, grossly 
stated, postulates that an expected rise in prices induces traders to carry larger 
quantities of inventory. From this, Weymar concludes that the current price 
level of a commodity is a function of both a long-run equilibrium expected price 
and the expected future behavior of inventories. This development is central to 
Weymar's Commodity Price Theory [45, p. 28]. 
Meadows' Dynamical Commodity Cycle Model (DCCM) [43] is a generic 
dynamic model to explain long-range commodity behavior. Meadows [43, p. 11] 
shows how direct application of the cobweb model leads to several misconceptions. 
First the cobweb model concludes that the period of commodity cycles is twice 
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the length of the production delay, a result whose effect is to underestimate the 
actual period exhibited by most commodities. Second, the behavior generated 
by the model consists of similar oscillations for prices and output, except that 
they are reversed in phase, and the amplitude of the cycles is a function of the 
price elasticities of supply and demand; inventories do not play any role in 
determining the price pattern (a defect also indicated by Weymar). Third, the 
classical cobweb model is unable to generate monotonic growth or decay. This 
is particularly unfortunate, as a commodity may exhibit such behavior during 
certain periods (i.e. coffee at the beginning of its commercialization during the 
2) 
IIXX century and natural rubber during the last fifty years). 
DCCM consists of a simple structure containing two coupled negative-
feedback loops, one to control production, the other to control consumption. 
Each one of these loops acts to adjust inventory coverage (months of supply) to 
a desired level. When the current coverage is larger than the target value, the 
abundant supply causes a fall in prices. In turn, the excess supply forces pro­
ducers to reduce current capacity and output. On the other hand, as prices fall, 
consumers tend to augment the usage of the commodity, an action that tends to 
rise again; as prices rise producers will tend to increase capacity and output 
(Figure III-2). The above adjustments in both, prices and stocks do not occur 
instantaneously; in fact, DCCM involves several delays between action and 
response, a timing of events which shape behavior. In particular, DCCM 
The DCCM is unable to generate self-sustaining growth or decay when it is 
stimulated by a bounded input. 
2) 
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Figure III-2. Meadows'DCCM. 
considers several delays which are not clearly handled by the cobweb model, 
and whose omission is one of the causes that makes this model underestimate 
the period of the cycle exhibited by most commodities [43, p. 20] , 
At the structural level, Meadows' model presents several innovations 
to explain long-run behavior. First, the rate at which capacity is allocated to 
produce the commodity is not only a function of the expected future price for the 
product, but also, of the expected price of alternative products. Meadows tested 
DCCM on the hog industry suggesting that the desired breeding stock (capacity) 
depends on the ratio between the expected price of hog and the expected price of 
corn (corn is an alternative product when the hog industry is depressed) [43, p. 24] , 
Second, Meadows' model assumes with minor modifications the inventory-price 
theory proposed by Weymar, and explicitly assumes price as dependent on cur­
rent inventory coverage, so that higher levels of coverage lead to lower prices 
and vice versa. Third, the DCCM assumes that capital can be used at low or high 
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levels of efficiency, depending upon price trends. These facts, among others, 
make the DCCM far more usable and realistic than previous cobweb models. 
Further, and more importantly, DCCM describes qualitatively and in equation 
form the postulated mechanisms underlying the commodity system structure, 
which allows for direct policy design and testing of results. The cobweb model, 
on the other hand, is a descriptive model with limited normative capability. 
B. Reasons to Build a Dynamic Model 
of the World Coffee System 
DCCM has been partially validated on the hog, cattle and poultry industries, 
3) 
all domestically traded U. S. commodities. This research presents evidence 
that DCCM requires extensive redesign and increased complexity when applied to 
coffee, an internationally traded commodity. 
The world coffee economy contains several structures and relations which 
do not have an equivalent counterpart in the Dynamic Cycle Commodity Model. 
First, world coffee prices reflect not only the level of stocks and its rate of 
change, but also the domestic policies followed by each one of the producer 
nations. Second, Meadows' DCCM model was built on the assumption of perfect 
competition. Thus, current stocks are always marketable stocks at the current 
price; this is not true for coffee, a commodity in which the larger producers 
are able to retain inventories and reduce current supplies to the market with the 
purpose of supporting prices. Third, obsolescence and abandonment of coffee 
1 Wright's thesis on Validation of Dynamic Models [58]. 
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trees play an important causal role in coffee price behavior, as described in 
Chapter V of this research. DCCM does not consider directly the problem of 
obsolete capacity. Fourth, coffee is a labor intensive crop; when prices rise 
and the income to the farmers is high, additional labor is attracted to coffee 
zones. The increase in labor supply facilitates the expansion of coffee acreage. 
These considerations and several others suggest the need to redesign Meadows' 
DCCM and build a more complete model for the coffee industry. 
The World Coffee Model proposed in this thesis is able to replicate both 
long-run cyclic behavior and intermediate movements. Weymar's dynamic model 
for the world cocoa business replicates intermediate-range cyclic behavior. 
Although Weymar has expanded the theory of Supply of Storage to capture certain 
effects provided by the cocoa future market [45, p. 3 9 ] , the structural feedback 
loops of his model do not include feedback loops arising from interplay of hedgers 
and speculators (Figure III-l). The World Coffee Model postulated here extends 
Weymar's model and specifically describes structures to describe the functioning 
of the future coffee market. As shown in Chapter VI of this research, the behavior 
of traders in the future market (the "commodity exchange") has an effect on the 
intermediate-range coffee cycles of about six years of duration. 
C. Methodology to Study the Behavior 
of the World Coffee System 
The purpose of this research is to study the behavioral characteristics 
of the long-and intermediate-cyclic movements generated by the World Coffee 
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System. In particular, this study intends to establish the conditions under which 
stability could be attained. 
Behavior in a dynamical system results from the interaction between 
exogenous inputs and system structure [57], [58]. This research takes the view 
that system structure is composed of coupled information feedback loops. An 
information feedback loop is a closed chain of causes and effects, each of which 
is decoupled from the others in time, so that any effect appears later than its 
cause (Forrester [57, p. 6 1 ] ) . 
Control theory is the area of knowledge that studies information feedback 
structures. Traditionally, mathematical control theory has been successfully 
used in studying the behavior of man-made systems, most of which are, by 
design, linear, stable and time invariant. Only a few cases of nonlinear systems 
can be cast within the classical procedures offered by this theory. Feedback 
Dynamics [ 5 7 ] , on the other hand, is an area of control theory specifically 
created to analyze the more complex, time-variant and non-linear socio-economic 
systems. 
The methodology of Feedback Dynamics has been described by Forrester 
[57] as follows: 
1. Identify a problem 
2. Isolate the factors that appear to interact to create the observed 
symptoms 
3. Trace the cause-and-effect informations-feedback loops that link 
decisions to action to resulting information changes and to new 
decisions 
4. Formulate acceptable formal decision policies that describe how 
decisions result from the available information streams 
5. Construct a mathematical model of the decision policies, infor­
mation sources, and interactions of the system components 
2 8 
6. Generate the behavior through time of the system as described 
by the model (usually with a digital computer to execute the 
lengthy calculations) 
7. Compare results against all pertinent available knowledge about 
the actual system 
8 . Revise the model until it is acceptable as a representation of the 
actual system 
9. Redesign, within the model, the organizational relationships and 
policies which can be altered in the actual system to find the 
changes which improve system behavior 
10. Alter the real system in the directions that model experimentation 
has shown will lead to improved performance 
The above methodological process can be grouped into three main steps. 
1) Descriptive phase. The descriptive or model-building phase consists of 
postulating a set of information feedback loops to explain the behavior of 
the system. Then the feedback loops are translated into a dynamic mathe-
4) 
matical model. 
2 ) Behavior reproduction phase. This involves the simulation throughout time 
of the postulated model, a process which is accomplished on a large scale 
computer. A condition to postulate a model as a possible representation of 
the real system requires that the model be able to replicate its relevant 
behavioral characteristics. Behavioral characteristics refer here to type 
of cyclic movements, period and amplitude of the wave(s), phase between 
related variables, and stability. 
3) Prescriptive phase. This step involves the design of alternative corrective 
policies to improve the system performance. This usually involves either 
the addition to or omission from the model of information feedback loops. 
The mathematical counterpart of a feedback loop is a set of first-order 
difference equations (Wright [58]). 
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The process of building a model, simulating behavior and improving per-
formance is a feedback structure in itself (Figure III-3). Initially, the behavior 
of the real system is analyzed, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative 
analysis involves the construction of a verbal description of the system's per­
formance. A set of feedback loops is then built to describe the formation of the 
behavioral patterns observed. These loops represent a hypothesis to be tested. 
The statements in each loop are translated into mathematical equations and a 
simulated time trajectory is calculated. Then the trajectory is compared with 
the real system performance to discover defects in postulated feedback loops, 
in the mathematical model, or in the methodology used to analyze the system's 
behavior. 
Validation is the process of assessing, at each iteration, how credible 
the postulated model is with respect to the actual system. It encompasses seve­
ral steps, each of which occurs inside the methodological feedback process pre­
sented in Figure III-3 [58, p. 53] . The first step is to assess the credibility of 
the results obtained from the analysis of the data (Loop V- l , Figure III-3). The 
second step is to construct feedback loops which best describe the generation of 
the analyzed behavior (Loop V-2 , Figure III-3). Third is the verification that 
each one of the proposed equations in the mathematical model reflects what it 
is described by the feedback loops (Loop V3, Fig. Ill-3). The final step consists 
of assessing how well the simulated behavior compares with the observed be­
havior and to what extent additional feedback iterations should be followed so 
that the behavior rendered by the model exhibits the basic characteristics 
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Figure HI-3. Methodological Feedback Process. 
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observed in the performance of the real system. The research reported here is 
the result of repeating the above feedback process over a period of two years. 
This thesis presents a useful device to build a feedback structure. It con­
sists of breaking the cyclic patterns of behavior exhibited by the system into their 
basic cyclic movements, via a Fourier type of analysis, i . e . , spectral analysis; 
each one of these basic movements appears as a combination of a fundamental 
cycle and several harmonic cycles of shorter duration. The modeler's task is 
to build separate feedback loops whose function replicates each one of the funda­
mental movements and each one of the harmonics. This process insures to a 
large extent, that the postulated model contains feedback structures whose opera­
tion causes a composite cyclic behavior close enough (in shape) to the observed 
pattern. 
In particular, Chapter IV, of this thesis, decomposes the cyclic per­
formance exhibited by the world coffee industry into its basic cyclic movements 
and harmonics. In turn, Chapters V and VI postulate specific feedback structures 
whose operation causes the appearance of each basic movement and several of 
the harmonics. Chapter VII presents the overall model behavior and Chapter VIII 
compares the simulated performance of the model postulated in this research with 
the actual behavior of the coffee system. 
A convenient way to simulate the behavior produced by a model is to 
disturb the system when all variables are at rest, i .e. steady state condition. 
The exogenous disturbance is called the input to the system. In the dynamic 
coffee model postulated in this study world coffee consumption per year is an 
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input to the model. In other words, internally generated changes in the model 
variables do not affect consumption of coffee. 
An input can take several forms; it could be exponential with growth, 
or an instantaneous impulse or the frequently used step function. The use of 
a step input to disturb a dynamic model generally permits one to visualize with 
more clarity the behavior generated by the system (Forrester, [57, p. 38] ). 
In particular, the step input is a useful device to analyze the stability of the 
5) 
system. The exponential input, on the other hand, has the benefit of testing 
the range of operations of the model variables, and allows direct comparison 
of the actual performance of the coffee industry with the model behavior. The 
dynamic coffee model postulated in this research has been tested with these two 
types of inputs. The model has been initialized at steady state, with variables 
roughly resembling the conditions of the world coffee economy at the turn of the 
previous century. 
Standard texts in control theory define a system as stable if a bounded input 
produces bounded behavior. 
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CHAPTER P7 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD COFFEE 
CYCLIC MOVEMENTS 
The violent fluctuations of world coffee prices and income represents a 
problem of great concern to coffee farmers, traders and governments. This 
chapter presents evidence that the fluctuations displayed by the coffee economy 
can be described as a combination of several cyclic movements with periods 
ranging from 2 to 32 years, and also that the long-term oscillations are wider 
than the high frequency or short-term cycles. 
A. Observed Cycles 
Visual inspection of the pattern of the last two centuries of coffee prices 
and output shows a marked unstability and suggests the possibility of cyclic move­
ments of varying period and amplitude. The behavior exhibited in Figures IV-1 
and IV-2 may reveal to the reader a major movement with duration of some 20, 
30, or 40 years, intertwined with a group of minor movements whose period 
could be as low as 2 years, or as high as 7, 8, or 10 years. Clearly a visual 
inspection of the world coffee patterns, with no consideration of the role played 
by harmonic movements, does not constitute a sufficient basis for informed 
statements about this complex cyclic behavior. Many observers have been mis­
led into misinterpretations and incorrect conclusions. The following remarks, 
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Figure IV-1, F7-2. World Coffee Behavior. 
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taken from several scholars and coffee policy administrators, provide the reader 
with background to appreciate the lack of agreement in this matter. 
. . . Decade after decade was marked by overproduction and under­
production, with a wavering balance maintained during a few inter­
mediate years. 
The cycle runs full course about every seven years. . . . 
A. Uribe, Brown Gold, p. 134, 1954. 
Dr. Uribe has been a coffee farmer and has held a long association with the 
Federacion Nacional de Cafeteros in Colombia. 
. . . Fluctuations of the world coffee crop are due mainly to: (i) 
damage to the coffee trees by the weather; (ii) the coffee tree tw>-
year cycle; (iii) faulty techniques of coffee production; (iv) the 
coffee-tree productive cycle; (v) the socio-economic conditions 
of coffee culture; and (vi) the structure of production costs. 
Equilibrium has been the exception rather than the rule of 
the world coffee economy. Between 1790 and 1956̂  a span of 166 
years, overproduction prevailed in six periods adding to 53 years, 
and underproduction in five totaling 36 years. 
J. Ruiz-Lara, Fluctuations of World 
Coffee Prices: An Economic Analysis. 
Ph.D. thesis, Graduate College of the 
University of Illinois, Urbana, p. 2, 1961. 
Dr. Ruiz was head of Planeacioh Nacional, planning agency of the Colombian 
government from 1966 to 1970. 
. . . (the coffee cycle) represents a long-term cobweb cycle, covering 
sometimes a span of two decades. Intertwined with this long cycle 
are purely short-run fluctuations, which are another source of 
disturbance. 
U.N., The Problem of Stabilization of Prices 
of Primary Products, p. 21, 1969. 
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. . . A further form of research has been to establish the coffee price 
movements since 1950 as a price cycle that revealed the typical feature 
of a cobweb cycle with a time lag of some six to eight years. 
T. Geer, An Oligopoly: The World Coffee 
Economy, p. 43, 1971. 
. . . The variation of production with time suggests a two-year cycle. Never­
theless, statistical analysis of the time series shows that the cycle is only 
an apparent one and that production behaves randomly. On the other hand 
the analysis does leave open the possibility of a twelve-year cycle for 
Brazilian production... 
Perpectivas del Cafe* a Corto Plazo, anony­
mous article published in Coyuntura Econo-
mica, Bogotd, 1972. Translation by 
Donovan Young. 
. . . there is the tendency for periods of generally high prices to alter­
nate with ones of generally low prices, a complete cycle lasting about 
20 years. . . .Whether such movements can be described as a true cycle, 
endogenous to the coffee production-consumption system, is not the 
subject of this paper, although it is indeed an interesting question. All 
that needs to be noted is that in the past, major movements have tended 
to repeat themselves at time intervals within the range of 13 to 40 years. 
A. H. Gelb, Coffee Prices and the Brazilian 
Exchange Rate, Oxford Economic Review, 
1971. 
. . .On the basis of the observations, consequently, there are reasons to 
believe the existence of an oscillatory behavior of the series of coffee 
prices in the period 1856-57 to 1904-05. . . . 
The preliminary analysis of the series of coffee prices during the 
past century shows that the behavior of the coffee market was 
altered after 1900. In the second half of the past century, there 
are some cycles, which will be explained subsequently, with an 
expanding phase of six or seven years and declining phases of 
longer duration. Since the beginning of this century, however, 
this behavior is more hidden. . . . 
A. Delfim Netto, paper published in "Essays 
on Coffee and Economic Development," 
Instituto Brasileiro do Cafe, Rio de Janeiro, 
1973. 
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• Dclfim Netto was Minister of Finance of Brazil from 1967 to 1974. 
The above quotations speak for themselves. The lack of a precise state­
ment about the number, duration in years, and relevance of each one of the cycles 
involved in the coffee industry, together with varied explanations to describe how 
each one of those cycles is generated, presents a great obstacle to formulation 
of effective stabilization policies. Furthermore, the almost invariant attachment 
of 'cobweb type' explanations to these cycles"^ compounds to create even more 
confusion as there are too many cycles to fit just one description of the model 
causing their appearance. 
On the other hand, the above quotations, when jointly considered, des­
cribe cycles of roughly 20, 14, 8 and 2 years. These are cycles which the 
authors have observed on the basis of statistical analysis of data, collected dur­
ing different periods, or perhaps more importantly from the author's own 
expertise and continuous contact with the coffee industry. One can hardly dismiss 
or neglect what these authors have postulated. Therefore, a more promising line 
of thought can be established by assuming that the world coffee patterns contain, 
tentatively, the full sequence of cycles claimed by the sources, and then proceed 
to explore the correctness and nature of each cycle. 
B. Procedure to Establish Cyclic Behavior 
Several techniques C Q I be used to estimate cyclic movements in a time 
series. These procedures vary from the widely used moving average technique 
"^Coffee literature invariably presents the biological cycle of the coffee tree as 
having a duration of two years. 
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to more sophisticated statistical methods such as parametric modeling or spectral 
analysis. 
Moving average, although crude, is useful, especially when used as a com­
plement to more advanced procedures. A disadvantage is that it filters out high-
2) 
frequency cycles, giving an estimate for long-term but not short-term movements. 
Netto [21] has used classical non-parametric tests to search for trend and 
oscillations in the world coffee price series from 1850 to 1950. His analysis shows 
no reason to reject random price oscillations around a constant mean; the analysis 
3) 
rejected the presence of a secular trend. 
Our objectives in analyzing the behavioral patterns of the world coffee 
economy are: (i) to establish the existence of non-random cyclic behavior; 
(ii) to estimate the period of each basic cyclic movement ; and, (iii) to find the 
dominant cycles, and hence, differentiate among several possible fundamental 
4) 
movements and their harmonics of higher frequency. Using these objectives 
2) 
The moving average or equivalently the exponential smoothing are special types 
of linear filters. The use of filters in time series analysis to 'clean' the data 
is a subject of current disagreement in the field of statistics. One obvious 
disadvantage is that filters tend to add autocorrelation to the time series. See 
Granger and Hatanaka [52] . 
3) 
Netto used Kendall-Mann test to reject the hypothesis of secular trend, and 
Wallis and Hoone test to reject the hypothesis of cyclic behavior [ 2 1 , p. 43]. 
He found three cycles of 11, 1 6 , and 20 years during the last half of the XIX 
century, and cycles of six or seven years during the present century [21, p. 48]. 
4) 
A periodic time series can be decomposed into an infinite series of sines and/ 
or cosines by Fourier analysis, i.e. if f(t) = f̂ (c + T), T = period in years, 
then for t in years 
J oo 
' 2TTt V* ' . /2iTTt , "\ 
f(t) = A o + A l sin — + L A. sin(-^—f rf. ; . 
(continued on next page) 
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in the analysis of data insures that the model to be constructed includes feedback 
structures that generate the fundamental frequencies of the behavioral pattern. 
Power spectral analysis is the statistical technique best suited to achieve 
the proposed objectives. Basically, the spectral technique provides an estimation 
of the variance (power) of the time series at each frequency band. Thus, the pro­
cedure classifies movements by period and by relative importance in shaping the 
series. Furthermore, the spectral plot of a time series has well defined statisti­
cal properties, a fact which provides the capability to test hypothesis about cyclic 
5) 
characteristics. 
So far the techniques of spectral analysis have received little attention in 
econometric research on coffee. However, it is perhaps the best way of preventing 
confusion about the definition and relevance of trends, long-run cycles and short-
term movements in a behavioral pattern. To my knowledge, only Gelb [ibid] has 
previously used spectral analysis within the context of the coffee economy. He 
has studied the relatedness at several frequencies between the world price and the 
Brazilian exchange rate. Among several other things, Gelb found a high degree 
of relatedness between these two variables at periodicities of around 2 0 years, 
but no relevant association between the variables at higher frequencies. 
The next sections describe the time series used and the cyclic movements 
rendered by spectral analysis techniques. 
The argument of the second term is called the fundamental frequency while the 
other terms are higher frequency harmonics. Choice of the fundamental period 
T is arbitrary as long as T is as long as the longest real period. 
The reader not familiar with spectral analysis may find a brief summary of the 
procedure in Appendix C. 
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C. Data and Time Series Used 
Power spectral plots have been constructed for both the annual world coffee 
prices and output, over a long time span (1825-1973) to provide adequate spectral 
plots estimated with relatively small variance. Appendix D shows the sources of 
information used. 
The pattern of prices during the period appears in Figure IV-1. Prices 
fluctuate around the 12£/lb mark, up to 1946, the year after which prices exhibit 
a wide jump toward and around 45£/lb. ^ Since spectral theory presupposes 
stationary time series, i .e . , constant mean and variance, the series has been 
adjusted for mean and variance in order to obtain a transformed stationary series 
over the period 1825 to 1973. Power spectral plots have been developed for the 
following price series: 
a. Annual world prices (in $ of 1900), 1825 to 1976 
b. Annual world prices and series adjusted for mean and variance, 
1825 to 1973 
c. Quarterly adjusted prices, 1896 to 1973 
d. Relative world coffee price index, 1861 to 1973. 
Relative world coffee price index (Fig. IV-3 and IV-4) has been calculated by 
Worldwide commodity price inflation has been taken as the main cause of this 
increase in coffee prices. Forbes, March 1, 1975, in "Is Depression the Only 
Cure for Inflation" shows a chart exhibiting the estimated world consumer price 
index since the middle ages to modern times. The index is fairly stationary, 
except during two remarkable periods, when the index showed abnormal growth. 
The first of these occurred toward the second half of the XV Century when the 
index rose from 100 to 600; the second, right after 1945, when the index rose 
from 600 to 4000. 
F:. -. es IV-:." : f , I V - 4 . Price Indices. 
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dividing the raw coffee price at year t by the wholesale commodity U. S. price 
at year t + 1. This series provides a useful device to check for possible exoge­
nous cycles. If this and the other series exhibit similar periodic movements, 
there is a reason to believe that all these movements are internally generated 
by the world coffee system. 
Figure IV-2 shows the production patterns of Brazil and the rest of the 
producer countries. In general, cyclic behavior of these two series exhibit 
remarkable similarities, although world production seems to flucturate around 
an exponential line, while Brazilian output appears to be leveling off around 
20 million bags per year (MB/yr). However, even at today's reduced Brazilian 
market share of about 35% (from a 70% during the early nineteen hundreds), 
most authors regard Brazilian output as the major contributor to price develop-
7) 
ments. On the other hand, a research conducted on the sources of informa­
tion in Appendix D, provided reliable annual world output figures only for the 
period 1915-1973, and 58 pieces of data are definitively not enough to develop 
even a very rough spectral plot to capture a long-term cycle. For these reasons 
we have prepared spectral plots from the Brazilian production series for the 
period 1856-1973. 
A study by Fedesarrollo [10, p. 144] claims that 77% of the total variation in 
world output during the last 20 years can be explained by Brazil output 
fluctuations. 
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D. Behavior of World Coffee Prices and Output 
1. Behavior of Prices 
The spectral plots obtained from the 'corrected' and 'uncorrected' 
series, reflect salient similarities at roughly similar frequency bands. 
Figure IV-5 displays the power spectra given by the annual prices from 1825 to 
1946, years during which the series did not exhibit trend. The solid line on 
the same diagram represents the spectra of the same series, extended up to 
1972, with the post war price jump removed and adjusted to provide a fairly 
stationary series. Figure IV-6 shows the spectral plots obtained on the relative 
price index, calculated as explained before. 
These plots exhibit very similar spectra with respect to shape, power 
distribution and peaks. In fact, the F statistic to test the null hypothesis that 
the two plots on Figure IV-5 are equivalent becomes significant at a value greater 
than 5%. Thus, on the basis of the data used, one cannot claim with 95% confi­
dence that the two spectra are different. This lack of statistical result and the 
visual evidence suggest that the plots contain the same distribution of variance 
at each frequency band. Therefore, the adjustment of the post-war jump has not 
apparently introduced spurious information into the frequencies involved in the 
coffee price pattern, and more importantly, the cyclic movements observed 
during the post war period are of the same type as those generated up to 1946. 
8) 
The ordinate in the spectral plots measures the power at each frequency. The 
area under the plot covered by a frequency band estimates the portion of the 
total variance of the time series which is produced by the frequencies em­
bodied within the band. 
Figure IV-5. Spectral Plot of World 
Coffee Prices. 
Figure IV-6. Spectral Plot of Relative 
Coffee Prices. 
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Similarly, the F statistic shows at about 90% confidence, that the spectrum ren­
dered by the relative coffee price index is equivalent to the one obtained from the 
annual price series. 
Each peak in a spectral plot of a time series may indicate the presence of 
a cyclic movement whose frequency is the frequency under which the peak appears. 
To establish the presence of a cyclic movement with some confidence level, con­
fidence bands have been drawn at each side of the observed spectral plot, as shown 
in Figure IV-6. If it is possible to draw a smooth curve between the confidence 
bands, a curve which does not peak anywhere, one would not reject the null hypo­
thesis of no peak, i .e . , the hypothesis that no cycle is present in the plot. At a 
very low confidence level, the two bands around the plot will tend to be much closer 
to it, which makes it easy to reject that most peaks observed are not cyclic move­
ments. On the other hand, at a very high confidence level, the two bands would 
be wide, and to draw a continuous line with no peaks in it would suffice to neglect 
all peaks, and claim that the time series does not contain any cyclic movements. 
Figure IV-6 shows 80% and 90% confidence bands drawn around the spectral 
plot rendered by the relative coffee price index series. At 90%, there is only one 
chance in ten that a peak on the 0.3 cycles band (3.3 years of period) is a spurious 
peak. At 80%, there is one chance in five that two peaks at 0.035 and 0.16 cycles 
per year (cpy) are spurious. The 0.035 cpy is a low frequency movement whose 
period may be as low as 16 years or as high as 40. To be sure, this cyclic move­
ment could be really formed by a combination of several frequencies embodied 
within the 0.035 band, as suggested by the wide band covered by the peak on the 
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spectral plot. Those cycles, of roughly the same power, combine to generate a 
sizeable portion of the total variance exhibited by the series. The second promi­
nent peak appears around the 0.16 cpy band, or about 6.25 years of period, and 
its power is almost ten times lower than the power exhibited by the previous move­
ment. Furthermore, confidence bands drawn upon the spectral plots produced by 
the annual price series (Figure IV-5) also confirms the existence of the same cycles 
at roughly similar confidence bands. 
When studying economic time series one very rarely finds pure sine waves 
9) 
with no harmonics of higher frequency. Therefore, if a long cycle exists in the 
behavioral pattern, the spectra will normally reflect the presence of its harmonics, 
with progressively lower power for higher frequencies than thai exhibited by the 
fundamental frequency. Thus, even if a cycle is not well defined in the plot, the 
presence of higher order harmonics should be taken as additional evidence that the 
major cycle is indeed built in within the time series in question. To check the 
presence of harmonics in the annual coffee price series, all peaks in Figure IV-5 
have been listed in the following table, where the first column shows the mid-point 
frequency around a bandwidth of 0.0125 cpy. This is the frequency interval when 
one wants to estimate 40 different cycles (bandwidth = M = 40 lags). The 
second column in the table shows the approximate period of the cycle in years, 
together with its range of variation, and the third column presents an estimation 
of the power provided by each frequency band. 
Granger and Hatanaka [52] . 
47 







































3 0.115 8.70 8.25, 9. . 19 0.100 Low 
4 0. 165 6. 06 5.84, 6. ,30 0. 100 80% 
5 0.225 4.44 4.32, 4. .57 0.067 Low 
6 0.310 3.23 3. 16, 3. 29 0. 105 90% 
7 0.400 2.50 2.46, 2. .54 0.009 Low 
8 0.455 2.20 2.17, 2. ,23 0. 011 Low 
A simple inspection of the above table indicates the presence of higher 
order harmonics, whose fundamental frequency is the longest movement. This 
is shown in the following table, where the first three columns represent the 
cycle number, the midpoint frequency, and its second multiple, respectively. 
Within less than a 10% error, frequencies 2, 3 , 5 , and 8 are harmonics of 
frequency 1. 
^The. error is due to lack of power resolution of the spectral analysis. No 
attempt was made to test the significance of this type of error. 
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Table IV-2. Harmonic Sequence 
Midpoint Second 
Cycle Frequency Multiple Percent 
No. cpy cpy Error 
1 0.028 0 .056 8 .93 
2 0 .061 -^t— 0.122 6 .08 
3 0 .115 ^ 0 .230 2 . 2 2 
y 
4 0.165 0 .330 
•y 
5 0.225 <-*- - 0.450 1.11 
6 0 .310 / / 0 .620 
/ 
7 0 .400 / 
/ 
8 0.455 V 
On the other hand, frequency No. 6 does not appear to be a harmonic of frequency 
No. 4 , though the observed difference is well below 10%. In this case, the two 
frequencies have roughly the same power, and more importantly, cycle No. 4 is 
significant at a much wider confidence band. 
Thus there is no reason to reject the existence of a low frequency move­
ment of about 29 or more years in the world coffee price series, a claim which 
can be made with 80% of confidence, i .e . , one chance in five that the cycle is 
the result of random events. Further, the presence of harmonics permits one 
to postulate the existence of such a long movement. Certainly, 150 years of data 
have not been enough to enhance the power resolution of the spectra at this low 
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frequency. Nevertheless, a more accurate figure for the period of years covered 
by this cycle could be obtained from the following observations. 
First, the 8th (highest) frequency listed in Table IV-1, with a period 
between 2.17 and 2.23 years, appeared in all the spectral plots when the number 
of lags was changed to narrow the bands. (See the closing window technique in 
Appendix C.) With 150 data points, this frequency is accurate enough; it is also 
the fourth harmonic of the major fundamental frequency; therefore, the third har­
monic should have a period not lower than 2.17»2 = 4 . 3 9 years and no higher than 
2.23 *2 = 4.46 years, a range which is included within the range obtained for 
frequency No. 5 in Table IV-1. Following the same reasoning, it is possible to 
find the set of ranges for the rest of the frequencies, as shown below: 
Table IV-3. Probable Period of Coffee Cycles. 
Range Probable 
Given Period 
Frequency Revised Range By Spectra (rounded) 
No. (years) (years) (years) 
1 34 .72 ,35 .68 2 9 . 2 0 , 4 5 . 9 8 35.0 
2 17.36, 17.89 14.87, 18.26 17.5 
3 8.68, 8.92 8.25, 9.19 8.8 
5 4.34, 4.46 4.32, 4.57 4.5 
8 2.17, 2.23 2.17, 2.23 2.2 
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Second, for the above observation to be true, a cycle of about two years 
should exist beyond any doubt. With annual prices the actual value of the period 
rendered by the spectral plot is likely to be biased as the two-year cycle may 
appear aliased with higher-order frequencies. To establish the existence of this 
cycle, we used quarterly coffee prices since 1895 to 1972. The spectral plot 
appears in Figure IV-7, and shows a small peak at a frequency of 0.123 cycles 
per quarter, just 2. 03 years. With quarterly data, this estimator for the period 
in question is more reliable than the previous estimators. Furthermore, all 
literature searched on coffee claims the existence of a cycle of about two years, 
i. e., the biological cycle of the coffee tree. 
With a value of 2. 03 years of period for the highest harmonic, one could 
postulate the following periods for the other concurrent frequencies: 4. 06; 8.12; 
11) 
16.24; and 32.48 years, respectively. ' 
Finally, direct observation of the price time series indicates a cycle of 
about 30 years for the major movement. With the information provided by the 
spectral power densities, one can attempt to rebuild the price series, and be 
able to 'tune' the values estimated by the spectra. Using the Fourier 
11) 
The spectra of quarterly prices suggests cycles at 3.42, 2.03, 1.45, and 
1. 09 years. The power of the spectra at longer cycles exhibit a rampant 
growth up to 1000; 308 quarters of prices or 77 years is too short a period 
to resolve the longer movement and its harmonics. The 1.45 years of period, 
reflected by a well established peak at 0.172 cycles per quarter confirms 
the six year cycle, i.e. 1.45 x 4 - 5.8 years. Finally, the cycle at 1. 09 
years roughly corresponds to the well-known cycle associated with the seasonal 
building of processor inventories during the fall of a year, just before the winter 
season. 
Figure IV-7. Spectral Plot of Quarterly Coffee Price. 
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expansion, an estimation for the prices is given by 
oo 
V /27 ? = a + > a. Sin — t + 4. t 0 ^ j ^P.jj=l J 
where ar t is the mean of the series, each a. is a constant proportional to the 0 j
power of the spectra at each frequency band j , P . is the period of each component 
and 6 is the lag between each frequency and the fundamental. 
The following equation generated the pattern exhibited in 
Figure III-8. 
f 27t /27t \ 27t Pt = 12 + l 5 S i nii- + 3.75Sta(—-l.l8)+Sin —- +27t 27t , 
+ 0.67 S i n — + 0.11 Sin-— R + 4.5 2227t . 27t + Sin — - + 1.05 Sin — -6 3  
where the a '̂s are the power densities shown in Table IV-1, multiplied by a 
factor of ten, and 12 is the mean of the actual price series in cents per pound. 
As depicted in Figure I V - 8 , the estimated series compares very favorably with 
the real price series with respect to period, shape, number of peaks, and 
amplitude. Naturally, the above combination of terms is just one among several 12) other good alternatives. Nevertheless, the result indicates that a long cycle 12) 
Given the above combination of cycl s, a 'best' fit could be easily obtained by 
P t : 5 Sin 2*t/32 + 3.75 S in (2r f t / l6 - l . l§ ) ••• Sin 2rft/8.8 t 0.67 S i n - 2 * t A . 5 
+• 0.09 Sin 2<t /2 .2 + Sin( '2*t /6-0.39;+ 1.05 Sin (2*t /3 .2»0 .78) 
The two phases 0.39 and 0.78 are not relevant . They can be omitted. 
Figure F / - . 8 . Actual and Estimated Price Series. 
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of around 32 years, combined with a lagged harmonic of 16 years, may indeed 
form the major coffee cycle. 
2. Behavior of Production 
Further confirmation of the existence of a very long cyclic movement 
appears in Figures IV-9 to IV-11. Figure IV-9 presents five year moving aver­
ages of Brazilian production, plotted on a logarithmic scale. The other two 
figures display the spectral densities generated by the same series and the spec­
tral with confidence bands, respectively. These plots exhibit the peaks listed in 
Table IV-4. 

















0. 033 30.30 24.19, 40.54 80% 
0.145 6.89 6.52, 7.32 Low 
0.320 3.12 3.05, 3.21 90% 
Figure IV-12 presents the spectral plot of the annual price series together 
with the spectral plots of the Brazilian production at 20, 30 and 40 lags, 
the use of a least square method or any other standard forecasting procedure. 
See Brown, Smoothing, Forecasting and Prediction of Time Series. 
Figure IV-9. Brazilian Production. Ol 
Figure IV-10 Figure IV-11 
Spectral Plots of Brazilian Production 
OS 
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Brazil Annual Production.; 
: : ; l 6 5 o - i y 7 2 , . : . . ; 
r - -;(iniil.Loa ;ba;ja) •••••!--:- - •'- • 
iJ*nopfche_dj Ppwpi v :opectr al :jistiniatps,'. 
r^rlout window. • : • • j ; 
Figure F7-12. Spectra of Production and Price Series. 
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respectively. The two spectra have remarkable similitude with respect to power 
distribution, shape and peaks. Due to the lesser number of data points in the 
Brazilian production the resolution of the spectral plot at the lowest frequency is 
not as good as in the price series, and a lower profile is displayed by the higher 
harmonics at about 16 and 2.2 years. Furthermore, the Brazilian production 
spectra do not exhibit harmonics at 8.8 and 4.4 years, but instead show a flat 
bump at about six or seven years and the total width of the band includes a har­
monic at 8. 8 years. Certainly the resolution provided by the spectra is poor, but 
the lucky coincidence of the plots about power distribution at roughly equal fre­
quencies and the presence of harmonics gives additional confidence to postulate 
these cyclic movements in the world coffee economy. 
On the other hand, the plots depict two differences worth mentioning. 
First, the three-year cycle has twice as much power in the production plot than 
in the price spectra, and second, the production pattern is strongly affected by 
a wide variety of higher order frequencies as indicated by the biological cycle of 
the coffee tree, by climatic disturbances and several other random events which 
directly impact on the production pattern, and which have a more indirect and 
delayed effect on price developments. 
E. Cyclic Movements ip. the World Coffee Economy 
/ 
This chapter provides strong evidence £o claim the existence of several 
fundamental cycles embodied within the world coffee behavior. Table IV-5 
presents a summary of our findings and identifies each cycle by a given 'number-
name, ' its period in years. Thereafter, coffee cycles will be referred with this 
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32 | 30 - 36 
16 J 15 - 18 
6 5.8 - 6.3 
3 3.16 - 3.50 



















16,8 ,4 ,2 
1.5 
80% in the 1825 - 1946 price and relative price index series. Much lower 
chance in the other time series studied. 




THE WORLD COFFEE PRODUCTION SECTOR 
AND THE THIRTY-TWO YEAR COFFEE CYCLE 
The world coffee production sector contains ten major feedback loops 
which link world price with land expansion, production rates and world supplies. 
A diagram of the sector appears in Figure V - l . 
This chapter presents evidence that the world coffee production sector 
causes a long price cycle of about 32 years combined with a sequence of harmonic 
movements of higher frequency. 
A. Introduction 
Behavior in a dynamical model such as the coffee system is produced by 
both internal structure and exogenous disturbances. Internal structure in a 
dynamical system consists of a set of coupled feedback loops, each of which 
describes a closed chain of causes and effects. The operation of feedback loops 
under the influence of exogenous disturbances generate time trajectories or 
"behavior" of the variables in the system. 
Figure V-2 is the loop diagram of an example of a feedback loop in the 
coffee system. It shows the dynamics of the International Coffee Agreements 
(ICAs), agreements that tend to be established as prices fall and to collapse as 
prices rise. Assume world supplies are rising above world demand; then the 
F i g u r e V-l« P r o d u c t i o n S e c t o r , 
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Figure V-2 . Dynamics of ICAS. 
surplus amount of coffee in excess of demand rises (arrow #1). Suppliers, 
anxious to allocate their abundant stocks amont customers, will tend to compete 
against each other. They will offer discounts to traders who buy a portion of 
their coffee surplus. Quoted prices then fall (arrow #2). As prices fall, the 
foreign coffee receipts of the producing nations rapidly deteriorate. Hence, 
pressures gradually build up among the most urgent producers to establish a 
joint system of export quotas and stock retention (arrow #3). The stronger the 
price fall, the higher the pressure to sign an agreement with lower export quotas 
will be enforced (arrow #5). Note the delay to carry out negotiations. Hence, 
the flow of coffee supplies to the marketplace diminishes (arrow #6). 
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The description initially assumed rising world supplies. In this case the 
operation of the loop resulted with a reduced amount of world supplies. Had we 
started the loop with falling supplies, prices would have risen and nations would 
have become less urgent to establish or enforce the ICA's pacted quotas. The 
effective level of quotas would then have increased, bringing additional supplies 
into the market. 
The above type of feedback is called a 'negative' loop; it generates a 
pattern of behavior in which the variables involved tend to swing up and down 
around a certain value, i .e . , oscillatory behavior. Conversely, a feedback loop 
which generates sustained growth (or decay) is called a 'positive' loop. This 
section describes in detail some examples of these types of loops within the cof­
fee production sector. 
The following section presents the main feedback loops embodied within 
the structure of the coffee production sector. Each feedback loop is described 
by a short paragraph, then the loop is graphically represented in a companion 
figure. A more complete description of the assumptions made to build each one 
of the postulated feedback loops appears in Appendix B-I, which is divided into 
numbered sections. The number which appears underneath the variables in the 
loops shown in this chapter refer to the section(s) in the appendix which best des­
cribe the concepto 
Here is a general explanation of the characteristics of loop diagrams: 
(a) Each loop consists of 'nodes' linked by 'arrows.' A node is a variable that 
changes through time, and produces effects on other variable(s). An arrow 
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from one variable to another indicates that the first variable affects the 
second. 
(b) Effects (arrows) can be positive or negative. A positive effect means that 
an increase in the first variable causes a rise (or avoids a fall) in the sec­
ond. A negative effect means that an increase in the first variable causes 
a fall (or avoids a rise) in the second, i .e . , production rates affect stocks 
positively; but sales affect them negatively. 
(c) Each effect occurs after an elapsed period of time. A rise in production does 
not immediately generate higher stocks, because the amount produced has to 
be packed, shipped and distributed before it actually arrives into the storage 
place. Thus each arrow in a loop usually includes a time delay. Sometimes, 
delays will be short, sometimes longer. 
(d) All other variables that do not appear in a given loop are assumed to remain 
unchanged. 
(e) Each loop is given a sign. A positive loop (+) is a loop that generates sus­
tained growth or decay. A negative loop (-) is a loop that attempts to control 
a variable within certain limits, around a target value. Negative loops often 
produce oscillatory behavior. 
B. Feedback Structure of the World Coffee Production Sector 
and the Thirty-Two Year Coffee Cycle 
The World Coffee Production Sector consists of ten major feedback loops. 
Each one of these loops performs a different function and generates a special type 
of behavior over time. When the feedback loops are coupled together, the 
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structure displays a long cycle of about 32 years of duration combined with 
harmonic movements of higher frequency. 
Each loop is given a name that describes the loop function. The postulated 
feedback structures that form the coffee production sector appear in the following 
order: 
Loop PI: Supply of Labor, Land Expansion and World Coffee Tree 
Capacity 
Loop P2: World Supply, World Coffee Price and Tree Capacity 
Expansion 
Loop P3: Coffee Export Rate 
Loop(s) P4: Maturing, Productive and Obsolete Stocks of Coffee Trees; 
Removal and Normal Obsolescence Tree Flow Rates 
Loop P5: Abandonment of Coffee Trees 
Loop P6: Effect of Obsolescence on Tree Planting Rate 
Loop(s) P7: Induced Tree Obsolescence Rate 
Loop(s) P8: Technological Innovations and Effective Yields 
Loop P9: Foreign Cash Reserves and Supplier Inventory Control Policy 
Loop P10: Export Quotas and ICAs 
The coupling of loops PI to P4 generates a coffee cycle of about 30 years. 
This behavior is primarily caused by the two loops that adjust tree capacity and 
prices, namely, PI and P2; the two loops embody a long sequence of time delays, 
one of which is the period required for a newly planted tree to bear fruit. The 
simulated cycle of 30 years appears in Figure V-8 , at the end of the description 
given for the four main loops. 
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Figure V-3 . Loop PI: Main Production Loop. 
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The addition of loops P5 to P8, i .e . , abandonment, obsolescence, and 
effective yields, distort the thirty year cycle. In particular, abandonment of 
trees introduces a harmonic of about 15 years into the main cycle, while induced 
obsolescence adds price unstability with wider oscillations. Figures V-12 and 
V-18 exhibit the effects caused by these loops. 
The behavioral effects of loops P9 and P10, stock and quota (ICAs) policy, 
are described in a later chapter. 
1. Main Production Loops and a Thirty Year Cycle 
a. Loop PI—Supply of Labor, Land Expansion and World Coffee Tree 
Capacity: Feedback Description. The current supply of available labor is a 
major determinant in expansion of coffee acreage, because a rise in the supply 
of labor is a precondition to prepare new land and to plant trees. Newly planted 
trees mature four years later, period after which matured trees enlarge the total 
stock of coffee trees; finally, production of green coffee tends to rise. Coffee 
areas with large numbers of trees and high production rates normally receive 
special attention from governments, whose policies and programs give support 
to the coffee farmer. As a result, the standard of living and income per capita 
in those coffee areas tends to increase faster than in surrounding non-coffee 
regions, a fact which establishes both higher rates of population growth in the 
coffee zone and rising migratory patterns toward those coffee regions. Therefore, 
labor supply, and consequently acreage with coffee trees, tend to rise at a faster 
rate (Figure V-3). 
Coffee is primarily a labor-intensive type of crop with labor costs 
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representing more than 70% of the total farm operating expenses. This clearly 
indicates the relevant role played by labor availability and supply when a farmer 
considers expanding his coffee acreage, planting new trees and cultivating them. 
In Brazil, a country with a high number of large farms, the relative scarcity of 
hired labor to plant and cultivate the trees (and not land availability), has created 
serious obstacles to promote the expansion of acreage in the past (Furtado [ l l ] , 
Arak [ l ] ). On the other hand, in countries with small coffee plots, where the 
farmer uses his own family as a source of cheap labor, the expansion of capacity 
has generally been accomplished with less difficulty. Generally these coffee states 
tend to show high population densities and growth. ^ 
A second assumption made in the previous feedback loop relates production 
of green coffee and standard of living with the attractiveness of growing coffee. 
In the majority of the coffee-producing nations, the farmer can sell most of his 
production, if he wishes, to the official coffee institutions at a floor price. Thus, 
the farmer who chooses coffee as his way of living expects to get at least a mini­
mum income, with almost no marketing effort on his part. Furthermore, with the 
exception of Brazil, during the last few years, proceeds from coffee foreign trade 
turn out to be one of the few key sources of capital to generate national economic 
growth. For this reason both governments and the official coffee institutions 
^The coffee states in Colombia have familities with six or seven children, on 
the average. In this country and the Central American nations which produce 
coffee, the supply of land may also play an important role in expanding coffee 
acreage. The author, however, has not found factual support to accept or 
reject this hypothesis. 
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have traditionally carried out policies which support, maintain and enlarge the 
pool of coffee growers as well as the planted capacity. The effect of these 
policies has been the improvement of the farmers 1 living conditions over and 
above the living conditions of farmers not living in the same coffee regions, a 
fact which can be easily shown by comparing coffee states in Brazil, (Sao Paulo 
and Parana), Colombia (Antioguia, Quindio, Caldas) with other rural areas in 
2) 
the same nations. The protection given by the government to the coffee farmer, 
together with the general belief that coffee farmers tend to get a higher standard 
of living and income, are reasons that compel farmers who live on suitable land 
to establish or expand a coffee plantation. Further, if the economic outlook of 
the coffee market appears attractive to the farmer, he will pay higher wages to 
get the additional labor required to expand his acreage. On the aggregate, then, 
the improvement of the living conditions of the coffee farmer tends to attract an 
increasing flow of new farmers and workers to coffee regions, a fact which tends 
to augment the supply of labor in the coffee sector. 
b. Loop P2—World Supply, World Coffee Price, and Tree Capacity 
Expansion: Feedback Description. A rise in world supplies above world demand 
tends to depress world prices. In the face of falling prices, governments adjust 
domestic price policy to prevent a rapid contraction of the nation's foreign 
reserves. Returns to the farmer fall. As domestic prices decay, coffee culti­
vation becomes less attractive to the farm owner, who will tend to reduce the 
Political reasons, too, compel governments to give support to the large pool 
of potential voters in coffee zones (Nieto Arteta [20 ] ). 
2) 
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rate at which he acquires cultivatable land, and to divert a portion of his coffee 
acreage to other uses. Thus, available land to plant coffee trees gradually be­
comes more scarce. Planting of new trees is then reduced; four or five years 
later, a diminished flow of newly matured trees will add to the stock of produc­
tive trees, which will grow more slowly, or fall if removal of trees was higher 
than planting during the period. Consequently, both production of green coffee 
and stocks will tend to fall, a factor which creates a market with tight supplies. 
With long-run demand constantly growing, scareness is inevitable, and the system 
evolves into a new period with rising prices (Figure V - 4 ) . 
A period of abundant and rising supplies causes low and declining market 
prices. Thus, as supplies rise above demand, aggressive competition gradually 
shifts from traders to suppliers who in the face of falling prices and income be­
come more and more anxious to allocate their saleable stocks to the customers. 
Therefore, increasing discounts will be offered to those traders who buy a cer­
tain portion of the nation's marketable stocks, which means that prices will fall 
even more. The price crisis aggravates as traders' demand falls with decaying 
3) 
prices. Hence, during a period of falling prices, when supplies tend to run 
high and traders' demand shrinks more and more, abundance of green coffee 
gradually increases, causing aggressive competition among suppliers, who now 
will be willing to sell additional amounts at the lowest prices to restore a poor 
3) 
'This is fully explained in the next chapter, within the context of the Supply of 
Storage concept. At the moment, it suffices to say that traders' stocks, 
coverage and then demand for green coffee tend to decay as prices fall, and 
vice versa. (See Figure VI-2 in Chapter VI.) 
Figure V - 4 . Loop P2: Main Production Loop. 
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foreign cash position. ^ 
On the other hand, a period of low supplies and rising prices leads to in­
creasing trader's demand, lower coffee availability, and further price increases. 
Figure V - 5 shows the postulated effects of coffee availability. The depicted 
function could take several possible different shapes, depending on buyers' per-
c eptions. If the reason causing a low flow of supplies is perceived as a temporary 
effect caused, say, adverse weather, small changes in relative supply will not 
tend to affect much world price; the curve is flat around zero (curve (a)). If on 
the other hand, small change in supplies and availability is perceived as an 
initial step leading toward a longer period with oversupply or scarcity, then a 
small variation in coffee availability will tend to affect drastically the formation 
of prices; the curve is steeped around the equilibrium point (curve (b)). An 
intermediate set of assumptions is depicted by curve (c). Curve (b) appears 
very plausible for the case of coffee in view of the anticipated formation of 
expectations about future long-range movements on both supplies and demand. 
5) 
This is the relationship used in the coffee model postulated here. 
4) 
'The world coffee market is an oligopoly with differentiation of product (Geer 
[13]). Substitution of one type of coffee for another is always possible, with­
in certain restrictions to provide blends of drinkable quality. Thus, some 
Arabic Brazilians normally compete against Milds during periods of low prices, 
and against Robustas during periods of rising prices. Mild and Robusta pro­
ducers tend, however, to compete more often within each group. See Geer 
[13, p. 7 1 ] . 
There is no hard data to attest the values chosen in this relation. Discussion 
with individuals familiar with the coffee industry indicate that the function has 
reasonable shape and range. 
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Figure V-5 . Relative Coffee Availability. 
Feedback Loop P2 assumes a direct relationship between world prices 
and domestic prices (Geer [13, p. 8 1 ] , Keith [17, p. 304]) . This means that 
rising or decaying prices generally lead to higher or lower domestic prices, 
respectively, after a delay caused by the time it takes to formulate a price policy, 
formulate a complex set of regulations, have them approved, and finally set up 
and implement enforcement mechanisms. After one or two years, at least, a new 
domestic 'equivalent' price, i.e. floor price, exchange rate, taxes, etc. will 
prevail throughout the nation. 
Feedback loop PI indicated a major, direct relationship between a higher 
74 
supply of labor and long run land expansions. Feedback P2 depicts, on the other 
hand, the adjusting effects of current domestic price and future farmers' price 
expectations on coffee land additions. Given a certain amount of labor (i.e. wages), 
and a level of prices with its direction of change, there always will be an amount 
of coffee acreage and trees which will return higher profits to the farmer than 
in any other crop. This amount of acreage is the desired extension of the total 
plantation [Arak, 1, p. 215]. We assume the desired amount of land in coffee 
can be described as a product of three functions: 
Desired Land = & (labor availability) x f ̂ (domestic price) x ^(domestic price 
change) 
The net annual additions of hectares to cultivate coffee, is then given by 
a fraction of the difference between the desired total acreage and the amount of 
land currently planted with trees. Newly added hectares can not be used imme­
diately to plant coffee. If the farmer is currently using them with other crops he 
will wait until the next harvesting period to collect cash and invest in coffee, and 
even then, he still will have to give rest to the land, add fertilizer, weed and 
prepare the soil. On the average, a time period of about two years may pass, 
before the land becomes reasy to support coffee plants. 
The rest of the feedback loop P2 has been previously described within the 
context of loop PI. The description of these relations will not be repeated here. 
However, the reader may take note of the long delays contained in the operation 
of both, loop PI and loop P2. The maturing dealy of four or five years is but one 
among a whole chain of similar delayed effects. These delays appear in Table V-1 
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Table V- l . Main Delays in Production Loops PI and P2 
Name 
Land Correction Time 
Land Preparation Delay 
Planting Correction Time 
Tree Maturing Delay 
Distribution Delay 
Average World price 
Formulation 
Government Domestic Price 
Policy and Control 




To adjust land to target value 
Period required to prepare land. 
To achieve desired number of 
trees. 
Time required to bear fruit. 
Period to wash, dry, pack, ship, 
and distribute the picked berries. 
Time to perceive current world 
price changes and their effects 
on foreign receipts. 
Period of time required to adjust 
domestic coffee policy. 
Period required by the farmer to 
perceive the effects of new domes­
tic policy. 
The behavior of the Dynamic Coffee Model postulated in this research is not 
sensitive to + 100% change in the values of these three delays. When the delays 
were reduced to one year, the model still exhibited a long cycle of about 30 
years. A value of 0.5 years for each of them produced a cycle of 29 years. 
Similar results hold for the other delays; the maturing delay does not produce 
major change within a + 25% variation. 
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Figure V-6 . Loop P3: Export Rate. 
77 
and are fully explained in Appendix B-L 
c. Loop P3—Export Rate: Feedback Description. The flow of green 
coffee exported during a year depends on both the amounts of coffee offered to 
the international market by the producer and the trader's demand for coffee at 
the current price. In turn, the volume of supplies offered to be sold depends on 
both the actual rate of production and the current level of stocks, and also, on 
the nation's foreign coffee policy,. 
The quantity offered at the market place is given by the amount of export­
able production plus the excess of stocks above a target value. The difference 
between the supplied quantity and the current demand establishes the current level 
of prices at which traders would be willing to buy the amount of coffee demanded 
(loop P2, and Figure V-4). When supplies surpass demand, suppliers will tend 
to offer discounts to traders on the condition that they buy additional amounts of 
green coffee. Hence, exports tend to rise above demand. On the other hand, if 
supplies are short with respect to demand, traders will tend to pay a premium 
to those suppliers who sell additional portions of their reserve stocks. Hence, 
exports will tend to rise above the quantity originally supplied to the market. 
Thus, on the aggregate, the current export rate will tend to be an amount lower 
than the quantity originally demanded by the traders, but higher than the amount 
originally supplied by the producer. An average between the two extreme 
^Export quotas under ICA's and the nation(s) stock policy, among others. See 
feedback loops P9 and P10 in this chapter. 
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quantities appears to be a good representation of the supplier-trader price-exports 
bargaining decision process. 
titles appears to be a good representation of the supplier-trader price-exports 
bargaining decision process. 
d. Loop Set P4—Maturing, Productive and Obsolete Stocks of Coffee 
Trees. Removal and Normal Obsolescence Tree Flow Rates: Feedback 
Description. Trees completing a gestation period of about four years are 
Maturing Trees. A rise in the flow of planted trees during a year, over and 
above the rate at which trees become matured each year, causes a rise in the 
total stock of Maturing Trees, otherwise the stock of trees will tend to remain 
unchanged on fall. In turn, an increase in the amount of trees in this group 
tends to augment the number of trees which each year reach maturity. As 
more trees depart from this tree-group, the total number of maturing trees 
tends to decrease. Conversely, a decline in the actual number of trees in the 
group, causes a decay in the tree maturity rate, a fact which tends to counter­
balance the original fall in the stock of maturing trees (Figure V-7-a) . 
Highly-Productive-Trees are matured trees with rising and high yields. 
On the average, the yield of a tree rises and reaches a plateau over a period of 
twelve years. A rise in the flow of newly matured trees per year above the flow 
of trees which each year become older with falling yields (i.e. the normal 
obsolescence tree rate), causes an increase in the total stock of highly productive 
trees. Otherwise, the stock of productive capacity will tend to remain unchanged 
or decay. In turn, a rise in the number of trees in this group tends to produce 
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Figure V-7-a. Tree Maturing Rate. 
higher obsolescence rates which tend to restrain further growth in the number 
of highly productive trees. Conversely, a fall in the current number of trees in 
this group, causes a reduction in the flow of trees obsoleted per year, the Tree-
Obsolescence-Rate, which tends to counterbalance the original decay in the stock 
of highly productive trees (Figure V-7-b). 
Figure V-7-b. Tree Obsolescence. 
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Obsolete trees are older trees with declining yields. A tree may stand 
as obsolete capacity for 16, 20 or more years under normal weather conditions. 
As the tree obsolescence rate rises above the rate at which trees are removed 
each year (the Tree-Removal-Rate), the stock of obsolete capacity increases. 
On the average, then, the flow of trees removed per year will also rise, a fact 
which produces a negative effect on the stock of obsolete capacity, which tends to 
fall. Conversely, a fall in the stock of obsolete trees generates a reduction in 
the Tree-Removal-Rate, a fact which tends to restrain the initial fall in the 
stock of obsolete trees (Figure V-7-c). 
Figure V-7-c. Tree Removal. 
The Tree-Removal-Rate may or may not be a function of world prices. 
Removal costs are high, and in addition, the farmer in many coffee areas of the 
world does not have attractive substitute crops or land uses open to him. During 
a period of falling prices, the farmer will find it more beneficial to abandon a 
fraction of his older and low yield trees than to remove a portion of his obsolete 
capacity (Arak [ l ] ). 
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Loop structures PI to P4 form the main feedback loops of the World Coffee 
Production sector. When these feedback loops are coupled together and each one 
of the postulated relations is translated into mathematical statements, the struc­
ture can be tested on a computer, to see the behavior it is able to produce. 
Figure V- 8 shows the behavioral pattern exhibited by the four main loops when the 
structure was simulated over a long period of years (1890-2000). This behavior 
shows a cycle in prices, production and stocks of about 30 years' duration. 
To test the behavior of the model, throughout the period, the model vari­
ables are initially at equilibrium. This means that the annual green coffee usage 
rate (exports plus domestic consumption) is originally made equal to the annual 
green coffee production rate. Hence, stocks of green coffee do not change in any 
direction. Similarly, planting rates are made equal to removal tree rates; hence, 
the total stock of trees remains constant. These conditions are maintained through­
out a period of ten years, from 1880 to 1890, years during which none of the vari­
ables plotted exhibits dynamic behavior in Figure V-8 . 
At the beginning of year 1890 the system receives the impact of an exponen­
tial demand. This is shown by the letter 'u' in the plots, which stands for 'required 
exports.' This quantity, rises exponentially, from an initial value of about 8 million 
bags during 1890, to about 58 million bags during 1970. The behavior generated by 
the feedback structure is direct consequence of the relations depicted by each loop. 
A sudden rise in exports depletes stocks and diminishes relative availability 
of coffee at the marketplace. Hence, price rise (loop P2 and Figure V-5). As 
world prices increase, domestic price policy is adjusted, and after a delay, 
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domestic prices to the farmer rise too. Acreage to plant coffee trees grows and 
additional trees are planted (loop P2). World prices, however, keep rising, since 
newly planted trees do not produce. Similarly, the rising prices tend to improve 
the farmer's standard of living, hence additional labor is attracted to grow coffee, 
a fact which allows rapid expansion of acreage (loop PI). By the year 1900 prices 
peak and stay there for a short number of years. Prices reach their maximum 
value, because the trees originally planted have already matured and are producing 
rising yields. Production then tends to rise above exports, and stocks begin to 
recover (loops PI, P2, P3)„ 
The rise in both production and stocks creates abundant supplies at the 
marketplace. Hence, world prices fall. As prices fall, excess capacity is not 
adjusted fast to keep production near world requirements, that is, tree removal 
rates do not generally depend on prices (loop P4-c). Hence, the only chance to 
reduce capacity will come through declining planting rates, which fall as prices 
decay. By the year 1915 prices are the lowest, while stocks peak. 
The low level of prices has induced farmers to reduce land expansion. 
Planting rates then tend to be lower than removal rates; therefore, total tree 
capacity falls (around the year 1916). By this time, the average age of the stock 
of trees will tend to be older. Thus, older trees with declining yields together 
with a reduced number of trees cause a fall in production rates below world 
requirements; this is the reason to explain the fall in stocks of green coffee by 
the year 1918. World supplies then, become scarce, and hence world prices 
begin to rise. 
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The first cycle just described has a duration of about 26 years. The 
other cycles displayed by the same figure show periods of 28 and 30 years , 
respectively. The reason to explain this expanding period, lies in the nature of 
the pattern used to represent the required exports, the input to the model. 
Actual coffee exports since 1890 to 1975 show an 'almost' exponential function, 
which grows with time. The input used to create the simulated behavior, on 
the other hand, exhibits exponential growth. Initially, exports grow at a lower 
rate, from 8 million of bags/year by 1890, to 20 million of bags /year by 1930. 
Nevertheless, after an additional span of 40 years (by 1970), exports reach 
almost 60 million of bags/year. Hence, during the first cycle, the unbalance 
created by the rise in exports was smaller than that created during the second 
and third cycles. Hence, farmers were able to correct excess or shortage of 
7) 
capacity in a shorter period of time than during the other cycles shown. 
2. Secondary Production Loops and Harmonic Cycles 
a. Loop P5—Abandonment of Coffee Trees: Feedback Description. At 
each level of prices, there exist an optimal age beyond which it is not profitable 
to cultivate older trees. With declining prices, the farmer generally finds it 
more beneficial to abandon this portion of older trees than to remove it [Arak, 
1, p. 215] . As prices fall, trees with declining yields tend to become less and 
less profitable; thus, the age at which the farmer will abandon obsolete trees 
7) ~ ' ' 
The model was also tested under a step increase in exports. Thus, originally, 
exports stay at 8 million bags /year; then, by 1890 they 'jump' to 40 million 
bags/year, and stay there for the rest of the period. In this case, all cycles 
exhibited a similar period of about 32 years of duration. 
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Figure V-9 . Loop P5: Abandonment of Trees. 
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tends to become younger. The younger the age of abandonment, the larger the 
fraction of trees to be neglected. Therefore, annual production rates decay, 
stocks tend to become less and less dominant, and the quantity offered to export 
tends to fall. A reduction in worldwide supplies tends to create a rise in prices. 
Hence, shortage of domestic supplies together with government action to relax 
domestic price controls combine to produce rising domestic prices to the 
farmer (Figure V-9). 
Abandoned trees are trees which are not cultivated, their surrounding 
area not cleared of weeds and their yield not picked. At lower prices, the far­
mer may find it beneficial to abandon a fraction of their obsolete capacity whose 
declining yields does not cover labor and fertilizer cultivation costs. Therefore, 
at each level of prices, there exist an 'optimal' age, beyond which the yield of 
the trees is lower than the cultivation cost of the tree. This age is the abandon­
ment age. Figure V-10 depicts three different abandonment ages at three diffe­
rent price levels. The broken lines show the dollar-yield i.e. price-yield, of 
trees at different ages, and at prices P , P , and P . As prices rise from 
say, a price P to a higher price P the dollar yield of the trees gradually 
shifts upward. 
The solid line on the same diagram, shows the annual cultivation costs 
per tree at different ages. Older trees require, generally, higher fertilizer 
costs than younger ones. Thus, annual cost tends to rise with the age of the 
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Figure V-10. Abandonment Age of Trees at Different Levels of Price. 
gives the abandonment age a . A rational farmer would not cultivate trees 
older than this age, as their annual cultivation cost rises above the returns per 
tree. Furthermore, as the level of prices increase from P to P and P , 
—~£i — -L U 
the 'optimal' abandonment age gradually becomes older; i.e. a is greater than 
The fraction of abandoned trees depends on the abandonment age a at the 
current price P. At very high prices, the age of abandonment tends to be also 
high; therefore, the farmer will tend to cultivate most of his trees and the frac­
tion of abandoned trees is low. As prices fall, the abandonment age of trees 
will look gradually younger; therefore, more and more trees are neglected; the 
fraction of abandoned trees rises. At the lowest prices, on the other hand, the 
- 1 ' 
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optimal age of abandonment may tend to be too young. A farmer probably will 
never abandon trees with rising or high yields (Arak [l, p. 215 ] ) . Hence, as 
the abandonment age approaches the average age a of the stock of trees, the frac­
tion of abandoned trees tends to reach a maximum beyond which additional younger 
trees will not be abandoned. Section 15 of Appendix B-1 fully describes the develop­
ment of the fraction of trees abandoned as a function of the abandonment age. The 
appendix shows, among other things, that the shape of the function depicted in 
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Figure V - l l . Abandoned Fraction of Trees. 
The addition into the World Coffee Production Model of the abandonment 
loop P5, introduces a lagged harmonic of about 15 years to the coffee cycle. 
Figure V-12 shows three price cycles of about 26, 31, and 30 years respectively. 
The harmonic of about 15 years can not be detected from a visual inspection. 
Nevertheless, the tendency of the price wave to fail and recover when prices are 
still high, undoubtedly suggest the presence of a lagged harmonic of about half 
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the period of the main cycle. 
The above result is a logical consequence of abandonment loop P5 depic­
ted by Figure V-9. The effect of this loop is to bypass the long delays involved 
in the main loops PI and P2, namely, the land expansion and maturing delays. 
In fact, if prices fall, a farmer may almost immediately decide not to harvest 
a portion of his standing trees. Thus, production and stocks tend to fall more 
rapidly than in the case in which abandonment was not included. This is fully 
confirmed by visual inspection of the plots in Figures V-8 and V-12. In the 
first plot, with no abandonment, production and stocks fall over a period of 
about ten or eleven years; in the second, they both fall over a shorter period 
of around eight years. 
b. Loop P6—Effect of Obsolescence of Trees on Tree Planting Rate: 
Feedback Description. Tree Planting Rate, the number of trees planted each 
year, depends on the amount of available land and also, on the fraction of 
obsolete stock, Arak [l, p. 215] . A high fraction of obsolete and older trees, 
induces the farmer to plant new trees and renovate his plantation. Four years 
later the matured trees will pass to enlarge the stock of highly productive trees, 
a fact which tends to reduce the fraction of obsolete capacity and hence, 
The author found this feature when he built the estimated coffee price 
series from the spectral plots, in Chapter IV (See Figure IV-8 ). 
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Figure V-13. Loop P6: Tree Flow Rates. 
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planting (Figure V-13). 
c. Loop Set P7—Induced Tree Obsolescence Rate: Feedback Description. 
The addition of younger trees with higher yields to a plantation, tends to accele­
rate the speed at which older but still productive trees are obsoleted. A rise in 
the Tree Obsolescence Rate reduces the stock of highly productive capacity, but 
augments the stock of obsoleted trees. As more matured trees with high yields 
depart from the first group to enlarge the obsolete group, the average age of the 
trees in each one of the two categories tends to look younger. If planting rates 
are higher than removal rates, the average age of the productive trees will tend 
to change faster than the average age of the obsolete stock. In turn, the average 
yield of the productive trees will grow faster than the average yield of the obsolete 
stock. Hence, the ratio between the two (average) yields tends to rise. A time 
period will elapse before a farmer fully notes and appreciates the effects of a 
rising yield ratio. However, as the ratio increases, a portion of the more mature 
and highly productive trees will appear to him uneconomical to support; these trees 
will tend to be considered as obsolete capacity by the farmer. Hence, the 
Obsolescence Tree Rate tends to increase (Figure V-14). 
An old tree with low and declining yields is an obsolete tree. If all the 
trees in a farm were able to produce the same yield regardless of age, soil and 
fertilizer used, then the farmer would probably never complain about his older 
9) 
Planting rate is also affected by the average age of the total tree stock. A 
farmer with older trees tends to promote planting; as the stock of trees gradu­
ally gets younger, the farmer will tend to reduce his rate of planting. See 
Appendix B. 
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Figure V-14. Loop P7: Obsolescence of Trees. 
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and obsolete capacity. Unfortunately, trees get older, and the older they get 
the less productive and more costly they become; at the same time, young trees 
and new species with higher yields, tend to increase farmer's expectations about 
returns on investment and growth potential. With newly matured stock, higher 
yield trees enlarge the total amount of more productive trees, therefore, the 
average yield of trees in this group tends to become much larger than the aver­
age yield of the older obsoleted capacity. Hence, trees which not long ago seemed 
to the farmer productive enough to warrant careful cultivation, will now appear 
as non efficient and costly trees to support. These trees will tend to be neglected 
and soon will pass to enlarge the normal flow of capacity being obsoleted. 
The Obsolescence Multiplier adjusts the speed at which productive trees 
are obsoleted. Figure V-15 shows one possible relationship, among several 
others. When the yield ratio is closed to a normal value, say 2, obsolescence 
will proceed normally with the aging of the productive stock. As the yield ratio 
rises above the normal value, more trees become rapidly obsoleted. 
The behavior of the World Coffee Production Sector with the addition of 
the two obsolescence loops (P6 and P7), is depicted in Figures V-16 a and b. 
In the first figure, the 30/15 year coffee cycles appear combined with higher 
frequency harmonics, as illustrated by the 'almost' square shape of the wave. 
More importantly, the price cycle seems to exhibit a larger amplitude, which 
means that the obsolescence mechanisms add instability to the main production 
loops. 
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Figure V-15. Effect of Yield Ratio on Obsolescence Tree Rate 
The Obsolescence Multiplier. 
When world prices stay high for a long period of years, planting rates 
tend to be higher than removal rates. The stock of highly productive trees will 
tend to be too young, with lower but rising yields. Therefore, the yield-ratio 
will stay relatively low, as shown by Figure V- 16-b right before 1940. Hence, 
tree obsolescence rate will be near its normal value, with very low induced 
obsolescence (loop P7). Over this period, production rates, although rising, will 
not be too high, a fact which supports a high level of prices. 
On the other hand, the stock of young, rising yield trees will tend to be­
come old enough at a certain age to reach high stable yields. Therefore, as this 
Figure V-16a. Effect of Obsolescence (Loop P7). C O 0 5 
Figure V- 16b. Effect of Obsolescence (Loop P7) 
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time approaches, the yield ratio tends to rise, as illustrated by Figure V-16-b, 
immediately after 1940. Furthermore, the sudden increase in the yield ratio in­
duces a more rapid obsolescence rate (Loop Set P7), which means that the total 
stock of obsolete trees and the fraction of obsolete capacity will both grow. Hence, 
the farmer will plant additional trees (Loop P6) to replace those which were 
obsoleted and also to maintain his stock of more productive trees. Therefore, the 
stock of obsolete trees will look gradually younger because trees which were not 
too old were obsoleted much faster (Loop P7); similarly, the stock of highly pro­
ductive trees will also tend to look younger, due to the rapid planting over the 
period (loop P6). Yields then will tend to be high; furthermore, the total stock of 
trees should be rising. This is the reason to explain both, the rapid growth in 
production rates and stocks, and the fast decay in prices when the yield ratio 
rises. See the two figures right after the year 1940. 
When prices fall too fast, land expansion and planting rates are 
rapidly reduced. Therefore, the stock of highly productive trees tends to fall 
and also will tend to age faster which reduces the group's average yield. Hence, 
when this group of trees reaches, on the average, a certain age, the yield-
ratio will tend to fall again, as shown by Figure V-16b after the year 1946. 
During these years, the total amount of trees stays on a plateau, and more 
importantly, the stock of trees is still relatively young. Therefore, the high 
number of trees combined with the high yields causes high levels of production 
rates and large accumulation of stocks. This is then, the reason to explain 
the sustained low level of prices since 1946 to 1954. During these years, a 
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reduced planting rate diminishes the stock of trees, which gradually ages to be­
come older with lower and declining yields. Production rates and stocks will thus 
slowly fall. After a ten year period, production turns out to be lower than usage 
of green coffee. Prices then will recover. 
d. Loop Set P8. Technological Innovations and Effective Yields: 
Feedback Description. 
(a) Technological and agricultural innovations in coffee tend to 
increase the average tree yield. Hence, production of green coffee stocks 
and then market supplies tend to rise over demand, which results in falling 
prices. With reduced prices, the depressed coffee foreign earnings of the 
nation(s) tends to hinder national development. Funds which were appropriated 
to agricultural research will be diverted to fit more urgent needs. Thus, tech­
nological innovations tend to stagnate for a period of time; the average yield 
of the coffee tree does not grow as fast as before (Figure V-17). The reader 
should note the long delays involved in the process of development and diffusion 
of technological advances. 
(b) Similarly, as both world and domestic prices fall, the farmer 
will tend to shift the intensity of care provided to coffee trees in favor of other 
10 
crops he generally produces as complementary sources of income. Hence, 
the yield per tree tends to decay and production falls. Falling production rates 
produce a negative impact on both stocks and market supplies. Thus, prices 
___ -
The small farmer may actually provide more intensive care to the tree with 
the purpose of increasing sales and then income. There appears no evidence 
supporting this conclusion, however. 
100 
Figure V-1.7. Loop Set P8: Technological Innovations 
and Effective Yields. 
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Lend to rise (Figure V-17). Effective yields are then given by the following 
expression: 
Effective Yield = Average Yield x f (technology) x f (domestic price) 
J- ^ 
where average yield depends on the age of the trees, f is the increasing effect 
due to advances in crop and seed technology and f is the result of varying 
intensity of tree care with prices. 
The two following figures display the behavior of the World Coffee Pro­
duction Sector under two different, but related situations. In the first diagram 
(Figure V-18), the main production sector (loops PI to P4) has been simulated 
after addition of both the abandonment loop P5 and the effect of varying care on 
the coffee tree, as described by loop P8-b. In this run, the two obsolescence 
loops P6 and P7 have been omitted. The behavior still shows a major long move­
ment of about 30 years, intermittent with high order harmonics of about 15 or 
16 years and 8 years respectively. Figure V-12 showed the combined 30/15 
year cycle generated by the interaction of the main production loops PI to P4 
together with the abandonment loop P5. Hence, the influence due to feedback 
loop P8-b, effective yields due to intensive care, is responsible for the appearance 
of a minor harmonic of about 8 years. 
Figure V-19 shows the behavior displayed by the World Coffee Production 
Sector when all the feedback loops previously described are coupled together, i.e. 
Main loops PI to P4, the abandonment loop P5, the two obsolescence loops P6 and 
P7, and the technological and effective yields loops P8-a and P8-b. Note the 
presence of the major cycle of about 30 years and the presence of several har­
monics . 
I 
• L - T - I 
-11 . 1 / 7 
' 3 
F A 
3 6 8 6 M 
Figure V-18. Effect of Loop P8: Eight Year Harmonic. S 
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Figure V-19 . Behavior of Coffee Production Sector. w 
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e. Loop P9--Foreign Cash Reserves and Suppliers Inventory Control 
Policy. Feedback Description. 
(1) Small Producers 
Each small producing nation is unable to directly affect world 
price developments. A reduction in world coffee prices causes a diminishing 
flow of foreign earnings to the small producer nations; hence, cash foreign 
reserves tend to fall. To reestablish a poor cash position to a normal value, 
pressures develop to keep a lower amount of stocks, and then to export the 
excess to consumers. If all small producers behave in a similar manner, total 
world supplies at the marketplace will tend to rise, causing a further reduction 
in prices (Positive Loop in Figure V-20). 
(2) Large Producers 
A large producer, i .e. Brazil, is able to influence world price 
developments by controlling the amount supplied at the marketplace. Therefore, 
when prices fall, and the nation's foreign cash position deteriorates, the big 
producer will tend to keep higher levels of stocks, thereby, reducing the amount 
of supplies to the marketplace. Hence, total world supplies tend to fall, and 
prices tend to rise (Negative loop in Figure V-20). 
The quantity of coffee to supply at the market place, depends on the 
average level of production, domestic needs and the difference between current 
stocks and the producer desired level of stocks. ^ 
Producers will always keep a minimum level of stocks as protection against 
sudden price fluctuations and demand changes. This is explained in detail in 
Appendix B-n. 
105 
Figure V -20 . Loop P9: Supplier Stock Control Policy. 
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Thus: 
Stocks - desired stocks 
Supplies = Production - Domestic Usage + PCT 
where PCT is the number of months (years, etc) required to attain the inventory 
target value. Domestic usage is the amount of green coffee used by domestic 
processors; it depends on the producer nation(s) population and consumption 
per capita. 
The desired level of stocks, depends in turn, on the nation foreign cash 
reserve. If the nation is a small producer, a low cash reserve causes a reduc­
tion in the desired level of stocks. Hence, supplies at the marketplace rise. If 
on the other hand, the nation is a large producer, a low cash reserve will induce 
retention of stocks and hence, a higher desired level of stocks. Figure V-21 
12) 
displays these two types of relationships. 
f. Loop P10—Export Quotas and ICA's Feedback Description. Falling 
prices induce nations to establish joint agreements to control the flow of supplies 
to the market. Upon signature of the agreement, a system of quota controls 
will prevail over a period of time, period during which the quantity supplied to 
the market falls to approach world demand. Hence, prices will tend to be main­
tained. If, on the other hand, market supplies become lower than world demand, 
prices will tend to recover and rise (Figure V-22). 
The basic model assumes a constant desired stock coverage (0.5 years of 
supply) for all producers. Chapter VII test the effects of each one of the 
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Figure V-21. Inventory Control Policy and Foreign Cash Position. 
When the level of prices rise, producers gradually show less interest 
in supporting and enforcing the established export quotas. Controls are then 
relaxed, and thus, world supplies tend to rise again; therefore, world prices 
13) 
will tend to level off to fall later. 
The effect on behavior of both the feedback which describes stock policy 
(loop P9) and the feedback which describes export quota policy (loop P10) is not 
given in this chapter. Their influence on behavior will be presented later, in 
Chapters VII and IX, respectively. 
Destruction of stocks of green coffee has been a common practice followed 
by the large producers during periods of falling prices. This type of stock 
policy is described in detail in Appendix B-I. 
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Figure V -22. Loop P10: Export Quotas and ICA's. 
C. Summary of World Coffee Production Sector and Behavior 
This chapter describes ten major feedback structures within the World 
Coffee Production Sector. The behavior generated by the system presents clear 
evidence that a major cycle of about 'thirty-two' years plus harmonics, can be 
generated by the postulated feedback structure. In particular, this chapter has 
shown the following: 
(a) The main production loops (PI to P4) generate a coffee cycle of about 30 
years. 
(b) The abandonment loop (P5) causes a cyclic harmonic of about 15 years. 
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(c) The efficient yield loop (P8-a) generates a harmonic of 8 years. 
(d) The obsolescence loops (P6 and P7) add higher frequency harmonics, and 
produce additional price unstability. 
The analysis of the coffee time series previously described in Chapter 
IV postulated a major coffee cycle of 32 years, combined with minor harmonics 
of around 16, 8, 4 and 2 years respectively. The results from the model com­
pare very favorably with the main coffee cycles encountered in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE COFFEE TRADE SECTOR AND THE SIX-YEAR CYCLE 
MQDEL STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR 
This chapter presents evidence that a six year coffee cycle is generated 
by policies and practices originated in the coffee trade sector,, The world coffee 
trade contains two major interlocked subsystems—the trade-distribution and the 
futures market subsectors (Figure VI-0). The chapter indicates, among other 
things, that the operation of the futures coffee market brings benefits to the 
trader who uses the market as a hedging device, in which case he may operate 
his business with a reduced amount of physical stocks. On the other hand, the 
chapter shows that the activity of the coffee futures market tends to add unsta-
bility and wide oscillations to the six year cycle movements. 
To some extent, this is a self contained chapter. The chapter briefly 
describes the operation of the futures markets, and shows the observed six year 
cycles in prices, stocks and volume of trade. In addition, the chapter postulates 
and describes the functioning of a feedback structure whose operation generates 
such market performance and presents the simulated behavior of this structure. 
Appendix BII describes each of the equations used to construct the trade and 
future market model postulated here. 
I l l 
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A. Physical Trade and Distribution Sector 
1. Behavior of Traders 
a. The Concept of Inventory Coverage . Time delays throughout the 
world coffee distribution system together with traders' anticipated expectations 
about future trends in prices create the need to carry inventories. A further 
reason to operate a business with additional levels of stocks is the frequent 
appearance of unpredictable events which cause wide price fluctuations as well 
as short term changes in the demand pattern. Conceptually, inventories can be 
segregated into at least four main categories, each of which supports different 
purposes. First, a working stock serves to maintain a continuous flow of busi­
ness to the customer if supplies become temporarily short. Second, a safety 
stock protects the trader against the risk of stockouts due to sudden demand 
fluctuations. Third, price coverage and speculative stocks provide the trader 
with financial leverage against rising price trends, unexpected price upsurges 
or both. Finally, traders will normally want to keep additional strategic 
marketable stocks to enlarge the flexibility and strength of various penetration 
policies designed to increase the trader's market share. 
Each one of the above four stock categories functions to provide protec­
tion to the trader in the face of uncertainty and delayed effects throughout the 
distribution system. The higher the levels of stocks, the higher the protection 
rendered by the inventory, but also, the larger the costs. A rational trader 
tends to weight the benefits afforded by the stock protection against his inventory 
holding costs. Therefore, the trader will tend to store coffee up to the point at 
113 
which the last unit of bought coffee barely adds benefits over the same unit's 
storage cost, that is, the marginal inventory holding cost equals the marginal 
benefit of the last unit added (Weymar [45, p. 35] ) . 
The degree of protection a manager wants to afford for his business is 
represented by the inventory coverage. This is the period of time during which 
demand can be directly served from, the stocks in case supplies become too short 
or too costly to buy. For instance, a half-quarter-supply of coverage means, 
that a trader may serve the normal customer demand during a period of a month 
and a half, should he not receive (green) coffee during that period. Therefore, 
an expression for the stock level is given by, 
Stock = Average demand • coverage 
(Bags) (Bags /quarter) (quarters) 
and thus, 
Coverage = Stocks /Average Demand. 
As we will see shortly, the concept of inventory coverage is central to 
understand the behavior of traders in the commodity market. 
b. Behavior of Coffee Prices and Coverage . Figure VI-1 displays the 
behavior of quarterly New York spot prices, together with the patterns of stocks 
and coverage held by U.S. roasters since 1954 to 1973. The price series 
exhibit two cycles of about seven and six years, price movements clearly defined 
by peaks during the years 1957, 1964 and 1970 respectively. This behavior 
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appears, however, hidden within the pattern exhibited by the roasters' stocks 
where a cycle of about three years of duration is more apparent than one of six. 
Inventory coverage, on the other hand, exhibits two cycles of around six years 
each, cycles which closely follow the movements generated by the price pattern.1 
The behavioral pattern displayed by the inventory coverage admits at 
least two important observations. First, the pattern shows a secular trend be­
ginning with a value of 0.4 during 1955 and ending with 0. 8 quarters of supply dur­
ing 1973. As the average coverage rises, the quarterly spot price seems to 
follow the downside portion of a longer term cycle: a 32 year cycle which began 
during the early fifties. In fact, if the reader plots a freehanded average on the 
price series, he will get rising spot prices at least since the earlier sixties. 
Thus, over the long run, both prices and coverage tend to rise together. A 
second observation results from direct comparison of the waves exhibited by 
prices and inventory coverage. Coverage peaks one or two quarters after prices 
have reached their maximum value, and more importantly, a rise or decline in 
prices is generally followed by a similar rise or decline in coverage. The above 
two observations suggest a close association between price and stock coverage. 
In fact, one could postulate that a positive price change (rising coffee prices) 
^Coverage has been calculated as the ratio of the U. S. roasters' stocks of 
green coffee to the average sales of roasted coffee in green coffee equiva­
lent per quarter. The sales pattern shows steady growth, except for small 
peaks just before the winter season. Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(U.S.D.A.) 
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induces a large coverage, and vice versa, a negative price change (declining 
prices) causes a lower stock coverage. This statement, when translated into 
managerial language, simply tells what is trivially known by roasters and 
traders; they will tend to increase thê ir purchases of green coffee in anticipation 
of an expected rise in prices, but will keep hand-to-mouth stocks during periods 
of depressed and declining prices. 
c. The Supply of Storage. The relationship between price change and 
coverage observed in the coffee market, is not a new concept. On the contrary, 
the concept is central to the theory of Supply of Storage, developed by several 
authors, Working (46), Brennan (36), Cootner (38) among others, and recently 
expanded by Weymar (45, p. 32) who successfully tested it on the world cocoa 
market. The theory relates expected price changes to the amount of stocks traders 




'The amount of storage a trader wants to supply, that is, the level of stocks, is 
given by the amount of storage which equates marginal holding cost to the 




+ MB PT 
where 
MC is the Marginal Cost of Holding one unit of inventory. 
M B g s is the Marginal Benefit provided by a Safety Stock, i.e. 
stock out yield. 
MB PF 
is the Marginal Benefit provided by the Speculative Stocks, 
(continued next page) 
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At negative rates of price change, when prices decay and supplies are 
abundant, a trader will always keep a minimum coverage, just enough to main­
tain the normal flow of business. As prices begin to rise, in the face of world­
wide scarcity, traders gradually increase their coverage, thereby augmenting 
their purchases and stocks in anticipation of further price increases. On the 
other hand, if prices rise too fast, the additional cost to store the required stock 
tends to become abnormally high, fact which restrain the rapid expansion of 
coverage . Figure VI-2 shows graphically a supply of storage functions whose 
shape closely follows the previous discussion. 
2. Feedback Structure of the World Coffee Trade 
and Distribution Sector 
The feedback structure of the World Coffee Trade and Distribution System 
consists of two coupled feedback loops, one adjusts desired coverage in response 
to prices, the other adjusts current coverage to its target value. 
Appendix B-II describes in detail the equations that compose the World 
Coffee Trade System. 
(continued) 
M B p T is the Marginal Benefit provided by Price Trend Coverage Stock. 
Thus, 
MB = Expected Price Change'= AP = M C „ - MB - MB = \$?(c) 
where M C H > M B s g , and MB are functions of coverage (c), in years-supply. 
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Figure VI-2. Supply of Storage Function (3) 
a. Feedback Loops 
Loop TI—Desired Stock Coverage and World Price, Feedback 
Description. Rising prices in a bull market (positive price change) cause 
traders to augment their desired stock coverage. Desired coverage then, tends 
to rise above the current traders' coverage. To adjust current coverage to its 
new target value, traders will increase their demand for imported green coffee. 
Thus, supplies tend to become relatively more scarce and prices tend to rise 
faster. See Figure VI-3. 
When prices are rising, change in price is positive. Traders, not 
knowing how far prices will increase and for how long, will tend to augment the 
length of their coverage period. (The Supply of Storage theory). Thus, to adjust 
3 ^ This is of the same shape as the supply of storage empirically developed by 
Weymar for the cocoa market [45, p. 64] . 
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Figure VI-3. Loop T l . 
the current coverage to its new target, additional amounts of green coffee will 
have to be purchased. If all traders respond to the rising prices in a similar 
way, total demand for green coffee (the Desired Quantity to be Imported) will 
grow too fast and above current world supplies. Coffee then, becomes scarce . 
In response to scarcity, each trader will tend to get their requirements at the 
expense of the other. Therefore, aggressive competition develops among 
the traders, who now will be willing to offer price premiums to avoid being 
under-supplied or driven out of business. Therefore spot world coffee prices 
will quote higher than initially; average prices then, will exhibit a rising trend 
120 
(Figure VI-3). 
On the other hand, during a price fall when coverage decays low traders' 
demand for green coffee, near or below current foreign supplies, will tend to 
shift aggressive competition from traders to producers. Therefore, suppliers 
will be willing to offer discounts to those traders who buy a certain portion of 
their stocks. Furthermore, as demand decays, the rising oversupply causes 
more aggressive competition among the producers who will offer increasing 
amounts of coffee at much lower price. 
Figure VI-4 shows the effect of world coffee availability on prices. The 
curve may exhibit several possible shapes depending on how sensitive the market 
is to availability. The solid line may be in fact a plausible relation, as described 





A v a i l a b i l i t y 
Figure VI-4 . Coffee Availability and World Price. 
121 
Loop T2—Stocks and Replenishment Policy—Feedback Description. 
Sales tend to deplete stocks, and hence reduce coverage. To restock low coverage, 
traders demand additional quantities of green coffee. After an elapsed period of 
time—the delivery delay—the purchased imported coffee will arrive to relieve 
the depletion and diminished coverage. Figure VI-5. 
Figure VI-5. Loop T2. 
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When current stock coverage is too low or too high with respect to the 
desired coverage, traders will tend to adjust the desired amount of purchases 
so that stock coverage gradually approaches the target value. Thus, if sales 
remain constant, the desired volume of green coffee in inventories is given by 
the product between the desired coverage and the average sales. If in addition, 
the current volume of stocks happen to be equal to this target value, then each 
month the trader would have to buy an amount equal to his monthly sales to keep 
his stocks unchanged and hence, his coverage. If on the other hand, stocks are 
lower than the target volume, the trader would have to buy, in addition to the 
previous amount, a quantity of coffee sufficient to restore the balance: the dif­
ference between the desired level of stocks and the traders amount on hand. 
Conversely, if the level of stocks is higher than the target (desired) value, 
purchases will be reduced by the same difference. 
The purchased quantity will not arrive immediately to the trader's ware­
house; before arrival, the purchased coffee has to be ordered, packed, shipped, 
inspected and distributed. The total stock of coffee already exported, but not 
yet marketable, is coffee said to be in the pipeline. A trader who does not 
control his pipeline is bound to experience alternating periods of oversupply 
and shortage (Forrester [57, Ch. 15]). We assume that inventory control 
policies do include the pipeline. The effect of loop T2 is then, to maintain 
(total) stocks close enough to its desired level. 
b. Behavior of Loops TI and T2. Figure VI-6 shows the Feedback 
Structure of the trade and roaster sector. Figure VI-7 displays the behavior 
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Figure VI-6. Trade and Roaster Sector Without Future Market. 
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generated by the two loops which compose this section. Initially, the system 
is at rest, that is, stocks and coverage are properly placed at their target 
values and the amount sold each year is equal to the amount bought each year. 
The run assumes that producer supplies stay constant, and are sufficient to 
satisfy traders requirements. After about 1.5 years, trader sales suddenly 
increase from 20 million bags per year to 25 million bags per year, and stay 
4) 
there during all the thirty years simulated. 
The sudden rise in sales tends to deplete traders on-hand stocks, and 
reduce the year's supply of coverage below its target value. Therefore, traders 
will place larger orders for green coffee to restore both stocks and coverage. 
Prices then rise, so that traders will tend to increase their coverage (Loop T2); 
this effect creates higher demand on the suppliers and rapid further price 
increases. 
After about one year, sizeable portions of coffee in the pipeline have 
already arrived into the traders' warehouses. Coverage rises and rapidly 
approaches the target (desired) value. Coffee demand on suppliers is then re­
lieved and prices tend to fall. As prices fall, traders will tend to reduce their 
target coverage; Loop T2 now works in the opposite direction: reductions in 
desired coverage tend to restrain demand even more; hence prices and stocks 
4) The amount of sales per year is an input to the system. In other words, 
internally generated changes in the model variables do not affect consump­
tion of coffee. An input can take several forms, it could be exponential with 
growth, or random around a mean, or the well known step function, as used 
here. The use of a step input to disturb a dynamic model generally permits 
one to visualize with more clarity the behavior generated by the system. See 
Forrester [57, p. 38 ] . 
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keep falling. In fact, prices decay up to the sixth year, year during which the 
depleted pipeline and stocks reduce the current coverage below their target 
value. At this time a new cycle is established. 
A step-disturbance simulation shows that the behavior of Loops Tl and 
T2 is stable. The disturbance creates price and stock oscillations that tend to 
diminish with time. After year 15th the system is once again at steady state. 
The total amount of stocks, which initially was 5 million bags, becomes almost 
15 million bags after the 15th year, because the coverage remains constant. 
(Constant coverage with higher sales implies higher stocks.) 
The simulation run shows a price cycle of about 4.5 years of duration. 
This short cycle compared with the previous long price movements of 32 and 16 
years, respectively, reflects the fact that the delays involved within the trade 
s ector are much shorter than those within the production sector. Here, delays 
are of the order of one or less years of duration, as shown by the equations in 
Appendix B-II. The Trade-Distribution sector (Loops T l and T2) form indeed 
a very stable structure. Changing parameters one-at-a-time or even three-
at-a-time within a 50% change, do not suffice to cause instability. 
B. The Future Market 
1. Background 
This section briefly describes the terminology commonly used in futures 
markets operations. The following notes have been collected from bulletins, 
Parameters are values which remain constant throughout the simulation. 
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pamphlets and articles listed in the bibliography [18] , [35] , and [40] . 
Futures trade has informally existed since ancient times. During the 
last two centuries, futures trade has been formally organized in commodities 
exchanges. Nowadays, a trader can buy or sell contracts of coffee for future 
delivery in the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange which established opera­
tions since 1882, or in the London Terminal Market, established during the 
nineteen fifties. 
a. Futures Contract. A futures contract is an "agrement to buy and 
receive or to sell and deliver a commodity at a future date" [18, p. 46] . In 
coffee, a trader can buy or sell contracts to be delivered in the months of 
March, May, July, September or December. These contracts are generally 
called 'Marchs,' 'Mays,' etc. 
b . Future Markets in Coffee. A futures market is a place where both 
buyers and sellers of future contracts meet to carry out their transactions at 
one commonly agreed price. This price is called the future-price. 
c. Future-Price, Spot Price and Basis. Both futures and spot prices 
tend to follow similar trends. The difference between the two prices is called 
the basis. In most commodities, the basis generally exhibits smaller fluctua­
tions than the two prices. 
d. Purpose of Future Trading. Commodity prices exhibit fluctuations, 
and fluctuating prices create uncertainty and business risk. Holders of com­
modity stocks, that is, traders, dealers, roasters, processors, and even 
producers, generally called hedgers, require protection against adverse price 
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movements. At the same time, there are individuals who are willing to assume 
the risk of frequent price movements for the sake of profits. They are specu­
lators who want to benefit from these price fluctuations. 
Trading future contracts is a mechanism by which hedgers transfer the 
unwanted risk to the speculators. The following example serves to illustrate 
the process. Consider a roaster of green coffee, whose main business and 
source of profit is to supply the roasted coffee to several processors. Assume 
prices are rising and the basis remains the same. On July, he buys green 
coffee at 85C7'lb in the spot market, and simultaneously, he sells the same 
quantity of coffee in Septembers, at 87£/lb. He then, earns 2^/lb. One month 
later, he sells his roasted coffee at a price equivalent to 89£/lb of green coffee, 
and buys a similar amount of Septembers at 91£/ lb, cancelling his previous 
commitment at the exchange. Then, he loses 2^/lb, but in total he has ended 
even after completing the two transactions. During the initial transaction the 
roaster establishes a hedge; during the second he lifts his hedge. 
The speculator, on the other hand, buys in July the Septembers sold by 
the roaster at the established 87£/lb. Then, one month later, he will sell to 
the roaster the required futures at 91£/lb, making a profit of 2£/lb in his 
transaction. Thus, the hedger has shifted business risk to the speculator, who 
has been willing to absorb it if he thinks he can get a premium. 
e. Volume of Trade. The total number of contracts sold and purchased 
in the exchange, over a period of time, is called the volume of trade. 
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f. Short and Long Positions. Assume traders sell or buy futures which 
will mature during a certain month X. A trader in the X-future may have sold 
more contracts than he has purchased. Then, he owns a certain number of 
unliquidated contracts. Had the month of maturity arrived he will have to 
deliver a number of bags of coffee of a certain quality to a trader indicated by 
the exchange authority. If, on the other hand, the trader has sold as many 
contracts for the same future as he has purchased, then the trader is even. 
Finally, if the trader has purchased a larger number of contracts for the same 
future, than he has sold, then he owns the difference, as unliquidated contracts. 
Again, upon the month of maturity, he is obliged to accept on delivery the 
unliquidated portion of bags of coffee. 
A trader who has sold more contracts than he has purchased is said to 
be 'short.' Conversely, if his purchases are greater than his sales, he is 
said to be'long.1 A trader who is even is in neither a long nor short position. 
Thus, 
if Sales > purchases, trader is short 
if Sales = purchases, trader has no position 
if Sales < purchases, trader is long 
130 
g. New Sales and Short Covering. A short who sells (new) contracts 
increases his short position. On the other hand, if he buys future contracts 
he is canceling a portion of his unliquidated contracts. Thus, if a short buys 
contracts he reduces his short position. This is the case of short covering 
(Figure VI-8). 
h. New Buying and Long Liquidation. A long who buys (new) contracts 
increases his long position. On the other hand, if he sells some of his future 
contracts he is cancelling a portion of his unliquidated contracts. Thus, he 
reduces his long position. This is a case of long liquidation (Figure VI-8). 
i. Open Interest. Open Interest is the total number of unliquidated con­
tracts in the exchange market. The term is equivalent to open commitment or 
open position. It follows then, 
Open Interest = T Shorts = T Longs 
all traders all traders 
2. Behavior oi the Coffee Futures Market 
Whether the performance of futures markets is systematic or not is sub­
ject to question. Some authors claim that the existence of speculative markets 
precludes the presence of predictable components of price behavior. Within the 
length of tradeable contracts, any systematic behavior would attract enough 
speculation to iron out patterns with amplitudes greater than the burden imposed 
by brokers commissions and overhead (Working [46]). Opponents of this theory 
indicate that the commodity market is made not only by profit-oriented speculators 
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but also by hedgers (traders whose motivation is to diminish their operating 
risk). The effect of hedgers is then to transmit to the future market systematic 
movements originating in the physical distribution system. Supporters of this 
view note that the presence of predictable patterns results from the cyclic 
behavior exhibited by supply and demand and periodic limitations of storage 
(Hauthacker [39]). 
The presence of short-term futures price cyclic movements in U.S. 
domestic commodities has been confirmed by Hauthacker [39]), Smidt [44] 
Alexander [34] and Labeys and Granger [40] . These cycles are just strong 
enough to give a small profit to short term speculators. (See Appendix A, 
Literature Survey.) 
The coffee futures market is dominated by hedgers (Gray [14] , This 
research takes the view that behavioral price patterns originates in the physical 
distribution sector of the coffee industry, passes to the futures market and 
reflects back onto the physical distribution sector. In fact, the research postu­
lates that speculators, in the face of short-term random price fluctuations, 
are forced to liquidate their positions within a time too short to smooth out 
a coffee cycle of six years. 
The future coffee market has traditionally been an inverted market. 
This means that the spot price tends to be most of the time above the quoted 
price for future contracts and also, that the current price of the nearest future 
tends to be higher than the quoted price of more distant futures. Gray [14, p. 
p. 303] reports that this situation has persisted during most part of the present 
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century. Figure VI-9 shows graphically the 'inverted' behavior of the coffee 
future market during a span of time sufficient to cover a full six year cycle. 
The chart has been constructed from five quoted prices per year taken on or 
1. A Short who s e l l s i s ' m o r e ' sho r t 
A Long who buys is ' m o r e ' long 
2. A Short who buys i s ' l e s s ' s h o r t 
A Long who s e l l s i s ' l e s s ' l ong 
F i g u r e V I -8. Buying, Sel l ing and T r a d e r P o s i t i o n . 
Figure VI-9. The Inverted Behavior of the Coffee Future Market. 
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about the twentieth day of February, April, June, August and November, in 
the New York Coffee and Sugar Exchange, respectively. The solid line reflects 
the spot price in the port of New York. The broken line shows the future price 
for the nearest future on the five dates and the dotted line shows the future 
price for the next distant future. For example, by the 20th of June of 1957, 
the spot price for coffee in New York was around 55£/lb (solid line). On the 
same date, the price for coffee to be delivered on July (the next coming future) 
was 55.5£/lb (broken line), while the price for coffee to be delivered in 
7) 
September (the next distant future) was 53.5^/lb (dotted line). 
In the same figure, the spread between the next and the next distant 
future narrows as prices rise and tend to widen during periods of declining 
prices. Furthermore, the fact that distant futures sell at a discount under the 
near future, has advantages for the trader who takes a long position; he will 
buy the distant future at the greater discount, and simultaneously will sell a 
previously bought nearest future at a higher price. Gray [14, p. 304] found 
that the future coffee market has provided profits to traders who routinely take 
a long position; similarly he found a tendency of the coffee market to be 
biased against routine sellers, who generally end up with a loss if they keep 
their short position over a long period of time. 
a. Speculation. Buying the discount seems to be a frequently used 
The chart has been prepared from data collected by Merrill, Lynch Associates 
and appearing in Coffee, a pamphlet. 
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technique in the coffee market. Such prestigious trading institutions as Merrill, 
Lynch and Associates openly suggest to speculators to maintain a long position 
in the more distant futures, Coffee [18]. In fact, the same trade firm claims 
to have published the benefits of this style of trading at least since 1950. 
Furthermore, the author found in personal conversation with an official of the 
firm, that this type of trading policy is normally used by professional specula­
tors in coffee. 
As said before the spread between the nearest and more distant coffee 
futures tends to narrow as prices rise, and tends to widen during a price fall. 
Hence, traders who buy the discount by routinely being long in the more distant 
future tend to get higher profits during a price decline, when the discount on 
the distants is higher. On the other hand, if one measures the spread as the 
difference between the distant-future price and the price of the nearest one, the 
result is generally, a negative number. Therefore, during a period of rising 
prices, when the basis (i.e., the spread) narrows, the percentile change in the 
basis turn out to be a positive number (See Figure VI-10). As prices fall, when 
the spread widens, the percentile change in basis is then negative. This means, 
that a positive change in basis, i .e. the discount narrows as price rises, tends 
to be associated with lower profits to the speculator; conversely, a negative 
change in basis, that is, the discount, widens as price falls, tending to bring 
higher profits to the trader. 
Figure VI-11 depicts graphically the previous description. The figure 
Figure VI-10. Behavior of the Inverted Future Coffee Market. 
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requires, however, a slightly different interpretation. A speculator expects to 
get higher or lower profits depending upon the way he thinks the basis is going 
to move; then he will tend to increase or decrease his desired long position on 
the future market accordingly. Thus far, the behavior of those traders who 
speculate on the spread could be expressed by the following statement: 
Desired Long Position = <£ (Expected % Basis Change) 
where <£ falls as the basis rises. 
There are speculators in the coffee market who trade on 'price trends' 
rather than on spreads between distant and next-future prices. These specu­
lators will prefer to maintain a long position as prices rise by buying distants 
which they will sell later, just before maturity, at the higher price. On the 
other hand, more professional speculators will tend to use a period with falling 
prices to establish a short position. They will sell a distant future at the higher 
price, and then, just before maturity they will buy the future to close their pre­
vious commitment. Therefore, at lower prices speculators on price-trend 
tend to increase their desired long position as prices rise; but will tend to 
switch to short positions if they expect a general fall in prices. Thus, 
Desired Long/ Short Position = F (Eixpected % Price Change) 
The broken line in Figure VI-11 depicts this type of relation. 
b. Hedging. Generally, a hedger in the coffee ma rket is a holder of 
physical stocks who buys at the spot market and simultaneously sells distant 
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Figure VI-11. Speculators' Desired Position. 
futures in the exchange, to protect his purchases against adverse price move­
ments. Thus, he routinely maintains a short position in the future market. 
Consider the following type of short hedge: 
Date Spot Market Future Market 
July 10 Buy X pounds of 
green coffee at 
Sept. 2 Sell to the custo­
mer X pounds of 
processed coffee 
at a price equiva­
lent to 
Profit/Loss in 
the transaction = 
P^ / lb 
-P2£/lb 
(p 2 - *y 
Sell X pounds in 
Septembers at F ^ / l b 
Buy X pounds in 
Septembers at F^/lb 
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Figure VI-12. Hedgers Desired Short Position 
at a Given Level of Stocks. 
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= <FX - P j ) - <F 2 - P 2 ) 
= B l ' B 2 
where B and B are the basis in July 10 and September 2 respectively. If 
B^ is greater than the previous hedge provides a profit. As said before, the 
coffee market is normally 'inverted,' therefore both B and B have negative 
values, that is, spots are quoted higher than futures. Therefore, a profitable 
hedge is more likely to happen during a period of declining prices, when the 
basis is widening, B > B . In fact, during this period, hedgers may prefer 
to sell distants over nexts, as it is during this phase of the price wave when 
distants exhibit the largest discount, a situation that tends to offer a wider 
margin of protection to the hedger. 
When the basis narrows, B is less than B (B < B ), the hedger loses 
ci J _ Ci J L 
money in his transaction. This situation tends to happen as prices rise, when 
the hedger is increasing his coverage and thus, his position in actuals. Hence, 
when the hedger expects the basis to narrow, he will tend to hedge a reduced 
fraction of his physical stocks; the hedger desired short position tends to fall. 
Therefore, hedgers'Desired Short Position can be formulated as, 
Desired Hedgers Short Position = Stocks x § (Expected % Basis Change) 
H 
where appears depicted in Figure VI-12 for a given level of stocks. 
H 
c. Volume of Trade and Open Interest in the Coffee Future Market. 
Volume of trade is the total number of contracts purchased (and sold) over a 
period of time. Figure VI-13 shows the volume of trade in million of bags per 
Figure VI-13. Volume of Trade and Prices. 
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quarter over the period 1930-1939. In turn, Figure VI-14 exhibits the annual 
volume of trade during the same span of time and also for the period 1955 -1972. 
The solid line exhibits the behavior of spot prices in £/lb. In the two figures 
both volume of trade and prices display cycles of about six years, one from 
1931 to 1937, the other from 1958 to 1964. More importantly, the smoothed 
curve showing volume of trade seems to follow the movements of the average 
spot prices. 
The fact that volume of trade rises together with spot price, reflects 
the behavior of both hedgers and speculators. During a rise in prices, traders 
tend to increase their position in actuals, that is higher coverage; thereby 
they will more frequently use the futures market as a hedging device. In 
turn, as both demand for contracts and price rise, speculators become in­
creasingly attracted toward the market, a fact which creates additional number 
of contracts traded, and a higher volume of trade. 
In the United States, coffee is not regulated by the Commodity Exchange 
Authority (CEA), an institution which periodically reports Open Interest, Volume 
of Trade and several other statistics on most of the U. S. traded agricultural 
products. For this reason, among others, the author was unable to collect 
long run figures to describe the open commitment in the Coffee Exchange. 
Several coffee trading papers have reported the following characteristics 
of open interest in the coffee future market. 
(a) Traditionally, a large percentage of the total open interest is composed of 
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open commitments in distant futures, Gray [14]. 
(b) Open Interest was several times higher than physical visible U. S. stocks 
during the first decade of existence of the New York Coffee Exchange, which 
started operations in 1882. Thereafter, open interest in coffee has been 
much lower, and definitely lower than in most other commodities. The 
establishment of the so called Valorization scheme by Brazil in the early 
1900s (a policy of stock retention), adversely influenced the speculators, 
who traditionally tend to trade in less restricted markets (Gear [13, p. 154] ). 
(c) During the last thirty years, open interest figures have rarely been as high 
as the volume of stocks kept by U. S. roasters. This further reduction in 
open commitment may be contrasted with the establishment by producers of 
several types of International Coffee Agreements (ICAs) over the period. 
(d) The coffee market is a 'thin' market, mostly dominated by hedgers. The 
amount of speculation is low when compared with other markets, Gray [14] . 
From the above remarks it is difficult to draw conclusions about the 
behavior of open interest. In fact, as volume of trade rises, open interest may 
decay or rise depending upon hedgers and speculators' needs. 
3. Feedback Structure of the Futures Market 
a. Loop T3—Spot and Future World Coffee Prices, Feedback Description. 
Rising spot prices generally cause rapid increases in the future price of the 
distant futures. In turn, higher future prices provoke additional rises in spot 
prices. Conversely, declining spot prices cause the distant future prices to 
decay, a fact which tends to accelerate a spot price fall (Figure VI-15). 
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Figure VI-15. Loop T3: Spot and Future Price. 
Both spot and future prices exhibit a similar six year cycle, as depicted 
by Figure VI-9. This behavior also appears in Figure VI-16, where the spot 
price has been plotted together with the highest monthly quotation for the (future) 
march contract, and over a longer period of time. The two figures clearly show 
that spot and future prices move together. In fact, futures prices tend to rise 
or decay a little faster than spot prices. Hence, an expected rise in spot price 
(positive price change) indicates to the traders that coffee is in short supply; 
speculators will tend to establish long positions well in advance, creating buy­
ing pressure on the future-price, which tends to increase. In turn, as future 
price rises (future-price change is positive), traders on actuals will tend to 
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Figure VI-16. Inversion of March Future Prices. 
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confirm their expectations about the possibility of a coming period with short 
supplies. Spot prices then, will rise faster. 
b. Loop Set T4—Aggressiveness of Buyers and Sellers of Futures and 
Future Price Formation, Feedback Description. Urgent short covering and 
rapid new buying rajtes reflect aggressiveness of buyers in the futures market. 
Similarly, prompt selling of new contracts and urgent long liquidation 
rates reflect the aggressiveness of sellers in the market. If buyers appear more 
aggressive than sellers, quoted prices will rise; otherwise they will tend to 
decline. Rising or declining future prices (together with 'basis1 movements) 
causes traders to adjust their desired short or long positions to higher or lower 
levels of commitment. Comparison of the traders' current commitment, i.e. 
current open interest, with the established desired targets creates, in turn, 
the need to buy or sell more urgently, either by canceling previous (short/long) 
commitments, or buying or selling larger quantities of contracts to establish 
new (short/long) positions. Hence, if buyers are more active than sellers, 
prices will tend to rise faster, otherwise they will not rise as rapidly, or may 
instead fall (Figure VI-17). 
Each desired short or long position in the aggregate coffee future 
market depends on both expected price trends and expected spread change, 
Q\ 
Several authors claim that a change in future price is a good estimator of a 




^ (Open Interest ) 
Current 
Commitment 
(Open Interes t ) 
Current 
Commitment 




Figure VI-17. Loop Set T4: World Future-Price. 
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as depicted by Figures VI-11 and VI-12. In turn, the total current short position 
held by traders in the market is equal to the total long position held by specula-
9) 
tors; each equals the total number of outstanding contracts in the futures 
market, i .e . , Open Interest. If the desired short position rises above the cur­
rent position by selling new contracts. Additionally, if for some reason, specu-
1 ators expect prices (or spreads) to move adversely, to jeopardize their large 
long position, they will tend to sell and liquidate previously bought contracts, 
thus, reducing their net long commitment. Then, in both cases intended sales 
rise. 
The two feedback loops to the left of Figure VI-17, describe the opposite 
effect. In this case, both, shorts and longs will tend to buy more contracts. If 
the total short position, i.e. open interest, is too high with respect to the shorts' 
desired position, traders will start buying back contracts to liquidate their 
excessive (short) position, hence, the short covering rate, i.e. purchases, tends 
to rise. On the other hand, if prices (or spreads) move to indicate favorable 
conditions to speculators, the desired long position tends to rise above the cur­
rent long position; this is, above open interest. Hence, speculators will tend 
to buy new contracts to enlarge their current long commitments. 
At the ongoing price, not all the intended sales (on purchases) will always 
be made. If intended sales is higher than intended purchases, sellers will 
The total number of contracts purchased should be equal to the total number 
of contracts sold. Thus, individually each trader holds a net short or long 
position, while on the aggregate, T shorts = T longs = Total Open Interest. 
9) 
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aggressively compete with each other and will offer discounts to prospective 
buyers. Hence future quoted prices tend to fall. If, on the other hand, buyers 
intend to purchase more contracts than sellers, they will offer premiums to 
those unwilling to sell future contracts at the old price. Hence, future quoted 
prices tend to rise (Figure VI-1.8). 
c. Loops T5—Open Interest, Feedback Description. Selling and Buying 
new contracts augments the total market open interest, while short covering and 
long liquidation reduce the current open commitment. As open interest rises 
above the desired short and long positions, old open contracts are canceled. 
Hence, as short covering and long liquidation rates augment open interest 
gradually falls to approach from above, either the desired short or long posi­
tions, or both. A low value of open interest, below one of the target (desired) 
value(s) has the opposite effect. New buying or selling rates will tend to rise, 
adding more open contracts to the market, hence increasing the open interest 
which gradually will approach, from below, the established target(s) (Figure 
VI-19). 
d. Loop Set T6—Desired Short Position and Degree of Protection 
Afforded by the Volume of Stocks Hedged in the Future Market, Feedback 
Description. Larger quantities of physical stocks requires frequent use of 
hedging as a protective device in the futures market<, Thus, stocks and open 
(short) commitments tend to rise together. On the other hand, the higher the 
open interest (open commitment), the higher the degree of protection rendered 
by the future market and the less the required coverage (years supply) in 
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Figure VI-18. Future Price and Aggressiveness of Buyers and Sellers. 
physical stocks. In turn, as desired coverage falls, the quantity desired to 
import (demand) tends to decline; stocks and prices then, will tend to fall. 
If stocks decay faster than prices, traders will be able to operate with smaller 
short position. Hence, they will tend to liquidate old open contracts, which 
means that open interest tends to decrease toward a lower level of commitment 
(Loop T6-a (VI-20). Nevertheless, if prices fall faster than stocks, the effect 
of a widening basis tends to force traders to keep a larger short position 
(Figure IV-12). Hence they will sell new contracts, which will produce a higher 
level of open interest (Loop T6-b VI-20). Thus, in one case, a higher open 
interest led to a lower commitment (negative loop), in the other, a larger open 
interest produced an even larger level of open commitment (positive loop). 
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Figure VI -19o Loop Set T5: Open Interest. 
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Figure VI-20. Loop Set T6: Hedging Protection. 
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The figure below shows several supply of storage curves (Figure VI-21) 
at different levels of short (hedged) positions. In particular, the figure shows 
0 A P Price Change 
Figure VI-21. Supply of Storage at Different Levels of Hedging. 
at a certain expected price change AP, three different levels of desired coverage 
C Q , C^, C 2 at three different levels of established short position, H^, H^, 
respectively. In the absence of a futures market, the trader would be unable to 
carry a portion of his stocks in futures, tending to maintain a larger coverage. 
Nevertheless, as the trader uses the future market to hedge an increasing portion 
of his stocks, he gradually raises his own protection against adverse price 
developments; this means that he will not require a coverage as high as before. 
Hence, as the fraction of stocks hedged rises from H to H in the figure, desired 
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coverage gradually declines from C to C years of supply. The net effect of 
a reduced coverage, is to decrease the amount of physical stocks held. In fact, 
a trader who increases his short commitments in the futures market, is able to 
reduce his stocks by holding the reduced portion in the alternative form of future 
contracts. 
e. Loop T7—Degree of Market Price and Export Controls (Quotas), 
Speculation, Open Interest and Volume of Hedging, Feedback Description. 
Declining prices generate pressures on the supplier's side to establish market 
controls and export quotas. The lower the prices, the stronger the enforcement 
of these controls, which attract less and less speculation to the market. Hence, 
the desired speculative position (generally, a long position in the case of coffee) 
tends to decrease, which reduces both volume of trade and open interest and 
creates obstacles to use the market as an efficient hedging device. This in turn, 
reduces the degree of protection rendered by the market to the hedger, who now 
will have to carry the otherwise hedged stock of futures in physical inventory 
(higher coverage). The need to carry higher levels of physical inventories cre­
ates additional demand for green coffee. Thus, the desired quantity to be im­
ported rises to meet supplies. In the face of poor availability of green coffee 
to satisfy the increasing demand, prices will not decay as fast as initially, and 
if availability further deteriorates, then prices will tend to recover and grow. 
The reader will find a more complete description of this process in Weymar 
[45, p. 39] . 
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Figure VI-22. Loop T7: ICAs and Speculation. 
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Similarly, as prices rise, producers become less and less anxious to 
maintain and enforce market price and export quota controls. They will tend 
then, to relax or neglect the application of these control policies; hence, specu­
lators will again appear in large numbers at the market place (Figure VI-22). 
C. Behavior of the Trade and Future Market Sector 
1. The Six-Year Coffee Cycle / y 
The feedback structure of the Cbffee/lrade-distribution system (Loops TI 
and T2) interlocks with the feedback* structure'of the future coffee market (Loops 
T3 to T7) through feedback Loops' T3, T6 and T7 . The total trade and future 
market sector appears in Figure VI-23. 
Figure VI-24 shows the behavior of the sector under a step increase in 
the amount of coffee sold per year. The system exhibits sustained oscillations 
of about 5.3 years of duration. Rising sales creates an upsurge in both spot 
and future prices (Loops TI and T3). Coverage then tends'to rise (Loop T2). 
As both coverage and stocks increase (Loop TI), traders intend to establish 
larger short positions, then, new selling rates, volume of trade, and open 
interest rise (Loop T6). At the same time, the rising prices motivate specu­
lators to establish larger long positions, they will then buy new contracts to 
increase their commitment (Loop T4). Prices peak because current coverage 
has surpassed the target (desired) coverage, which tends to reduce traders 
demand and then, spot prices (Loop TI). As prices fall, a portion of the 
speculators tend to switch from a long to a short position, therefore the 
Figure VI-23. The Coffee Trade Sector. 
Figure VI-24 . The Simulated Six Year Coffee Trade Cycle. oi 
CD 
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futures price receives selling pressure; then, both futures and spot prices 
rapidly fall (Loop T3). Traders then reduce their desired coverage, and stocks 
also fall (Loop TI). 
In the same figure stocks are seen to oscillate around an average of 
about 12.5 million bags. Had the performance been stable, stocks would have 
remained at this level after a certain time. Compare this value with the final 
value of stocks in Figure VI-7. In this figure, stocks reach steady state at 
about 14.5 million bags. Thus, the functioning of a futures market allows the 
trader to operate with a reduced average level of stocks, but unfortunately adds 
instability to his inventories. 
Figure VI-7 showed the performance of the trade-distribution sector 
without a futures market. The behavior of this sector was stable, stability 
which was not affected when the parameters of the system were changed within 
reasonable extreme values. Therefore, the appearance of sustained (unstable) 
oscillations in Figure VI-24 can be entirely attributed to the policies and prac­
tices used by traders in the futures market, and fully described by Loops T3 to 
T7. In fact, one of the major reasons which affect stability in this market lies 
in the way traders establish their short- and long-target positions. 
When prices rise, price-trend speculators tend to increase their long 
positions (See Figure VI-25); hedgers, on the other hand, in response to a 
narrowing basis will tend to reduce the fraction of stocks to hedge. Neverthe­
less, as prices rise they will buy stocks in advance to anticipate further price 
increases. Most likely the total desired short position will end up increasing 
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during this period (Desired Short: Position = Stocks x ^ (AB)), but it could rise 
above or below the speculators desired long position. Open interest, however, 
will approach whatever of the two targets is the lowest. Assume open interest 















Figure VI-25. Hedgers and Speculators' Desired Position. 
but both rising. Hence, speculators would gradually stop their trading as their 
current commitment equals their desired target. On the other hand, hedgers 
would be anxious to establish new short positions to achieve their new short 
target, a fact which creates selling pressure to depress prices. In turn, a 
negative change in prices (real or expected) affects speculators' needs; some 
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of them, the speculators on the spread, will want to increase their long commit­
ments, others, the speculators on the price-trend will liquidate their older long 
position and switch to a new short position. Thus, on the aggregate, open in­
terest will tend to exhibit a further increase, as shown by Figure VI-24. 
The rise in open interest will not last long; rapid falling prices tend to 
reduce coverage and thus, physical stocks. Therefore, hedgers will now tend 
to liquidate a portion of their previous (short) commitment. Open interest then, 
will tend to fall. This completes the cycle. 
Stable equilibrium in the future market requires,then, the fulfillment 
of at least three conditions. First, prices and expected prices should be at rest 
(A P = 0). Second, basis and expected basis should be also at rest (AB = 0), 
and third, the desired short position should be equal to the desired long position, 
and both equal to the current open interest. 
(1) A P = 0 
(2) A B = 0 
(3) Desired Short = Desired Long = Open Interest 
Conditions (1) and (2) insure that both, the desired long and short posi­
tions respectively do not change through time. In this case, the coffee market 
A o u l d tend to be an almost risk free market, and then, speculators or hedgers 
would not have strong motives to trade futures. Condition (3), on the other hand, 
11) 
Fey (54), (55) in two papers on feedback dynamics theory, discusses the 
behavioral effects of two different desired (target) values when controlling 
flow rates of change and accumulations. In general, target values based on 
conflicting interests produce unstable performance. 
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insures no additional buying or selling of contracts, and hence no price and basis 
change. 
Figure VI-26 shows graphically, how unlikely it is for the coffee future 
market and its 'six' year cycle to attain stable equilibrium. The figure has been 
prepared from Figure VI-25. The broken line(s) represent the total desired long 
position by price-trend speculators and spread speculators as a function of price 
12) 
change. The solid line shows the desired short position by both hedgers and 
short speculators in the coffee market. Consider the intersection of curve (a) 
with the solid line. At an expected price change AP , the two target positions 
a 
would be equal, condition (3). Nevertheless, prices and basis are rising 
(AP > 0), therefore the equilibrium attained is not stable. On the other hand, 
a 
stability would be obtained if say, curve (c) cuts the desired short position 
curve at point E , where AP = 0, point where the stability conditions are met. 
In turn, several factors affect the position on the figure of the broken long 
speculative curve, one of which is the degree of export and quota controls. The 
likelihood that all of these factors combine to place 'exactly' the curve to cross 
point E is certainly remote. 
Spread speculators and hedgers take positions depending on expected basis 
change, not expected price change. We have shown, however that in the case 
of coffee, rising prices (AP > 0) leads to a narrowing basis (AB > 0) and vice 
versa. Hence Figure VI-26 is at best a rough approximation. It is presented 
here to clear the discussion about price stability. 
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Figure VI-26. Equilibrium in the Futures Market. 
D. Parameter Testing 
Parameters are values which remain unchanged throughout the simula­
tion run. In the Coffee Trade Model previously described, parameters were 
13) 
varied three-at-a-time, and up and down + 50% from the normal value; a 
large change by all standards. All the simulations exhibited unstable (sustained) 
oscillations, with period varying from 4.19 to 9.65 years of duration, average 
about 5.3 years. As a sample, Figures VI-27 and VI-28 show the behavior of 
Appendix E shows the experiment design used to test parameters three-at-a-
time. This experiment was designed by Dr. W. Low who allowed us to use it. 
13 
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the model under a particular set of parameters. Table VI-1 shows the frequency 
distribution of the appearance of the 'six' year coffee cycle in all the 54 simula­
tions performed. 










4.5 4 7.4% 
5.5 37 68.0% 
6.5 2 3.7% 
7.5 4 7.4% 
8.5 3 5.5% 
9.5 4 7.4% 
Total Runs 54 100 % 
The above results imply that it is the operation of the feedback loops 
which compose the structure of the World Coffee Trade System, and not any 
particular choice of parameter values, which causes the appearance of a coffee 





BEHAVIOR OF THE DYNAMIC WORLD 
COFFEE MODEL (DWCM) 
A. Coupling the Production and Trade Sectors 
The Dynamic World Coffee Model (DWCM) postulated in this research 
contains two major subsystems—the production and trade sectors. The struc­
ture and behavior of each was described and explained in Chapters V and VI 
respectively. The main results obtained from these two chapters are summarized 
in Table VII-1. 
This chapter displays the behavior produced by the World Coffee System 
when the two major sectors are coupled together. Figure VII-1 shows the main 
points at which the two subsystems interlock to complete DWCM. Recall the 
meaning of Quantity-to-Export, Quantity-to-Import, Export-Rate and the 
formation of World-Price. 
Producer-Stocks - Desired Level 
Quantity to Export = Exportable production + of Stocks ^ 
This is the quantity offered by producers; exportable production is the difference 
between the current production rate and the domestic consumption. The second 
term of the above expression adjusts current producer stocks to the desired (tar­
get) level; PCT is the 'Producers Correction Time,' this is the period of time 
169 
Table VII-1. Behavior Produced by the Two Major Sectors 
of the Dynamic World Coffee Model 
1. Production Sector 
a. Main Production Loops (PI to P4 
b. Abandonment Loop (P5) 
c. Effective Yields Loop (P6) 
d. Obsolescence Loops (P7, P8) 
2. Trade Sector 
a. Trade and Distribution Sector. Loops (TI, T2) 
(Without future market) 
Approximate Period 




Other harmonics of 
shorter period. 
4.8 
b. Trade and Future Market Loops (T3 to T6) 5.5 
required to drive stocks near target value. v PCT is a parameter established 
by the producers' management. In the basic simulation run, it has been 
assumed to be equal to one year. 
The 'Quantity to Import' or traders' demand is given by the following 
expression: 
~̂ A11 simulations performed on the Coffee Trade sector in Chapter VI, assumed 











Desired Traders Stock - Trader Stocks 
TCT (b) 
where the 'Desired Traders Stocks' is given by the target coverage in years-of-
supply. TCT is the 'Traders Correction Time, 1 the period of time required for 
the traders' stocks to approach their desired (target) value. In the basic simu-
2) 
lation runs, TCT has been taken as 0.5 years. 
Chapter V described the bargaining process normally used by producers 
and traders to establish both the actual volume of exports and its price (loops P2 
and P4). A result of this bargaining process implies that the current amount to 
export, i.e. the export rate, can be formulated by the average between the 
original quantity offered to be sold, i .e. the 'Quantity-to-Export,' and the origi­
nal traders' demand, i.e. the 1 Quantity-to-Import.' Further, the larger the 
discrepancy between the two quantities, the lower or higher the quoted price to 
carry out the commercial transaction. 
Export Rate = ~ -̂ Quantity to Export + Quantity to Import j (c) 
Price = ^(Quantity to Export - Quantity to Import) (d) 
3) 
The above equations link the Production with the Trade Sectors. 
2) 
To develop the simulation runs on the Production Sector (Chapter V), the 
'Quantity to Import1 was forced to follow exponential growth. 
3) 
Loop T3 in Chapter VI shows other links. This loop relates future-price to 
spot prices and vice versa. Furthermore, the existence of a system of 
export quotas (ICAS) provide still other links in the sense that it affects 
speculative transactions in the future market. 
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B. Behavior of the Basic Simulation Run (DWCM) 
Figure VII-2 shows the behavior of the DWCM when the two sectors are 
coupled together. In this and the subsequent simulation runs, the input to the 
model is the pattern of annual consumption of coffee ('U1 in the plots); it has 
been assumed to grow exponentially beginning with 8 million bags a year by 
1885 and reaching 58 million bags a year by 1970. This pattern roughly 
approximates actual consumption rates. 
In the figure, the behavior of world prices exhibits a long cycle of about 
32 years, and the shape of the wave suggests the presence of harmonic cycles 
of 16 and 8 years; this feature was previously described in Chapter V. From 
the figure however, it is difficult visually to observe a recurrent six year cycle 
generated by the Coffee Trade Sector. Nevertheless, a comparison of Figure 
VII-2 with the behavior exhibited by the production sector in Figure V-19 
(repeated here for convenience) presents clear evidence that one effect of the 
trade sector is to create wider oscillations combined with several movements 
not previously found in the behavior of the production sector. In particular, 
note in Figure VII-2 a five year cycle from 1945 to 1950, and a similar one from 
1974 to 1979. 
The behavioral pattern of annual production rates grows above and below 
the pattern of exports (letter E in the plot), and exhibits peaks at 1907, 1934, 
and 1964, a span of 27 and 30 years respectively. Similarly, the production 
pattern presents other peaks at 1920, 1951 and 1981, a span of 31 years in each 
case. Furthermore, the elapsed period of time between each peak and the next 
Figure V-19. Behavior of the Coffee Production Sector. - 3 CO 
Figure VII-2. Behavior of the DWCM. 2 
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one is 13, 14, 17 and 17 years respectively. Therefore, the production pattern 
reflects a major cycle of about 32 years, together with a harmonic cycle of 
about 15 years duration. 
The behavior of the producer stocks displays a major cycle of about 30 
years; a cycle whose amplitude widens over the simulated years. Intertwined 
with this major movement, there appears a minor cycle of about 15 years. 
The fact that stocks exhibit unstable oscillations—widening amplitude—together 
with the fact that prices peak when stocks are almost totally depleted, is a charac­
teristic of the coffee industry, as initially described in Chapter II and graphically 
depicted by Figure II-1. 
A reason to explain the rapid depletion of stocks as prices rise lies in 
the coupling of the production with the trade sector. When both production rates 
and stocks fall, a reduced quantity is supplied at the market place, i. e.jthe 
Quantity-to-Export in expression (a); consequently, as supplies become scarce 
prices then rise like during the mid fifties in Figures VII-2. A well established 
price trend forces traders to purchase in advance to avoid higher prices in the 
future. Thus, they will increase their desired coverage, their stock and also 
their demand to suppliers (Loop T2, Figure VI -1). Hence, the Quantity-to-import 
tends to rise (see expression (b))„ Therefore, over the period, the quantity sup­
plied at the market place falls while the quantity demanded rises. This situation 
gradually causes worldwide coffee scarcity with rising prices (expression (d)). 
On the other hand, the fact that demand rapidly rises while supplies fall, 
may establish a rising or falling export rate (expression (c)) depending upon which 
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of the two sides of the market is stronger. In any case however, the already 
falling stocks will tend to be depleted much faster, because production rates 
stay below the export rate during the period (See Figure VII-2, from 1952 
4) 
to 1960). 1 
Figure VII-2 exhibits certain phase relations among prices, production 
rates and stocks. Generally, the major peaks in the producer stocks reach a 
maximum about ten years later than prices and about five years later than 
production. Similar phase relationships were also found in the actual patterns 
of behavior of these variables in the coffee industry. (See Chapter II, Section A, 
and Figures II-1 and II-2.) 
C. Behavior of Small and Large Producers 
This section tests the effect on behavior of the stock policy followed by the 
small and the large producers (Loop P9, in Chapter V). Expression (a) in this 
chapter, describes the Quantity-to-Export (world supplies) as the result to add 
the exportable annual production with a second term whose effect was to adjust 
current stocks to their desired (target) value. Loop P9, on the other hand, postu­
lated that the desired level of stocks in years of supply was a function of the for­
eign cash reserves of the producer nation(s). In turn, the shape of the function 
'Further explanation of the cyclic behavior in Figure VII-2 and the ones to 
follow is omitted in the chapter. See the portions of Chapters V and VI 
that describe the production cycle (32 years) and the trade cycle (6 years). 
4) 
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was the result of the power of the nation(s) to manipulate world prices (Figure V 
The rationale presented there was the following: when prices fall and the 
foreign cash reserve of a small producer deteriorates, the small producer unable 
to manipulate price formation tends to supply a larger amount of coffee to the 
marketplace to augment its flow of foreign earnings. To accomplish this objec­
tive, the producer will attempt to store a reduced (target) stock, thereby in­
creasing the Quantity-to-Export (expression (a)). The effect of a fall in prices 
would be to augment the world coffee surplus; prices then would fall faster than 
initially (Positive Loop P9). 
The effect of this type of relation on behavior appears in Figure VLT-3. 
Note that the plots exhibit stronger unstability than in previous runs; this is a 
natural consequence of the functioning oi the positive loop P9; a rapid price fall 
tends to produce too low planting rates, a fact which creates abnormally low 
capacity several years later. At that time then, prices will grow rapidly. 
Figure VII-4 displays the behavior of the large producer. In this case, the 
producer nation powerful enough to retain stocks and alter price tends to enlarge 
its desired level of inventories when its foreign cash position deteriorates; thereby, 
the Quantity-to-Export declines (expression (a)). Loop P9 then, becomes a nega­
tive loop: as prices fall and the producers' foreign cash position decays, world 
supplies become tight. Hence, prices will tend to rise. The effect of the negative 
loop P9 is to smooth out the oscillations exhibited in the previous figure. 
The two plots however, show again the same basic behavioral character­
istics depicted by all previous simulation runs: this is, cycles, period, wave 
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Figure VII-4. Behavior of Large Producers. 
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shape and phase among the variables remain almost the same. Although both 
figures display unstable performance, the behavior of the small producers tends 
to add more instability than the behavior of the large producers. This is the 
main conclusion of this section. 
D. Parameter Testing and the Behavior of the DWCM 
Parameters in a model are quantities that do not change throughout time. 
The Aver age-Number-of-Hectares-per-Tree (HAPTR), the Percentile Yearly 
Growth-in-Agricultural-Labor-Force (PYGAL), the Producers-and-Traders 
Correction-Times (PCT and TCT) are examples of parameters in the DWCM. 
Throughout a simulation run, each one of these quantities remains constant. 
Over a long period of time., however, parameters in a dynamical system 
may change. The DWCM assumes that possible variations in the model parame­
ters over the simulated period do not have a relevant effect on the behavior of 
the system. To see how valid is this hypothesis, the DWCM was simulated with 
different parameter values and the parameters were chosen both one-at-a-time 
5) 
and then three-at-a-time. Within a variation of + 40% to +50% from the nor­
mal parameter value, the behavior produced by the DWCM generally exhibited 
similar cyclic and phase characteristics. The fact that non-linear feedback loops 
tend to compensate the effect of a variation in parameters is a well known charac­
teristic of feedback dynamic models previously developed (Forrester [57, p. 172]). 
5^Chapter VII and Appendix E briefly describe the experimental design used here. 
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Figure VII-5. Sensitivity of World Prices to World Supplies. 
Figure VII-6. Shorter Correction Time in Trade Sector. 0 0 
D O 
183 
Figure VII-5 shows the behavior of the DWCM when the Traders-
Correction-Time (TCT in expression (b)) is reduced from 0.5 to 0.24 years. 
The behavior is again basically the same as the one exhibited by the basic run 
in Figure VII-2. Here however a five year cycle originated in the Coffee Trade 
Sector displays larger unstability. Traders who want to adjust their stocks 
to their desired target too fast (TCT = 0.25 years) normally end up with wild 
inventory oscillations. 
Figure VII-6 shows the behavior of the DWCM when prices are made to 
respond more rapidly to unbalances between supply and demand. In the basic 
run, an excess or shortage of green coffee less than 2 million bags did not pro­
mote too much price change (Availability-Significant-Difference AVSD = 2, in 
equation of Appendix B-I). In the current run, the market is made more sensitive 
to excess or shortage; AVSD = 1 million bags. The plot exhibits higher unstabil­
ity than before, as reflected by a wider amplitude in the sic year Trade-Cycle 
and the rapid fall and rise in both prices and stocks. Nevertheless, despite the 
change in parameter value, the behavior exhibited by the DWCM displays the 
similar composition of cyclic movements previously described. Furthermore, 
stocks still exhibit unstable oscillations and the phase relations among produc­
tion, stocks and prices remain unchanged throughout the experimentation. 
Figure V1I-7 displays the behavior of the DWCM when the annual growth in 
agricultural labor force (PYGAL) reduced from 3% to about 2.5% per year. Note the 
Two other parameters were changed in this run. WPSD and WFPSD both from 
an original value of 7.5 to one of 5. A reduction in these two parameters, 
together with the reduction of TCT, increases the sensitivity of traders to 
adjust coverage, and the effect of the future market upon spot prices. 
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reduction of the amplitude oi the wave. In fact, when the DWCM is simulated with a 
lower amount of available labor, it becomes more costly and difficult to the farmer 
to expand acreage and plant new trees (loop PI). Therefore, if prices rise over a 
period, the amount of accumulated excess capacity tends to be lower; hence, produc­
tion rates and stocks will not grow too fast and prices will not tend to fall to the lowest 
values. The reader should recognize here the effect of the main feedback loop PI on 
behavior. A reduction in labor growth has the effect of diminishing the dominant 
role of this loop on the DWCM. Then a way to reduce unstability in the world coffee 
model is to control the pool of available labor to grow coffee. 
E. Summary 
DWCM displays a long cycle of about 30 years combined with a harmonic 
cycle of 15 years of duration. Intertwined with this long movement, there appears 
a six year 'trade' cycle. Producer stocks display unstable oscillation; stocks peak 
about ten years later than prices, and around five later than production. These 
characteristics are typical of the World Coffee Economy, as described in 
Chapter II. 
Parameter changes do not tend to affect this type of behavior. Therefore, 
the behavior rendered by DWCM is more the result of its feedback structure 
than the result of a particular choice of parameters. 
The behavior of the small producers tends to add instability to the 
World Coffee System. More importantly, a way to reduce the unstable per­
formance of the world coffee economy is to control the flow of available labor 
to grow coffee. 
Figure VI1-7. Reduced Growth in Labor Force. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY OF VALIDATION PROCEDURE 
Validation is the process of assessing how close a dynamic model 
resembles the system under study. This chapter presents a summary of con­
clusions in previous chapters which support the Dynamic World Coffee Model 
postulated in this research. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first 
section compiles evidence from Chapter IV to attest the existence of postulated 
coffee cycles. The second briefly describes the process of structural validation, 
loop assessment and model verification,, The third compares the behavior gene­
rated by DWCM with the actual patterns of behavior of the world coffee economy. 
Finally, the fourth section shows that the behavior of DWCM is more the result 
of the feedback structures which compose the model than the result of a particu­
lar choice of parameters. 
A. The Coffee Cycles 
The coffee cycles postulated in this thesis appear in Table VIII-1. This 
research claims that there is 80% chance that the cycles displayed by the world 
coffee price and production series are not the result of random events. This 
claim is further supported by the following additional findings in Chapter IV: 
1) 
Wright [58, p. 40-43] 
187 







is not , 
(years) Spurious 
Elements of DWCM that Generate Cycles 
of Similar Frequency 
32 
16 
80% Main production loops PI to P4 
Abandonment loop P5 
Effective Yields loop P-8a 
1.5 
80% Trade Distribution and Future Market 
Sector 
Not included in DWCM 
Variance of the power estimate as a function of frequency can be roughly removed 
by drawing a smooth curve through the power estimate. If this curve makes an 
excursion beyond the \ % confidence band, then there is approximately \ % con­
fidence that the excursion did not occur by chance (following [52]). 
1. Both the spectral plots of the price series (1825 to 1972) and the Brazilian 
production (1856 to 1972) and the Brazilian production (1856 to 1973) display 
a similar frequency composition (Figure IV-12). 
2. The presence of harmonic cycles of shorter duration suggests the existence 
of the major fundamental movements. 
3. More importantly, when the postulated cycles and harmonics were combined 
into a mathematical expression to rebuild the price series since 1880, the 
estimated series exhibited remarkable similarities with the real price series 
with respect to period, shape, number of peaks and amplitude (Figure IV-8). 
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B. Structural Validation of DWCM 
Structural validation is the process of assessing how well the postulated 
model describes the mechanisms, procedures and policies actually followed by 
farmers, traders and governments in the coffee economy. Structural validation 
contains two salient steps: (1) loop assessment, (2) model verification. 
Loop assessment is the appraisal of the capability of each feedback loop 
to describe the organization, policies and practices depicted by the system, and 
to establish which feedback loops are relevant to behavior and which others can 
be omitted. The loops postulated in this research are plausible. To assess their 
presence in the system the author undertook an extensive research on coffee 
2) 
history, read numerous economic publications on coffee, held discussions with 
several Brazilian and Colombian farmers, and discussed DWCM with a well-known 
processor of coffee in the United States. 
Both Chapter V on the coffee production sector and Chapter VI on the coffee 
trade sector give references supporting the postulated relations. The chapters 
present charts and factual evidence to attest the correctness of certain relationships. 
The two appendices Bl and BII give additional literature references in support of 
the hypotheses postulated in the microstructure of the loops. In several situations, 
however, the author did not find bibliographical references to support postulated 
relations. The appendices describe these relations as 'assumptions' which require 
further investigation. A list of the assumptions appears in Chapter X, Section C. 
Recommendations for Further Research. 
2 ) On coffee history: [ 1 1 ] , [ 2 0 ] , [22] , [24] , [25] , [ 3 3 ] . 
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Model verification is the process of insuring that the relations depicted by 
each loop are properly translated into the mathematical model. This is one of 
the purposes of describing verbally and then in mathematical form each one of 
the equations contained in DWCM. These descriptions appear in Appendix Bl and 
BII. 
Model verification also involves the checking of typographical errors in 
the model equations. A computer printout of all the model equations is included 
at the end of each of these two appendices. Equations in the printout appear in 
t h e s a m e o r d e r a s t h e y a p p e a r i n A p p e n d i x B . 
C. Behavioral Validation of DWCM 
If a model is a good representation of the actual system, it should be able 
to replicate the behavioral characteristics of the system. Behavioral character­
istics refer here to wave shape, period, phase relations among variables, ampli­
tude, and stability. 
Chapter V of this research has shown that the coffee production sector of 
DWCM contains feedback structures whose behavior displays a major 32-year cycle 
and two of its harmonics. These results appear in Table VIII-1. In particular 
the chapter showed that the main production loops PI to P4 generate an unstable 
coffee cycle of about 30 years in duration; that the abandonment loop P5 causes 
a lagged harmonic of about 15 years, and that the effective yield loop P-8-a 
causes a harmonic of about 8 years. In turn, Chapter VI showed that the coffee 
trade sector generates a cycle of about 6 years in duration. 
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Furthermore, the behavior displayed by DWCM in Chapter VII exhibits 
characteristics similar to the actual behavior of the world coffee economy since 
the year 1885. Prices, production and stocks exhibit similar waves in the simu­
lated runs to those generated by the actual system. Phase relations among these 
variables closely resemble the actual phase relations; stocks peak about 10 years 
later than prices and roughly 2 or 3 years later than production (Figures VII-2, 
II-1 and II-2). 
The behavior of the producers' stocks in DWCM presents the type of 
unstability exhibited by producer inventories in the world coffee economy—a long 
cycle of about 32 years in duration with widening amplitude. In fact, stocks fall 
to near depletion levels when prices peak; and each oscillation is wider than the 
previous one (Figures VII-2 and II-1). 
Table VIII-2 sumna rizes the above results. The third column of the table 
presents the approximate value of prices, production and stocks in four sample 
years. Although the purpose of building DWCM is to explain coffee behavior, not 
to predict values on the variables, these values allow the reader to appreciate the 
range of operation of the depicted variables. Certainly DWCM is able to function 
within a range of values close enough to resemble the behavior of the world coffee 
economy. 
Figure VIII-1 presents the spectral plot(s) of the world coffee price series 
(these spectra appeared in Figure IV-5). The thick broken line shows a typical 
spectral plot of the simulated price series. Note almost concurrent peaks when 
Table VIII-2. Behavioral Comparison Between the Simulated Behavior (DWCM) 
and Actual Behavior of the World Coffee Economy 
* 
Major Cycle Approximate Value During Year Approximate Phase Among Variables 
(years) Sample with respect to prices (years) 
Variable DWCM Actual Years DWCM Actual DWCM Actual 
World Prices 31 32 1925 25 25 
(real £ / lb) 1935 4 8 
1955 30 27 -
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Approximate values taken from actual data, Figures II-1 and II-2, and from the simulated behavior in 
Figure VII-2. Presented here for range comparisons, not for point-to-point comparisons. 
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Figure VIII-1. Spectra Plots of Actual and Simulated Data. 
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one compares the two spectral plots at 40, 16, 9, and 6 years. Therefore, the 
diagram shows that the simulated price series contains similar cyclic composition 
to the actual coffee price time series. 
D. Parameter Testing 
The characteristics of behavior of the World Coffee Economy are more 
the result of the operation of the feedback structures embodied within DWCM than 
a particular choice of parameters. To assess the validity of this hypothesis, 
extensive parameter testing was conducted on DWCM. Parameters in the model 
were chosen three-at-a-time and were varied up and down + 50% from the normal 
value, as shown by the experimental design in Appendix E. A change of + 50% in 
parameter values is abnormally large by any standard. The DWCM exhibited 
very similar behavior under this experimentation. From a total of 108 simulation 
runs, 65 produced a long cycle whose period was within 25 and 35 years. Table 
VIII-3 shows the frequency distribution of the appearance of the 32 year cycle. 
The results imply a probability of about 80% that DWCM exhibits a cycle 
of more than 25 years when parameters are varied up and down 50% of their normal 
value. Therefore, the presence of this cyclic movement is more the effect of the 
feedback loops in the model than a particular choice of parameter values. 
Chapter IV established the peak at 40 years as the 32 year cycle; also the peak 
at 9 was redefined as a peak at 8 years. 
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Table VIII- 3. Frequency Distribution of the Appearance of the 32 Year 
Coffee Cycle when Model Parameters were Varied +50% on a Three-at-
a- Time Experiment 
Range of 
Wave Period No. of Frequency 
(years) Runs % 
35, 40 19 17.59 
30, 34.9 35 32.41 
25, 29.9 30 27.78 
20, 24.9 11 1 0 * 1 8 
15, 19.9 3 2.78 
10, 14.9 9 8.33 
5, 9.9 1 0.93 
Total Runs 108 100% 
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CHAPTER DC 
INTERNATIONAL COFFEE POLICY AND 
THE STABILIZATION OF PRICES 
This chapter contains two major sections. The first one, tests the effects 
on behavior of two 'stabilization' policies frequently advocated by scholars, 
administrators, and policy makers in the coffee business. The second section of 
the chapter constructs a new policy and tests its effects on the stability of 
coffee prices. 
A. Traditionally Recommended Policies 
1. The Effect of an Export Quota Policy (ICAS). (Loop P10, in Chapter V) 
On December 3, 1975 the NF1C Digest"^ published the following description 
of a newly signed coffee agreement: 
Re: Coffee: Coffee negotiators reach agreement in London on a new 6-year 
coffee accord to take effect next Oct. 1; final polishing remains, but last 
minute compromises by the U. S. and Brazil brought a breakthrough to the 
new treaty which will regulate world trade in coffee; essentially, the U. S 
gave way on its demand for applying penalties to nations which do not ship 
the full amount of their market-share quotas; Brazil, together with other 
concessions, accepted a slightly smaller slice of the world market than its 
traditional 33%. The negotiators sought to make the new agreement much 
more flexible than is typical of commodity agreements; supply-reducing 
quotas won't even be imposed unless prices drop to one of two trigger points: 
average '75 prices or 15% below the average for the year before the one 
under consideration; in another innovation, the new pact provides that 
quotas can be suspended, once in effect, if prices rise 15% above their 
previous-year average. J,WSj/28 
Noticias, National Foreign Trade Council, Inc., New York. 
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The above paragraph clearly relates the establishment of export quotas to 
(average) prices. In fact, each one of the previously implemented ICAs have 
characterized by a similar type of relationship: the lower the level of prices the 
lower the quota and the reduced the quantity supplied at the market place; and 
conversely, the higher the level of prices, the higher the quota and the larger the 
2) 
actual quantity of coffee released to the market. 










12 14 Real World Coffee 
Price (tf/lb) 
Figure LX-1. Effect of Prices on Export Quotas. 
axis shows the level of average world coffee prices (AWPR).i n r e a l U. S. £/lb. 
The vertical axis shows the percent of exportable supplies which each year is 
retained when prices fall below the average value of 12c" Ab. The policy depicted 
2) 
The reader may find a complete description of the 1962 and 1967 ICAs in 
Geer [ 13 ] , Rowe [24, 25] and [ 15 ] . 
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by the diagram indicates that a lower level of prices induces a lower fraction of 
export quotas; and conversely, as prices rise above their average, quotas tend 
to be relaxed. Figure LX-1 presents three different quota-price relationships. 
Each one of these reflects the same type of policy, although the actual fraction 
of retained exports is different in each case. In particular, the solid line depicts 
a case in which larger percentages of the exportable supplies are retained from 
the market place. 
Export quotas not only depend on the average price level; they are also 
affected by the rate of price change. This means that producers and consumers 
tend to respond one way when prices are high (low) and falling; but they will 
respond different when prices are high (low) and rising. 
Initially, when prices decay, the system of export quotas tends to be care­
fully enforced by suppliers. Nevertheless, if prices fall too fast, there always 
exists the temptation on the part of the smaller producers to default on their quotas 
and 'dump' additional supplies to the market place. Hence, the effective quota 
to the market tends to be higher than it should be. 
When prices rise, producers lose interest in the enforcement of the quotas; 
therefore, pressures to establish a worldwide agreement shifts from the supplier 
side to the consumer side. Consumers then will be willing to offer a variety of 
trade concessions to suppliers on the condition that they relax their quota fraction. 
Hence a too rapid price increase also tends to induce default on quotas; the 
effective quotas to the market will again be higher than agreed. 
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The above ideas are captured by Figure DC-2. The broken line shows the 
Effect on 
Quota 
- 1 0 1 % Price Change 
Figure DC-2. Effectiveness of Pacted Quotas. 
'theoretical' effect on the pacted quotas due to a fractional price change. The 
solid line on the other hand, displays the actual effective quota to the market. The 
two lines deviate from each other at their extremes in response to quota defaults. 
The quantity supplied at the market place is then given by the following 
expressions: 
Quota = Q.|L(P) x Q 2 (A P) (a) 
where Qn(P) and Q (AP) are the two relations depicted by Figures IX-1 and 
IX-2 respectively and, 
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Quantity Supplied =: Quantity-to-Export x Quota (b) 
where Quantity-to-Export is equal to the annual exportable production plus or less 
a fraction of the difference between the current producers' stocks and the desired 
stock value, i .e . , 
and PCT is the Producer-Correction-Time, the period of time required to drive 
stocks to its desired (target) value, (PCT = / year). See Chapter VII, expres­
sion (a). 
Figure IX-3 exhibits the effect on behavior had the quota policy been insti­
tutionalized since the beginning of the century. Prices still exhibit the same 
unstable performance and combination of cyclic patterns as in the simulation runs 
exhibited in Chapter VII; nevertheless, stocks tend to fluctuate with more violence 
than before. 
The reason for such behavior lies in the nature of the export-quota policy 
(loop P10) and also on the way it interacts with the structure of DWCM. When 
supplies are curtailed from the market place, the rate at which prices fall may 
initially be reduced. Further application of the quota policy may even support 
prices to a level high enough to promote more coffee acreage expansion than it 
would otherwise Rowe [29, p. 187] . The wider unstability of stocks is then the 
result of two combined effects: one during the short run, the other over a longer 
period. First, the enforcement of the quota policy creates larger stocks; second 
Quantity-to-Export = Exportable Production + 
Stocks - desired level 
PCT (c) 




the acreage expansion induces higher production rates and larger inventories 
several years later when the newly planted trees reach maturity. In fact, the 
main effect of the quota policy is to amplify the response due to the main pro­
duction loops PI (Labor) and P2 (prices), but it does not reduce the cyclic be­
havior generated by these two feedback structures. 
2. Effect of a Buffer Stock Policy 
A traditional alternative to export quotas is a buffer stock policy. A 
buffer stock policy consists in the creation of an international agency to 
regulate the flow of supplies to the market place. When prices fall the agency 
will purchase the surplus output to counteract a further price increase; the 
buffer stock then rises. On the other hand, when prices increase, the stocks 
are released to the market with the purpose of augmenting the available supplies 
and thus reducing any further growth in prices. This section shows that the 
creation of an international buffer stock does not promote the price stability it 
intends to achieve. On the contrary, the section shows that a buffer stock 
policy is apt to generate wider price oscillations and instability. 
Figure IV-4 exhibits the structure of a possible buffer stock policy, hi this 
3) 
case, producers still maintain a large control on the newly created buffer. The 
operation of the policy follows from the feedback loops in the diagram. When 
3) 
There are several variations to the buffer policy postulated here: the buffer 
could be primarily administered and controlled by either producers or con­
sumers. Further, whether the buffer agency should directly sell to consumers 
or not is indeed a sensitive issue in coffee policy. All of these aspects among 
others, will require a different formulation of the buffer policy tested here. 
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Figure LX-4. Buffer Stock Policy. 
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producers are overstocked and prices fall, the International Agency will buy a 
portion of their stock excess. Therefore, the Quantity-to-Export (world supplies) 
decays and prices may recover. When prices rise and the producers are with 
tight inventories, the Agency will release a portion of their stocks to the producers, 
thereby augmenting the Quantity-to-Export which creates higher supplies and a 
negative effect on prices. 
Figure IX-5 presents the behavior of the above policy. The price wave 
exhibits a similar amplitude as in the case of the quota-policy; the major difference 
however, is that the six year cycle plays now a major role; hence, the effect of a 
buffer stock policy is to create even more unstability than a quota policy. 
The amplification of the six year cycle results from the interaction of the 
new feedback loop P l l in Figure DC-4 with the loop structures TI and T2 in the 
Trade and Distribution Sector. Assume prices are falling; thus production rates 
and producer stocks tend to be high and rising. At the same time traders are 
reducing their coverage (Loop TI) and also their purchases (Loop T2). Gradually, 
producer stocks will rise above the established desired value; then a portion of 
the surplus inventories will pass to enlarge the buffer stock (Loop Pl l ) . Hence, 
the Quantity-to-Export, i.e. supplies, tends to fall (expression (c) in Quota 
Policy). Prices then will not fall as fast as initially (Loop P2) which result in 
a larger desired traders coferage (Loop TI). In turn, a rising coverage requires 
an additional amount of imports; therefore, traders' demand rises while produ­
cer stocks will tend to fall. This situation creates a market with tight supplies. 
Prices then will rise. Similarly, producer stocks will gradually fall below the 
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established desired level. At this time, additional quantities are released from 
the buffer stock, world supplies will tend to rise to counterbalance the previous 
period with rising prices. A new six year cycle is ready to begin. 
Figure IX-5 still exhibits the long cycle of 32 years plus the harmonics 
movements generated by the production loops (PI to P9). Clearly, the buffer 
stock policy in loop P l l does not produce any change on the basic relationships 
depicted by the production feedback loops; these loops cause the complex wave of 
32 years plus its harmonics. Therefore, solutions to produce stability of this 
major movement require a direct effect on this structure, not the indirect and 
unfavorable effects provided by the buffer policy postulated here. 
B. A New Proposed Stabilization Policy 
The DWCM exhibits persistent cycles and unstable behavior under different 
conditions; this results from the operation of the basic structures embodied within 
the coffee market. Both the parameter testing in Chapter VII and the application 
of policy in this chapter provide evidence that a change in the behavior of the 
World Coffee Economy is possible only when the dominant effect of the feedback 
4) 
structures in the system are reduced. 
This research has found that the major cycle of 32 years is caused by the 
operation of loops PI (Labor - Planting Rate - Trees - Production - Income to 
Farmers - Labor), and P2 (Supplies-Price-Planting Rate - Trees - Production -
The dominant effect of loops in a feedback is frequently referred to as the 'gain 
of the loop'. 
4) 
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Stocks - Supplies). Furthermore, the amount of supplies at the market place is 
given by 
Quantity-to-Export = Production Rate - Domestic Consumption 
Producer Stocks - Desired Stock Level 
+ PCT 
and the 32 year cycle appears in the behavior of production rates, stocks and 
prices, variables embodied in both loops PI and P2. 
A way to reduce the dominant effect, i .e. the gain, of the production loops 
PI and P2 is to transform expression (c). In fact, if production rates are to be 
driven near current world consumption, the amount supplied at the market place 
ought to be a function of demand, not output. Furthermore, to avoid the presence 
of unstability originated in the Coffee Trade Sector, demand refers to end con­
sumption, not to traders' demand. Hence, a new policy statement to regulate the 
annual amount of world supplies can be formulated as follows: 
_ ... x ^ ^ „ , Producer Stocks - Desired Stock Level Quantity-to-Export = Consumption Rate + ——; 
P C T (d) 
where consumption rate is the annual amount of equivalent green coffee which each 
year is used to brew drinkable coffee. In addition, one effect of expression (d) 
is to omit the unstability caused by the production rates. The time to adjust the 
producer stocks to its desired value (PCT = 1 or 2 years) is a too short period. 
5) 
Consumption Rate in (d) is the variable used as an input in the DWCM. 
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When the DWCM was simulated with the new policy in (d) and with a correction 
time of 2 years, the system still shows wide unstability. The reason is that the 
additional amount of supplies caused by the stock adjusting term is large enough 
to promote a rapid price change;, this in turn, stimulates the functioning of the 
production loops PI and P2 to generate the long cyclic movements. 
Figure IX-6 displays the behavior of the new policy when the Producer 
Correction Time is made sufficiently long to smooth the effect of over or under 
stocks on world supplies (PCT = 30). Note that the Traders Correction Time, the 
period used by traders to adjust their stocks to their desired target, remains 
unchanged (TCT = 0.5 years). The figure shows the effect of the policy had it 
been institutionalized since the beginning of the century. The simulated run does 
not exhibit a 32 year cycle or any of its major harmonics; also until the year 1970 
the behavior of prices is rather stable. Thereafter, however, the six year cycle 
displays rampant fluctuations. 
The application of the new policy did not alter any of the feedback loops of 
the Coffee Trade Sector; hence nothing has been done to prevent the appearance 
of the six year cycle. A way to reduce the unstable performance of this type of 
cycle is to augment the Traders Correction Time from its normal value of 0.5 
years to say, 6 years. With this change the new policy transforms into: 
World Supplies 
*Quantity-to-Export = Average Consumption + 
Producer Stocks - Demand Stock Level 
PCT 
PCT = 30 years 
Figure IX-6. Behavior with Proposed New Policy, 
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Traders Demand 
Quantity-to-Import = Average Consumption 
Desired Traders Stocks - Trader Stocks 
+ TCT 
TCT = 6 years. 
Figure IX-7 displays the stabilization effect of the new policy. Prices 
gradually grow in a stable manner, and export rates stay almost in balance with 
consumption. 
This policy does not produce a total stable system however; stocks still 
exhibit a long cycle of about 40 years although the amplitude of the wave tends to 
be smaller than before. In turn, the behavior of both the tree-capacity and pro­
duction rates also shows a similar wave pattern, a cycle difficult to observe in 
the figure. 
The cause of the improved performance of the DWCM under the new policy 
lies primarily on the effect the policy has on the bargaining process between pro­
ducers and traders to establish sales and price (loops P4 and T2). With the new 
policy, both the Quantity-to-Export (Supplies) and the Quantity-to-Import (Traders' 
demand) contain a common term: the average consumption. Therefore, the 
amount of surplus (the difference between supply and demand) at the market place 
tends to be much lower than before. Hence, prices will not respond as fast as 
6 )Chapter VI. 
7) 
Export (E) and consumption Rates (U) are both plotted on the same scale, from 0 
to 80 million bags /year. Production rates (R) and Stocks (S) are both plotted on 
a scale of 0 to 100 million bags/year and bags respectively. 
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in the previous runs. 
The next two figures display the effect on behavior when Brazil the largest 
producer with about 35% of the market share, implements the new policy while 
the smaller producers follow the traditional supply policy with a long correction 
time (PCT = 30). Figure IX-8 assumes a Brazilian market share of 35%; Figure 
IX-9 on the other hand assumes a larger market share (50%) for the same country. 





CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Conclusions 
1. The Coffee Cycles (Chapter IV) 
The cyclic behavior of the World Coffee Economy has been a subject of 
controversy and contradiction. This research presents evidence that the be­
havior of the coffee industry displays a combination of intertwined cyclic move­
ments of different period. Analysis performed on the behavioral patterns of 
both the annual coffee prices (1825 to 1973) and yearly production rates (1850 
to 1973) rendered the following results: 
(a) Long-Run 32 Year Cycle. This is a long cycle of around 32 years in 
duration. The cycle contains a lagged harmonic whose period is 16 
years. Furthermore, this long-run movement contains several minor 
harmonics of shorter duration: 8, 4 and 2 years respectively. 
(b) Intermediate-Range 6 year Cycle. This is a minor cycle which combines 
with the above composite wave. 
(c) Short-Term Cycles: 3 and 2 years respectively. The analysis indicated 
the presence of two cycles of about 3.3 and 2.2 years in duration; the 3.3 
year cycle has a stronger influence than the 2.2 year cycle. 
When the above cyclic movements were grouped together into a mathema­
tical expression to rebuild the world (real) coffee price series since 1880, the 
2 1 5 
estimated series exhibited remarkable similarities to the actual coffee price 
pattern. In fact, both series displayed a similar shape and number of peaks, and 
the amplitudes and values of the two series approximate each other. 
(Figure IV- 8 ). 
2 . Nature of the Coffee Cycles and Price Unstability 
a. The World Coffee Production Sector and the 32 Year Cycle (Chapter V). 
The structure of the World Coffee Production sector postulated in this research 
consists of ten coupled feedback loops. Four of these (loops PI to P4) form the 
main structure of the sector; their operation generates unstable oscillations of 
32 + years in duration. These four loops describe the effects of labor supply 
and world price on land expansion and planting rates. Further, the same loops 
describe the effects of additional tree capacity on production rates and stocks; 
on price formation and income to the farmers; and together they explain how these 
variables interrelate to attract more or less labor to coffee regions. 
The length of the 32 year cycle is caused by a long sequence of delays 
embodied within the adjusting mechanisms of the main loops and which were not 
clearly recognized in earlier coffee studies. Some of these delays are the 
following (Table V-l, Chapter V). 
(1) Time to adjust land to a desired acreage 
(2) Time to prepare the newly added land 
(3) Time to plant additional available acreage 
(4) Tree maturing delay 
(5) Time required to distribute the current production rates 
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(6) Time to average current quoted world prices 
(7) Time to adjust/enforce domestic price policy 
(8) Time to average current domestic prices to the farmer 
(9) Time to perceive a change in farmers' income and standard of living 
(10) Time required to attract labor to coffee regions 
(1) Time to adjust land to a desired acreage (as (1) above) 
Each one of the above time delays involves a duration of at least one 
or two years. The maturing delay of four or five years is just one delay among 
many. 
Loops P5 to P10 are secondary loops within the coffee production sector. 
Their operation causes the presence of harmonics of shorter duration which com­
bine together to shape a complex wave of 32 years of period. In particular, the 
fact that older coffee trees are abandoned as prices fall (loop P5) causes a lagged 
harmonic of around 16 years' duration. Similarly, the tendency of farmers to 
upgrade their cultivation procedures when prices rise (loop P8) introduces an 
additional harmonic whose period is about 8 years. 
One of the effects of advances in agricultural coffee technology is to develop 
more productive seeds. An undesired byproduct of this technological process is 
to accelerate the obsolescence of the more matured trees (loops P6 and P7); the 
research shows how rapid tree obsolescence rates produce higher order harmon­
ics which combine with the 32 year wave; more importantly, this type of "techno­
logically induced obsolescence" tends to add instability to the behavior of prices. 
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b. The Coffee Trade Sector and the Six Year Coffee Cycle (Chapter VI). 
The Coffee Trade Sector contains two major subsystems: The Trade-and-
Distribution Sector and the Future Market Sector. The Trade-and-Distribution 
Sector involves two coupled feedback loops, one to replenish and maintain inven­
tories near a target value (loop T2), the other to adjust traders' inventory 
targets in response to expected price changes (loop Tl) . The operation of these 
two loops exhibits a stable cycle whose period is about 4.8 years. 
The Future-Market Sector contains four coupled feedback structures 
(loops T3 to T7). Some of these describe the behavior of hedgers and speculators 
in the future market (loops T4, T5 and %6); others function to interlock this 
market with the Trade and Distribution sector (loops T3 and T6). When the two 
sectors are linked together the behavior of the system turns out unstable and the 
period of the cycle increases to near six years in duration. 
Despite the unstabilizing effect on the Coffee Trade Sector, the futures 
market renders a benefit to both traders and users of green coffee. In fact, a 
user who routinely maintains a short position in futures is able to operate with 
a lower average level of inventory investment. 
c. Coffee and the Three and Two Year Cycles. This research does not 
study the nature of these two short movements. The two year cycle may reflect 
the biological cycle of the coffee tree, as claimed by most authors. The three 
year coffee cycle (3.3 years) encountered in this research presents an interesting 
and intriguing problem, however. History on coffee economy does not attest 
the existence of such a type of movement. Yet, there exist a chance of about 
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95% that this cycle is not the result of random events. 
3. The Dynamic World Coffee Model (DWCM) (Chapter VII) 
The Dynamic World Coffee Model (DWCM) postulated in this research 
couples together the Coffee Production and Trade sectors. The behavior of the 
model exhibits both the long cycle(s) originated by the production sector, and 
the six year cycle generated by the trade sector. 
The DWCM exhibits the unstable characteristics displayed by the actual 
behavior of the coffee market (Chapter II): 
(a) Prices, production rates and producer stocks display a composite wave of 
about 32 years in duration. The amplitude of the wave tends to widen 
throughout time. 
(b) The widening peaks are more prominent in the case of the producer stocks. 
Stocks tend to grow rapidly, reach about one year of supply and then decay. 
A price recovery occurs when stocks have fallen to abnormally low values. 
(c) Stocks peak about ten years later than prices and about six years later than 
production. 
(d) The shape of the simulated price and stock patterns exhibits remarkable 
similitude with the actual pattern of behavior of these two variables in the 
world coffee market. 
4. Price Instability and Policy 
Simulation runs of the model indicate that the following structural 
characteristics of the World Coffee Economy are responsible for the unstable 
performance exhibited by the coffee market. 
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(a) Producers Supply Policy. Chapter LX on World Coffee Policy showed 
that a supply policy based on exportable production rates and rapid stock adjust­
ment produces unstable cycles of 32 years. 
(b) Traders Demand Policy. The same chapter shows that the unstable 
trade cycle of 6 years can be stabilized by augmenting the period of time during 
which traders adjust their stocks to the desired target value. 
(c) Stock Policy of Small Producers. Chapter VII presents evidence that 
the stock policy followed by the small producers tends to cause wider price 
fluctuations than the stock policy of a large producer. 
(d) Induced Tree Obsolescence. The development of new types of seed 
with high yields per tree induces large tree obsolescence rates. Rapid accumu­
lation of obsolete capacity produces an additional effect on price instability 
(Chapter V). 
(e) Labor Supply. The Coffee system is sensitive to changes in the rate 
at which the available labor force grows. A reduction in the percent rate the 
producer nations1 population growth tends to reduce the amplitude of the price 
wave (Chapter VII). 
5. Effect of Traditionally Recommended Stabilization Policies (Chapter LX) 
(a) Export Quota Policy (ICAS). This research presents evidence that 
systems of export quotas like those traditionally used in the previous ICAs do 
not produce a major effect on the unstable performance of the World coffee 
economy over the long range. 
(b) Buffer Stock Policy. Preliminary research on a buffer stock 
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policy indicates that an internationally administered buffer stock does not pro­
duce its intended stabilization effect. On the contrary, it appears from this 
research that the establishment of this type of policy may even add more in­
stability to the long run performance of the World Coffee Economy. 
6. Stabilization Policy 
This research shows that a major change in the producers supply policy 
produces a more stable performance of the World Coffee Economy. The new 
supply policy is given by the following expression: 
World Supplies = Average (End) Consumption 
Producer Stocks - Desired Stock Level 
Producer Stock Correction Time 
where consumption means the annual rate of coffee usage by the end customers; 
the Producer Stock Correction Time is the time required to adjust stocks to 
their desired value. In the new policy this period of time is made very long, 
about 30 years. 
The above policy presents two important differences with respect to the 
current policy used by producers. One, the amount supplied at the market place 
depends on end consumption, not on exportable production. Second, although 
the stock adjustment term remains unchanged, the new policy requires the 
implementation of a very slow and gradual stock adjustment process, as opposed 
to the current policy in which stocks tend to be driven to the desired value over 
a too short period of time, one or two years. 
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The new policy diminishes the instability of the 32 year cycle and its har­
monics. To reduce the unstable performance of the 6 year cycle, the demand 
policy used by traders requires also the application of a slower adjusting stock 
mechanism. 
B. Recommendations 
1. Although the new policy constructed in this research produced a far more 
stable response than the other policies tested, the author of this research 
recognizes that several problems remain to be solved before a definite 
recommendation can be given in regard to the benefits brought about by the 
new policy. The following is a short and incomplete list of some of the 
main issues that require further investigation: 
a. Effect of parameter sensitivity on the new policy. 
b. The new policy as a type of International Coffee Agreement: (i) produ­
cers; (ii) producers and consumers. 
c. Market share required by a larger producer(s) in order to stabilize the 
market. In this case small producers would be assumed to follow the 
traditional supply policy. 
d. The stabilization effect of the new policy, or any other for that matter, 
depends on the actual position of the coffee cycle at the moment of 
implementing it. The proper question is then, should the new policy 
be introduced when prices are high or low? 
e. Stabilization of the six year coffee trade cycle requires further 
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investigation of the future market. Implementation of the new policy re­
quires the establishment of several arrangements between producers and 
consumers. 
The Dynamic World Coffee Model (DWCM) postulated in this research could 
be extended and redesigned to test in detail the following aspects of the 
World Coffee Economy: 
a. Behavior of small producers versus the behavior of the large producers. 
This would require the addition into the model of complete sectors 
representing both the small and the large producers. 
b. Behavior of the Mild, Arabic and Robusta producers and the effects of 
price differentials and producers competition on the coffee cycles. 
If a new stabilization policy is not implemented, the model extension(s) 
suggested above will allow designing individual producer policies to stabi­
lize income or increase market share in the face of world coffee unstability. 
In particular: 
a. 'Best' policy of the largest producer, i . e . , Brazil, in the face of an 
unstable market. 
b. 'Best' policy of the small producers, i . e . , Colombia or the Central 
American nations. 
The trade and distribution sector could be extended to investigate similar 
questions at the trade and processor levels. If several competitors are 
included, the model will allow testing the goodness of individual policies 
with the purpose to establish the best course of action to achieve further 
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market penetration and growth. 
C. Recommendations for Futher Research 
Most assertions in the coffee model postulated in this research have 
been supported by factual evidence, cited literature or obvious logic. In seve­
ral situations, however, the author did not find bibliographical references or 
hard data to support the postulated relationships. Additional research is re­
quired to assess the veracity of both the logic and conclusions upon which these 
relationships are founded. Table X - l lists the assumptions made in the DWCM 
which require further investigation. 
Table X - l . Assumptions in DWCM Which Require 
Further Investigation 




1. Production Sector V B-I 
a. Induced Obsolescence 13 
b. Abandoned Fraction of 
Trees 15 [1 ] 
[1 ] c. Effect of Prices/income 
on Removal of 
Obsolete Trees 
14 
e. Foreign Cash Reserve 
and Stock policy 18 
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Sector Chapter Appendix Section if any 
2. Trade Sector VI. BII 
a. Trade and Distribution 
1. Qualification of 
Supply of Storage 
Function for 
Coffee 3 [ 4 5 ] 
b. Futures Market 
1. Long/ Short positions 
in response to price/ 
basis change 11, 12 
2. Intended sales-purchases 
and price formation 4 
3. Pressure to sell distant 
futures over next futures 
and market inversion 4 [14] , [18 ] 
4. Behavior of open interest 
at the coffee exchanges 6 [14], [18] 
APPENDIX A 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
1 . Coffee 




1. Rowe's Study on Coffee j 
Rowe [24, 25] considers that the best solution to the problem of recurrent 
overcapacity and coffee price unstability is to return to an unregulated market. 
Nevertheless, the present conditions of the coffee market require the creation 
of an international agreement of some sort with the purpose of achieving a gradual 
transition from the current state to one with no controls. 
The International Coffee Agreement (ICA) is an effective process for con­
trolling prices to meet the producer countries' needs. Consequently, the ICA 
provides a subsidy to high cost producers while at the same time prevents a 
downward price adjustment toward genuine costs of production. For this reason 
Rowe foresees a general stagnation in the development of higher productive tech­
niques, a development which would hinder both the expansion of low cost coffee 
plantations and the removal of obsolete capacity—a situation not compatible with 
a real long run equilibrium. Furthermore, these type of agreements have the 
adverse effect of postponing the implementation of sound economic solutions to 
the coffee industry and make the application of corrective policies difficult to 
put into effect, in view of the well entrenched interests generated during the ICA 
period. 
Although one of the aims of the ICA is the adjustment of production to 
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meet demand, the controls to regulate surplus stocks and productive capacity 
have been traditionally vague. These controls to be effective enough would re­
quire the use of massive financial assistance which must come from abroad, a 
plan not included in the 1962 agreement, although established six years later. 
Rowe believes that international controls should still exist to drive the 
present coffee economy into a state of pure competition and long run equilibrium 
between demand and supply. This approach, which will allow a gradual transition, 
should permit producers to adjust its necessities to lower levels of coffee income, 
while at the same time an international fund or arrangement of some sort will 
help to switch resources to more productive activities. Nevertheless, Rowe 
insists, the basic principle which any control scheme must contain is allowance 
for a 'decline of the price level down to the true equilibrium level of supply of 
demand.' Thus, he considered as economically sound one of the first proposals 
from the Coffee Study Group of the United Nations in 1961 which contained gradual 
reductions in annual coffee prices, and the establishment of an international system 
of buffer stocks to keep prices within certain limits. Both conditions were unaccept­
able to most producer nations. 
V. D. Wickizer [28] is one of the authors who has studied the coffee 
economy. He has developed additional criticism of the regulatory schemes pro­
vided by the International Coffee Agreements, and has presented comments simi­
lar to those made by Rowe. In-particular he has concentrated on explaining the 
political motivation behind the ICAs and has analyzed the major obstacles faced 
by producers and consumers when trying to enforce most of the controls existing 
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within the agreement. Unfortunately, limitations of this thesis do not permit 
further explanation of Wickizer's work. Reference [ 2 8 ] presents a summary 
of the criticism he developed previously in several other papers. 
2 . Geer's Study on Coffee 
Thomas Geer [13 ] has studied the world coffee economy within the frame­
work of the theory of oligopolistic competition. He has concluded that the world 
coffee industry can best be represented by a bilateral oligopolistic model with 
product differentiation on the production side, and by an oligopsonist model on 
the buying side. The normal performance of this type of market is characterized 
by instability, rather than stability and long-run equilibrium, as it would be were 
the coffee market a pure competitive market. Therefore, he advocates the need 
to consider this market as an 'exception' in which appropriate regulatory controls 
should be imposed to drive the system toward a stable performance. 
Geer analyzed the behavior of prices from 1945 to 1960. He concluded 
that the price unstability over the period was the result of non-collusive strategies 
followed by the producer countries. In turn, the non-collusive strategy of oligopo­
lists acting on a differentiated market makes it increasingly difficult for one 
oligopolist to establish a regular pattern or reaction when faced by competitors' 
price changes. As a result, every one of the independent sellers confront a 
widely undeterminate and fluctuating demand for his produce under some conditions. 
This situation may produce price stability at some indeterminate level, although 
more often than not it will tend to create chaotic price fluctuations in which a long 
run equilibrium cannot be reached—a situation which he names indeterminate 
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instability. 
This performance requires therefore, some form of collusion among 
producers, collusion which must take the form of a restriction of the freedom 
of all oligopolists to use independent market strategies. This need for collusion 
among producers, in order to diminish the state of indeterminate instability, is 
one of the reasons to implement prices and output controls as a first step to get 
a more 'competitive' and stable type of behavior. 
Geer considers the International Coffee Agreements of 1962 and 1968 as 
efficient and successful ways to establish a policy of collusion among suppliers. 
Their major benefit however, has been to prevent price fluctuations created by 
oligopolistic price wars. He notes that short term price fluctuations during the 
ICAS' period have been reduced from 12.4% to 6.9% per year. 
3. Arak's Study on Brasilian Coffee Growers 
The decision process of the Sao Paulo coffee growers with respect to 
planting, removal of old capacity and crop abandonment has been studied by 
Arak [1] . 
The decision to plant a certain number of trees each year, depends on 
the difference between a desired planted acreage and the current acreage planted 
with coffee trees. In turn, Arak postulated that the speed at which usable land 
is conditioned to plant coffee is proportional to the percentage of trees which 
are old; also, if the average yield of the tree stock is relatively low the farmer 
will tend to plant new productive trees to renovate his plantation. 
The removal decision is based upon a different process than the planting 
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decision. Arak postulated that the number of trees removed each year is a func­
tion of the expectations of both price and physical yield, where the average yield 
of a plantation depends on the average age of the trees and also on the fertility 
of the soil [1, p. 216] . 
An abandoned tree is one which remains standing up but which is not 
cultivated. As the tree ages, its yield and revenue declines while the cost of 
harvesting and cultivating the tree increases. Therefore, the farmer will not 
cultivate those trees whose annual revenue is less than its maintenance cost. 
From this argument Arak concluded that the older the trees at which abandon­
ment takes place, the smaller the percentage of older trees abandoned [l, 
p. 216-217 ] . 
Arak used the above set of hypothesis to test the price responsiveness of 
the Sao Pablo Coffee growers. The linearized statistical model rendered accept­
able explanation for the performance of the coffee growers during the years 
studied. The World Coffee Dynamic Model proposed in this thesis makes use 
of several of the concepts developed by Arak. 
4. Other Studies on Coffee 
The performance of the coffee market under the International Coffee 
Agreement has been analyzed in several investigations sponsored by the United 
Nations, the International Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other world­
wide organizations [ 5, 6, 16, 27]. These studies generally present a large body 
of factual data and concentrate on exploring the feasible application of regulatory 
controls and their effects on domestic developmental policies. 
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Modeling and statistical experimentation on coffee have recently received 
attention by various authors. Wickens et al. [27] have constructed a coffee model 
which explains the import demand for each type of coffee bean. They have assumed 
that the demand for the coffee produced by a particular country varies in relation 
to the prices of four I substitutable bean varieties. The research shows that con­
sumption of coffee may not follow the classical demand theory and seems to be 
influenced by the inventory held by individual processors. 
M. Epps [4] has built a simulation model of the world coffee economy to 
determine market outcomes based on possible changes in the terms of the 
International Coffee Agreement. The model consists of fifteen equations which 
taken together represent the world market viewed as an oligopoly with product 
differentiation. The research estimated the foreign income receipts at different 
levels of Brazilian support prices and export quotas assuming several production 
goals for each one of the producers of Brazilian, Mild and Robusta types of coffee. 
The simulation was run for the 1958 to 1965 period and the estimated equations 
were used to forecast the revenue outcomes during 1966 and 1967. Results of 
this study indicate that for all three export grades of coffee, the revenues vary 
in direct proportion with the support price; a price of 90£ per pound yielding 
the largest revenues. 
B. Previous Research on Commodity Economic Systems: 
A Summary 
To date, there exists no unified theory to explain the short, medium, and 
long term movements of commodity prices. There is, however, a broad spectrum 
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of statistical techniques which have been used to analyze direct open-loop rela­
tions among some of the variables which shape the commodity markets. These 
methodological approaches have followed the lines of the classical econometric 
theory with frequent use of auto-regressive models, time series analyses and 
more recently, spectral analysis. These applications have been used to test 
the performance of the variable trends during medium and short periods and 
also in studying the random nature of short term price fluctuations. 
1. Short Term Price Fluctuations: Studies by Working, Larson, and Brinegar 
A number of different theories have been proposed to explain the nature 
of commodity price behavior. Among these, the theory of anticipatory price 
formation by H. Working [46] , has received major attention during the last years. 
Working hypothesized that the erratic price behavior observed in most commodi­
ties is the result of randomly appearing information in regard to the future 
states of the demand and supply for the product. Thus, the price of futures in 
a commodity is the result of anticipated expectations about the future, and not the 
effect of current changes in output and consumption. To confirm his theory, 
Working found no positive or negative correlation between two successive price 
changes, which indicates that short term price movements for the commodities 
studied may follow a random walk. 
The previous theory has been partially confirmed by Larson [42] and 
Brinegar [ 3 7 ] , who found evidence of low positive or negative correlation in 
price changes when studying the same group of U. S. domestic products. 
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2. Short Term Systematic Behavior: Studies by Houthacker and Others 
The presence of systematic price behavior has been confirmed to some 
extent by the works of Houthacker [39] , Smidt [44], Alexander [34] and others. 
They have observed the profits or losses resulting when trading procedures are 
applied in a consistent fashion. If the selected procedure, in response to a given 
price pattern, produces a profit over a long period of time, then past price 
movements can be successfully used to forecast future price changes. This means 
that price changes are not entirely independent. Authors following this method­
ology have generally suggested that the short term price formation of a commo­
dity results from a combination of both a random walk pattern and a seasonal 
movement. However, they generally agree that the systematic component has 
less effect than the random component in explaining the variability of the price 
pattern of futures. A similar situation has been found for spot price movements 
[40, p. 98] , although in this case the systematic component of prices seems to 
have a larger influence than in the case of the futures. 
To date, none of the postulated theories explains satisfactorily the short 
term price movements exhibited by most agricultural commodities. Critics of 
the random walk theory generally note the weakness of the statistical procedures 
used to test the randomness of price changes. They note that under such tests 
systematic trends may look like random walks. On the other hand, some theorists 
claim that the very existence of speculative markets preclude the presence of 
predictable components of price behavior; a predictable pattern would attract a 
large number of profit-oriented trades whose effect is to add randomness to any 
234 
systematic pattern [40, p. 84] . Still, an opposite view indicates that, contrary 
to the purely speculative markets, the commodity market is made not only by 
profit-oriented traders but also by hedgers, processors whose primary motivation 
is to diminish their operating risk caused by fluctuation in their raw material, and 
who consequently do not seek profits; hence the existence of systematic behavior 
is possible. Further, supports of this view note that the presence of systematic 
price patterns result from the seasonal behavior exhibited by supply and demand, 
a seasonality also associated with periodic storage limitations. 
Worth noting here is a remark made by Hauthacker [39] in regard to the 
nature of the short-term price movements of most commodities: 
Commodity price developments are watched by relatively few traders, 
most of them quite set in their ways; even in the most active future 
markets the volume of serious research by participants seems to be 
quite small. It is therefore possible that systematic patterns will re­
main largely unknown for a very long time. 
3. The Labys and Granger Studies 
Perhaps the most complete statistical experimentation on the behavior of 
short term price movements has been conducted by Labys and Granger [40, 4 l ] . 
Their investigation deals only with a group of commodities produced and traded 
on domestic U. S. markets, in particular, those featuring both cash and futures 
exchanges and having a fairly complete history of data and records on speculation 
and hedging. The authors have created a commodity price econometric model 
capable of both explanation and prediction of short term price behavior. 
Labys and Granger have used spectral analyses to analyze daily, weekly, 
and monthly price movements of both cash and future price series. The 
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estimated power spectra suggests that the price pattern of all commodities 
studied has a strong random component, but some regularity has been discovered 
in the fluctuations of seasonal or longer duration. 
The authors established the frequency components of the price patterns, 
then used these results to investigate the validity of Working's theory of expecta­
tions and its influence on price formation. To check this theory, they tested the 
hypothesis: "the future price is a good estimator of the expected spot price, once 
the future has matured." The cross-spectra between the futures and spot price 
time series rendered rather conflicting results, as coherence between the two 
series was found significant but the required lead-lag relation was non consistent. 
Therefore, the research was unable to prove or refute the expectations hypothesis. 
Nevertheless, the study brought into light several relations useful to predict 
price developments. Among these, Labys and Granger found that the best 
predictor of a future cash price is the current cash price, while near future 
prices were found to be more related to current cash price than were more 
distant futures. 
One of the important conclusions provided by Labys and Granger's 
investigation deals with the role the simple price-quantity theory of demand plays 
in shaping longer run price regularities. In general, current supply and demand 
failed to provide adequate explanation for price movements while both hedging 
and speculating in the future market were found to have a larger influence in 
price formation than was previously recognized [40, p. 13ol 
236 
The authors have also tested the influence of several other factors on prices. 
The results of these investigations were brought together by means of step-wise 
regression procedures. They found that price fluctuations are the result of 
prices of substitutable commodities, levels of hedging and speculating, the pres­
sures of demand on supply, and business-cycle indicators, in that order [40, 
p. 36] . However, the effect of speculative influences tends to decline in impor­
tance as one considers a longer run, while the effect due to the business cycle 
becomes more relevant. 
4. Other Important Studies on Commodity Price Behavior 
There are several authors who had investigated the nature of both inter­
mediate and long-run commodity behavior. Traditionally, these researchers focus 
on the Keynesian concept of risk premium and develop variations of the supply of 
storage theory to explain intermediate type of movements while many other 
researchers have developed alternative formulations of the Cobweb form to 
explain long run behavior. 
Cootner [38] , Hauthakker [39] and Working [46] , among several others, 
have been leaders in the development of the Supply of Storage concept to explain 
medium range behavior. Later, Weymar [45]further elaborated on the theory 
and successfully tested it within the context of cocoa, an internationally traded 
commodity whose tree characteristics and market structure loosely resemble 
those of coffee. On the other hand, one of the best known conceptual models to 
explain long-run commodity behavior is perhaps the Dynamic Commodity Cycle 
Model (DCCM) developed by Meadows [43] in 1970. Both Weymar's cocoa model 
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and Meadows' DCCM are two important pieces of commodity research; in particu­
lar they form the starting point to build the World Coffee Dynamic Model presented 
in this research. For this reason, a more detailed review of these two studies 
appear within the main text of this thesis, in Chapter III. 
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APPENDIX B-I 
A WORLD COFFEE MODEL 
PRODUCTION SECTOR 
(Description of Equations 
Assumptions and Support) 
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I. PRODUCTION SECTOR 
1. Agricultural and Urban Labor Force (ALABF, ULABF) 
The total number of individuals currently working or potentially employable 
within the agricultural and industrial sectors of the coffee-producing countries 
constitute the agricultural and urban labor force, respectively. The labor force 
in each one of these groups at the end of a year can be easily calculated from the 
previous year labor force population and the net growth and migration rates during 
the same year. Migration tends to restrain the growth in the agricultural labor 
force, while it compounds to create higher growth rates at most urban centers. ^ 
L ALABF. K=ALABF. J+DT*(NGALF. JK-MTUC. JK) (1) 
N ALABF=3*10 6 
L ULABF. K=ULA BF. J+D T* (M TUC. JK+ N GULF. JK) (2) 
A TALABF.K=ALABF K+ULABF.K (3) 
* ALABF - Agricultural Labor Force (men) 
NGALF - Natural Growth Agricultural Labor Force (men/years) 
MTUC - Migration rate to Urban Centers (men/year) 
* ULABF - Urban Labor Force (men) 
NGULF - Natural Growth Urban Labor Force (men/year) 
* TALABF - Total Labor Force (men) 
In the coffee producer nations, population of urban centers has traditionally 
grown at faster rates than population in rural areas. In Latin America it is not 
uncommon to find cities with yearly growth of about 6%, a figure which is almost 
twice as large as the average population growth of these countries. 
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2. Labor Growth and Migration Rates—NGALF, NGULF, MTUC 
The natural population growth of the coffee-producing countries generates 
a steady flow of individuals who want to enter the labor force and engage in pro­
ductive life. A further increase in labor force normally brings about the formation 
of new families, and the raising of children who later, when mature enough will 
also enter the labor force. At the same time, elders will be leaving the pool of 
labor, departure, which grossly stated, also depends on the total number of indi­
viduals composing the labor force. Hence, the 'net' natural growth in labor force, 
as frequently stated, is proportional to the current labor force (equation 4 and 5). 
The constant of proportionality (0.028) is less than the natural fraction of popula­
tion growth given by demographic sources (0.035) but high enough to reflect the 
frequent use of very young persons in coffee and other agricultural activities. 
Migration to urban centers results from the tendency of developing econo­
mies to industrialize and to switch human resources devoted to agricultural pur­
suits in favor of industrial and service activities. The gradual change from an 
agricultural to industrial base is accomplished through the acquisition of productive 
capital whose equipments and techniques upgrade the output and distribution of food 
among the growing population, and create accumulation of wealth to expand the 
industrial base. On the other hand, the use of productive capital in the rural 
sector compels' idle labor to move to city centers and to engage in better paid 
industrial jobs, with the hope of reaching the higher standard of living generally 
provided by urban life. Hence, migration rates depend on the total pool of rural 
workers (ALABF) and also, on the attractiveness posed to the peasant by living 
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conditions in the city (Equation 6). 
R NGALF. KL=ALABF. K*PYGAL*GROWTH. K (4) 
C PYGAL=0.028 
R NGULF. KL=ULABF. K*PYGUL*GROWTH. K (5) 
C PYGUL=0.02 
R MTUC. KL=ALABF. K*NPYM*ATUC. K*GROWTH. K (6) 
C NPYM=0.01 
*NGALF - Natural Growth Rate Agricultural 
Labor Force (men/year) 
PYGAL - Yearly Growth Fraction, Agricultural 
Labor Force (Fraction/Year) 
GROWTH - 0,1 Variable to Test Model without/with 
Growth (Dimensionless) 
*NGULF - Natural Growth Rate Urban Labor Force 
(men/year) 
PYGUL - Yearly Growth Fraction Urban Labor 
Force (Fraction/Year) 
*MTUC - Migration Rate to Urban Centers (men/year) 
NPYM - Normal Fraction Yearly Migration 
(Fraction/Year) 
ATUC - Attraction to Urban Centers (Dimensionless) 
3. Attraction to Crop Coffee (ATCC) and Available Supply 
Only a fraction of the agricultural labor force (ALABF) of a producing nation 
lives within areas suitable to coffee cropping. Generally, a farmer will be attrac­
ted toward a coffee area when he expects to get a higher income and standard of 
living than the one he gets if engaged in other regions. For similar reasons, a 
farmer who owns a plot of land within a coffee area may choose to plant and harvest 
coffee trees. In the case of coffee, the returns to the peasant include his wages, 
of Labor (AVCL) 
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if a worker, or his wages and profits if he owns the land, plus several other 
benefits he normally receives from official institutions whose purpose is to main­
tain and support the pool of coffee growers. In fact, the income per capita in most 
states whose economic base is coffee tends to be higher than in other regions 
dedicated to other agricultural pursuits, despite their higher levels of population 
n 
densities and growth rates. ; Hence, the supply of labor in the coffee areas 
depends on the ratio between the earned coffee income per capita and the income 
he will receive if engaged in other activities. 
Equation (7) shows the total producers' income (PROIN), the product of 
whatever was produced during a year, and the domestic price per bag received 
by the farmer—all production can be sold at a floor price to the official coffee 
institutions. The current labor employed in coffee is given by EMCL, in 
equations (8). The first of these two equations gives the maximum employable 
labor force (IEMCL), this is the product among the total land used (LAND+LABP), 
the labor units required per hectare (LUPHA) and the fraction of acreage being 
actually harvested (1-ABFRT). The second equation indicates that the actual 
employed labor (EMCL) cannot be higher than the current availability of labor 
(AVCL). The value for the parameter labor-units-per-hectare (LUPHA = 0.200) 
has been adjusted from data presented by Kalmanoff [l6, p. 59 to 62], 
Equations (9) develop the relative income per labor unit (ARIPLU). As 
this ratio increases above one, the cropping of coffee becomes more and more 
2) 
The coffee states of Antioquia, Caldas and Quindio in Colombia; Parama and 
Sao Paulo in Brazil. 
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attractive to both the farm owner and worker; on the other hand, during periods 
of depressed prices and income, many workers and farmers may instead seek 
employment in other activities. This relationship appears in equation (10) and 
graphically in Figure Bl-a, where the variable 'attractiveness to Crop Coffee' 
(ATCC) is measured on a scale from 0.4 to 1.6. A value of one, in ATCC, means 
that the earned coffee income per labor unit is about the same as incomes earned 
in other economic activities within the same coffee area or its surroundings, and 
hence, there is no incentive to enter or leave coffee farms. On the other hand, 
even if the relative income per labor unit (RIPLU) or more precisely, its expected 
value (the average of RIPLU) is just below one, but laborers expect their coffee 
income to increase at a faster rate, many of them will decide to stay within the 
coffee activity, rather than leave it, unless the workers and the public expect a 
drastic income reduction. This is the meaning attached to Figure Bl-b. The 
reader may note the different shape exhibited by the two previous relationships. 
In Fig. B-l-a, Attractiveness to Crop Coffee, (ATCC) grows or decays exponen­
tially with the average relative income—that is, with the current benefits received 
from being a coffee harvester. On the other hand, in Figure Bl-b, the effect 
due to average income change reflects future expectations; certainly, the farmer 
of a traditional agricultural base, as coffee, will tend to judge future expectations 
about his income with caution. Hence, if our hypothesis is right, the shape of the 
curve should gradually approach a maximum (and a minimum) beyond which a 
rapid (expected) income change would not suffice to make the owner of the farms 
to plant more trees, or to attract more labor. This is the meaning of equation 12 . 
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Attractiveness to Crop Coffee Attractiveness to Crop Coffee 
ATCC from Income Change 
ARIPLU AINCH 
Average Relative Income per Average Income Change 
Labor Unit 
(a) (b) 
Figure B- l . Attractiveness to Crop Coffee. 
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Q 
A PROIN.K=ADPR.K*APRR.KxlO (7) 
(8) 
(9) 
A IEMCL. K=(LAND. K+LABP. K)*LUPHA*(1-ABFRJ. K) 
A EMCL. K=MIN(IEMCL. K, AVCL. K) 
C LUPHA=0.200 
A INPLU. K=PROIN. K/EMCL. K 
A R M N T P L U . K = I N P L U . K / M I N P L 
N MINPL=INPLU 
A ARIPLU. K=SMOOTH(RINPLU. K, 1) 
A ATCC.K=TABHL(TATC, ARIPLU. K, 0.8, 1.2,0.05) (10) 
T T A T O 0 . 4 / 0 . 6 / 0 . 8/0. 9 /1 /1 . l / l . 2 /1 .4 /1 .6 
A AINCH. K=SMOOTH(RINPLU. K-ARINPLU. K/ARIPLU. K, 1) (11) 
A ACICHM. K=TABHL(TATH, AINCH. K, - 0 . 05, 0. 05, 0. 01) (12) 
T TATH=0. 8/0. 8/0. 85 /0 .9 /0 . 95/1 /1 . 05/1. l / l . 15/1 .2 /1 .2 
PROIN - Producers' Income ($/year) 
ADPR - Average Domestic Price ($/bag) 
APRR - Average Production Rate (million bags/year) 
EMCL - Employment Coffee Labor (men) 
LAND 1 _ T o t a l U g e d L a n d / h e c t a r e g ) 
LABP J V ' 
LUPHA - Labor Unit per Hectare (men/ha) 
ABFRT - Abandoned Fraction of Trees (fraction) 
AVCL - Available Coffee Labor (Men) 
INPLU - Income per Labor Unit ($/men-year) 
MINPLU - Minimum Income per Labor Units 
in Non-Coffee Activities ($/men-year) 
RINPLU - Relative Income per Labor Unit 
(Dimensionless) 
ARIPLU - Average of RINPLU (Dimensionless) 
ATCC - Attractiveness to Crop Coffee 
(Dimens ionle s s) 
AINCH - Average Income Change (Fraction) 
ACICHM - Attractiveness to Crop Coffee from 
Income Change (a Multiplier) (Dimensionless) 
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Finally, the supply of labor, Available-Coffee-Labor (AVCL) is given by 
the fraction of agricultural labor force (ALABF) willing to engage in coffee crop­
ping activities; equation 13. A normal fraction (NFRCL) of about 0.25 seems 
3) 
to be a good choice after reviewing information about Colombia and Brazil. 
The smooth operation in the same equations takes into account the fact that newly 
developed conditions in the coffee business, do not attract labor immediately. On 
the average, a delay of one year may be a reasonable value. 
A AVC LI. K=ALABF. K*NFRCL*ATCC. K*ACICHH. K 
C NFRCL=0.25 (13) 
A AVCL. K=SMOOTH(AVCLI. K, 1) 
AVC LI - Available Coffee Labor Indicated 
(men) 
NFRCL - Normal Fraction Coffee Labor (fraction) 
ATCC Attractiveness to Crop Coffee 
L (Dimensionless) 
ACICHM (Two Multipliers) 
AVCL - Available Coffee Labor (men) 
4. Desired Land to Plant Coffee Trees (DELND) 
The opening of new lands to cultivate coffee trees depends on the benefits 
the farmer expects to receive from enlarging his coffee acreage as compared with 
the gains he would receive by cultivating other crop(s). The advantages deriving 
from coffee cultivation result, primarily, from the nature of this crop which 
requires large quantities of human labor and does not need complex and costly 
See Kalmanoff [l6 p. 28] and bulletins by the Pan American Coffee Bureau 
[29 , 30 , and 3 l l 
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agricultural equipment, and secondly, on the application of several governmental 
policies conceived to protect and maintain the pool of coffee farmers and their 
productive stocks of trees, as described in the previous section. The main 
determinant of acreage dedicated to coffee is the availability and cost of labor. 
Figure B2 exhibits the estimated cost structure in typical farms in Colombia at 
different levels of yields per hectare. At lower yields,labor costs account for 
almost all the costs incurred; however, as the yields increase the participation 
of labor costs decay toward a 70% of the total costs; still a high figure. There­
fore, a farmer who considers whether to plant coffee trees or use his land for 
other type of product would weight the probable cost of the labor he would use in 
coffee, versus the costly capital he would require in the alternative crop,unless, 
of course, the substituteve crop requires as much labor and as few capital as 
coffee. Furthermore, the farmer who owns a small plot, who does not have 
readily access to credit and finance and who has cultural attachments to agricul­
tural tradition will show a preference for coffee, a product with lower operating 
risks, among other things,because of the floor price the governments normally 
guarantee on surplus output, and also a crop in which the farmer can use most 
of his family to provide cheap non-waged labor. Certainly, not by coincidence, 
most coffee areas where the land tenure is composed by small plots typically 
show families with six or more children, as happens in the coffee states of 
The structure of costs in other countries follows a similar pattern. Wickizen 
in Coffee, Tea and Cocoa (p. 492) claims that on the average labor costs 
























Figure B2 # Estimated Cost Estructure at Different 
Yie lds per Hectare in Colombia (1967)• 
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Colombia. 
In Brazil, where the size of the farms tends to be larger, the availability 
of labor to weed, plant and harvest the coffee plantation has been a salient and 
recurrent problem. Furtado (11, chapter on Coffee) describes several periods 
during the economic history of Brazil in which the scarcity of labor created 
serious obstacles to the expansion of Brazil coffee acreage. In turn, Arak 
(1, p. 214) has presented the situation of the Sao Paulo coffee grower in the 
following terms: 
. . . In Sao Paulo the main barrier to the immediate expansion of coffee 
cultivation to the 'desired' [acreage] level was labor. The coffee 
sector which absorbed a large portion of Sao Paulo's labor force was 
not a perfect competitor in the labor market. Future labor costs thus 
depended significantly upon demand for labor in the coffee sector, 
ceteris paribus. In deciding whether to plant a new tree in year t or 
in a later year t+1, the rational farmer would consider, among other 
things, the probable demand for labor in the two years. 
Therefore, as shown by equation 14 , the desired acreage in coffee 
depends primarily on the availability of coffee labor (AVCL). Furthermore, 
given an established price to the farmer's output, there would be a land extension 
which will return larger profits in coffee than in other crops. Thus, when prices 
are high and the farmer expects them to be even higher, it would pay him to incur 
larger labor wages to get enough labor to expand, prepare, weed and plant addi­
tional acres of land. Conversely, at lower and declining prices the farmer may 
not expand his coffee acreage, but rather may prefer to dedicate a portion of his 
coffee land to other activities, in which case he will have to pay the high cost 
involved in uprooting obsolete trees, or if no other alternative seems possible, 
he may decide to keep his current acreage and not harvest a fraction of his trees. 
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Thus, equations 14 and 15 describe the desired land in coffee as determined by 
the available labor (AVCL) and also by adjusting effects due to both, the current 
level of prices and the farmer's expectations about price change. These two 
effects, LPM and LPCHM have been depicted in Figure B3. 
Land (Price) Multiplier Land (Price Change) Multiplier 
LPM LPCHM 
AD PR (S/Bag) 
Average Domestic Price to the Farmer 
(a) 
RDPRC 
Percent Domestic Price Change 
(b) 
Figure B3. Land Multipliers. 
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A value of about $6 /Bag of green coffee to the farmer appears enough to main­
tain his actual acreage; in this case no further land expansion is induced, 
(LPM=1). As price rises, new lands are opened to crop coffee, with the result 
that labor and possible land, will tend to become scarce and more costly. This 
is one of the reasons to explain the gradual leveling of the land (price) multiplier 
at high prices, (LPM ~ 1.23). The other reason is associated with the farmer 
expectations about the stability of high coffee prices. Most of them know that 
very high prices will not last long and if high enough, a reversing price trend 
may be approaching; hence, the farmer will tend to become more conservative 
in his decision to expand acreage at these high price levels. On the other hand, 
a reduction in prices below $6/Bag, tends to create income to the farmer near 
or below his subsistence level, and only a few of them will be willing to expand 
acreage (LPM=0.8). See equation 16. 
The rationale to explain the shape of the land (price change) multiplier 
(LPCHM) in equation 17 is very similar to the one presented above. Price 
change is an indication of the future price level, hence a measurement of price 
expectations. Furthermore, the two multipliers, LPM and LPCHM combine 
themselves to evaluate current and expected developments in the coffee market. 
The multiplication of these two variables, and not their addition for example, 
is the reflection that a farmer should react very differently to high and rising 
prices than to high but declining prices, or any other possible combination of 
terms (equation 15). 
Finally, desired land (DELND) has been taken as a smoothed (average) 
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version of the desired land indicated (DELNI). The effect of the smooth operator 
(equation 18) is to create a weighted average of past developments, in which the 
weight is higher for more recent events than for more distant. This final 
equation describes the gradual process of adjustment that should occur when say, 
unexpected exogenous disturbances affect price developments. If the current 
state of affairs indicates a total desired acreage of 1000 hectares and a sudden 
disturbance points at 5000 hectares, farmers may not be willing and may not 
have the required resources on hand to rapidly change their desires and expec­
tations that rapidly. Rather, if the sudden disturbance persists, they will gradu­
ally reach the conviction that new additional land really creates a lasting and 
profitable opportunity. 
In this research most smooth operators have the same meaning attached 
above, unless specifically stated otherwise. Further description of this type of 
equations will be committed hereafter. 
A NDLAND. K=AVC L. K/LUPHA (14) 
A DELNI. K=NDLAND. K*LPM. K*LPCHM. K (15) 
A LPM. K=TABHL(TLPM, AD PR. K, 4,24, 2) (16) 
T TLPM=0. 8 /1 /1 /1 . 05 /1 .1 /1 .15 /1 .18 /1 .2 /1 .22 /1 .23 /1 .23 
A LPCHM. K=TABHL(TLPC, RDPRC. K, - 0 . 05, 0. 05, 0.01) (17) 
T TLPC=0. 9/0. 91/0 .93/0 . 95/0. 98/1/1 . 03/1. 035/1. 04A- 05/1.05 
A DELND. K=SMOOTH(DE LNI. K, TADL) (18) 
C TADL=1 
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NDLAND - Normal Desired Land (Hectares) 
DELNI - Desired Land Indicated (Hectares) 
LPM - Land (Price) Multiplier 
(Dimensionless) 
LPCHM . - Land (Price Change) Multiplier 
(Dimensionless) 
DELND - Desired Land in Coffee (Hectares) 
TADL - Delay to Adjust Desired Value (Years) 
5. Land Preparation Rate (LPR) and Land 
Removal Rate (LRR) 
The amount of hectares per year to be cleared, weeded and conditioned 
to support coffee trees is the land preparation rate (LPR). As said before, the 
desired land in coffee (DELND) is the total acreage the farmer is willing to use 
in coffee. Therefore, the yearly additions of land (LPR) can be easily calculated 
as a fraction of the difference between the desired acreage and the current land 
in coffee. If the farmer is able to adjust his land to the desired value in just one 
year, he would add hectares of coffee land equal to the difference between the 
desired and the actual hectares used; on the other hand, if the land he intends to 
use is currently utilized with other crops, he will probably have to wait until the 
next harvesting period to collect his cash and invest in coffee. Let us say then, 
that each year, the farmer can adjust only 50% of the difference between the target 
area and the current used land (equations 19). 
The total number of hectares of land being cleared, weeded and prepared 
to transplant small coffee trees is defined here as Land Being Prepared (LABP) 
equation 20. One or two years thereafter when the land has received proper 
treatment and rest, new land will be ready to support coffee trees. Thus, every 
254 
year, a fraction of this land is additional to the total acreage planted. This is 
the meaning of the Net Land Arrival Rate (NLAR) depicted in equation 21. 
The total area (LAND) supporting coffee plants or ready to be planted 
with coffee at the end of a year is equal to the same area one year ago, plus 
the Net Land Arrival Rate (NLAR) during the year, minus the number of hec­
tares removed from coffee plantations during the year (LRR), as indicated by 
equation 22; this is a level type of equation reflecting the total accumulation of 
usable and used hectares at each period of time. 
Trees which become obsolete by age, or which are damaged by plagues 
or adverse weather conditions are removed. Tn general, land which has sup­
ported coffee trees during a long period of years may not be usable again for 
coffee and if so, the farmer would have to expend high costs in fertilizer to 
get modest yields (Arak, p. 213). Hence, the removal of obsolete capacity in 
fact, reduces the total land previously dedicated to coffee. Equation 23 shows 
the yearly Land Removal Rate (LRR). It depends on the annual number of trees 
removed and the average number of trees per hectare. 
A LNDA. K=(DELND„ K-LAND. K-LABP. K)/LCT 
C LCT=2 (19) 
R LPR. KL=MAX(LNDA. K, -LABP. K/DT) 
L LABP. K=LABP. J+DT*(LPR. JK-NLAR. JK) (20) 
R NLAR. KL=LABP. K/DTUL (21) 
C DTUL=2 
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L LAND. K=LAND. J+DT*(NLAR. JK-LRR. JK) (22) 
R LRR. KL=ATRR. K*HAPTR (23) 
C HAPTR=O.OOT 
* LNDA - Land Adjustment (hectares/year) 
LCT - Land Correction Time (years) 
* LPR - Land Preparation Rate 
(hectares /year) 
* LA BP - Land Being Prepared (hectares) 
* NLAR - Net Land Arrival Rate 
(hectares /year) 
DTUL - Delay to Utilize Land (years) 
* LAND - Land Used and Usable in Coffee 
(hectares) 
* LRR - Land Removal Rate (hectares/year) 
ATRR - Average Tree Removal Rate 
(Trees/year) 
HAPTR - Hectares per Tree (ha/Tree) 
6. Available Land to Plant New Trees (AVLND) 
The difference between the total land currently used and usable (LAND) 
and the actually planted acreage gives the available land to plant additional trees 
(AVLND). In turn, the extension of hectares planted with trees (used land = 
USLND) is simply the product of the total number of standing trees and the hec­
tares required per each tree (equations, 24, 25). 
A USLND. K=TTR.K*HAPTR (24) 
A AVLND. K=LAND.K-USLND.K (25) 
* USLND - Used Land in Standing Trees 
(hectares) 
* AVLND - Available Land to Plant New Trees 
(hectares) 
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7. Planting Rate (PLR) 
The seeding and cultivation of the small coffee plants of the mild type is 
normally accomplished in a shaded nursery bed, near to the place where the 
plant will definitely stand as a coffee tree. Thus, planting rate (PLR) refers here 
to the number of trees one or less years old which are transplanted to the field 
during each year. Depending upon the variety of coffee, trees are planted closer 
2 
or farther from each other. On the average, a space of some 10 m per tree 
seems to be a good number, figure which is equivalent to 1000 trees per hectare. 
(HAPTR =0. 001 ha/tree). Furthermore, how quickly the available land (AVLND) 
is to be covered with trees depends on several things. First, the availability of 
labor to accomplish the task; second, if the farmer owns a large proportion of 
obsolete capacity he may choose to rapidly plant the new varieties to renovate 
his plantation, and finally, if the expected yield of the newly seeded trees is 
higher than the yield of his obsolete trees, he may as well decide to enlarge the 
proportion of new trees and plant more frequently (Arak 1, p. 213). 
Equations 26 and 27 describe this mechanism. The available land (AVLND) 
divided by the number of hectares per tree (HAPTR) gives the maximum number 
of trees to plant. Depending upon the conditions stated above, only a fraction of 
this amount will be planted each year, i .e. 1/PLCT.K. Furthermore, one can 
confidently assume that under most normal circumstances, the farmer will never 
choose to uproot some of the newly planted trees; PLR is positive. Instead, as 
Arak and many others have pointed out, if general conditions in the coffee market 
are poor, the farmer may rather choose not to plant at all and perhaps may uproot 
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some of his oldest trees [1 , p. 214]. 
The speed at which the farmer wants to plant is captured in the concept 
Planting-C orection-Time (PLCT),. As indicated previously, this is the number 
of years required to plant the whole available land, or stated in another way, the 
inverse of this number shows how fast the available land is used. Equation 27 
shows the Planting-Correction-Time (PLCT) as affected by both the fraction of 
obsolete trees through a multiplier, the obsolescence-Plant-Multiplier (OBSPM) 
and the ratio between the highly productive yields of young trees and the low yield 
of older trees. This latter effect is described as Productive-to-Obsolete-Yield-
Ratio-Multiplier (POYRM). The effect of labor availability on planting speed has 
been excluded, although labor indirectly affects the planting rate, in view of our 
assumptions about land expansion. 
Figure B4-a exhibits the values and shape of the two planting multipliers. 
When there is almost no obsolete capacity (FOTR=0), planting correction time is 
not reduced, and the speed of planting will proceed normally. Initially, gradual 
increases in the amount of obsolete trees may pass unnoticed to the farmer to 
promote rapid planting; later on, however, when it becomes clear to him that 
more than 60% of his tree stock is old, he will decide to increase the renovation 
rate of his plantation. This is the reason underlying the gradual decay in the 
obsolescence planting multiplier (OBSPM). On the other hand, even if the farmer 
wishes to plant his available area very rapidly, he will encounter a limit beyond 
which it will be impossible to accelerate the pace of planting. Hence, the curve 
gradually bends toward this lower limit. See Figure B4-a, and equation 28. 
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OBSPM POYRM 
Obsolescence Planting Multiplier Productive to Obsolete Yield Ratio 
Multiplier 
FOTR POYR 
Fraction Obsolete Trees Productive to Obsolete Yield Ratio 
(a) (b) 
Figure B4. Planting Multipliers. 
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Similarly, when the total stock of trees is relatively old, the yield ratio 
between the more productive and less productive trees is close to one, and also 
each one of the yields will be lower. Thus it becomes more urgent to plant young 
trees to re-establish yields with larger profits. On the other hand, as the stock 
of trees becomes gradually younger, the rising yield ratio will tend to 
restrain the speed at which the plantation is renovated—renovation becomes less 
urgent, a fact which explains the diminishing change exhibited by the Yield-Ratio-
Planting-Multiplier (POYRM) as it approaches high values (Fig. B4-b and 
equation 29.) 
Finally, the fraction of obsolete trees (FOTR) is stated as the ratio of the 
total obsolete capacity (OBTR) and the total number of trees (TTR) in the 
plantation (equation 30). 
R PLR. KL=MAX(AVLND. K/(HAPTR*PLCT. K), 0) (26) 
C HAPTR=0.001 
A PLCT.K=NPLCT*OBSPM.K*POYRM.K (27) 
C NPLCT=3 
A OBSPM. K=TABHL(TUPM, FOTR. K,0, 1,0.1) (28) 
T TOPM= 1/1/1/0. 95/0. 9/0. 85/0. 80 /0 .75 /0 .7 /0 . 60/0.60 
A POYRM. K=TABHL(TYRM, POYR. K, 1, 10,1) (29) 
T TYRM=0. 6 /0 .7 /0 .75 /0 . 8/0. 85/0. 9/0. 95/1 /1 /1 
A FOTR. K=OBTR. K/TTR. K (30) 
* PLR - Planting Rate (Trees/year) 
* PLCT - Planting Correction Time (years) 
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NPLCT - Normal Planting Correction Time (Years) 
* OBSPM - Obsolescence Planting Multiplier 
(Dimensionless) 
* FOTR - Percent of Obsolete Trees 
(Fraction Dimensionless) 
OBTR - Obsolete Stock of Trees (Trees) 
TTR - Total Stock of Trees (Trees) 
* POYRM - Productive-to-Obsolete Yield Ratio 
Multiplier (Dimensionless) 
8. Maturing Delay (MATR) 
On the average, a newly planted tree will reach reasonable productive 
levels four years later. The total stock of maturing trees (MATR) at year t, 
can be easily obtained from both the planting rate (PLR) and the trees which 
become mature during the year (MTRR) and the stock of maturing trees at year 
t - 1 (equation 31). All the maturing trees will not, however, mature at the same 
time. Some will reach maturity sooner, others will have a longer gestation 
period; nevertheless, on the average, most of the trees will mature after four 
years of planting. To simulate this effect, the DYNAMO compiler provides a 
third order delay, as displayed in equation 32, where MTRR stands for the flow 
of trees which every year attain full productive levels. 
During the last two centuries, the average delay to mature (the four year 
period) have suffered alterations. New seeds and types of trees have been 
developed and several technological improvements have been used to shorten the 
long years of gestation. For instance, in Colombia there are special types of 
trees whose maturity can be obtained after only a three year period. Therefore, 
one could safely assume that crop technology has a definite effect on this type of 
delay, as presented by equations 33 to 35 and Figure B5. 
TECHD 
Technology Effects on Maturing Delay 
Figure B5. Index of Development of the Coffee 
Producing Nations. 
MATR. K=MATR. J+DT*(PLR. JK-MTRR. JK) 
MTRR. KL=DELA Y3(PLR. JK, CMATD. K) 
CMATD. K=M A TD * TE C HED. K 
MA TD=4 
TECHED. K=SMOOTH(TECHD. K, 5) 
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A TECHD.K=TABHL(TECD, DEVEST. K, 50, 100, 10) (35) 
T T E C D = l / l / l / 0 . 90/0. 80/0.75 
* MATR - Stock of Maturing Trees (Trees) 
* MTRR - Maturing Tree Rate (Trees/year) 
* CMATD - Current Maturing Delay (years) 
MATD - Normal Maturing Delay (years) 
* TECHD - Technology Effect on Maturing 
Technological Developments 
TECHD - Technological Developments on 
Maturing Delay (Dimensionless) 
DEVIN - Development Index of the World 
Coffee Producing Nations 
(Dimensionless) 
9. Productive and Obsolete Stocks of Trees (HPTR, OBTR) 
The yield of coffee trees depends primarily on the age of the tree. Typically, 
the yield of the tree will rise during the first sixteen or eighteen years, after which 
it will gradually decay. Highly productive trees are those trees whose yield has 
not decayed yet, while obsolete trees are defined here as trees with lower and 
decreasing yields. Further, a tree which has matured enters to form part of the 
stock of highly productive trees (HPTR), stays there for several years, twelve on 
the average, and then as its yield decays becomes obsolete. The number of trees 
which becomes obsolete during a year is the Tree Obsolescence Rate (TOBR). 
Hence, the stock of Highly Productive Trees (HPTR) at the end of a year, is equal 
to the stock of trees in the same group one year before, plus the trees which 
matured during the year (MTRR) minus the Tree-Obsolescence-Rate (TOBR). 
Similarly, the stock of obsolete trees (OBTR) at the end of a year, is equal to last 
5 
Delay (Dimensionless) 
Years Required to Start Using New 
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year's stock of obsolete trees plus the flow of obsoleted trees during the year 
(TOBR) minus the number of trees uprooted during the year, the Tree Removal 
Rate (TRR) (equations 36 and 37). The total number of trees (TTR) is then the 
addition of the Maturing Stock of Trees (MATR), the Highly Productive Stock of 
Trees (HPTR) and the Obsolete group of Trees (OBTR). 
L HPTR. K=HPTR. J+DT*(MTRR.JK- TOBR. JK) (36) 
L OBTR. K=OBTR. J+DT*(TOBR.JK- TRR. JK) (37) 
A TTR. K=OBTR. K+HP TR. K+MA TR. K (38) 
* HPTR - Highly Productive Trees (Trees) 
MTRR - Maturing Trees Rate (Trees/year) 
TOBR - Tree Obsolescence Rate (Trees/year) 
* OBTR - Obsolete Trees (Trees) 
TRR - Tree Removal Rate (Trees/year) 
* TTR - Total Tree Stock (Trees) 
10. Average Age of Trees (AA MT, AAPT, AAOT) 
The ratio between the total amount of maturing trees (MATR) and the 
average flow of trees reaching maturity (HTRR) gives an estimation of the number 
of years a newly planted tree requires to exit the maturing group and becomes a 
mature tree. For instance, let us say that there are a billion trees currently 
maturing. If the number of trees reaching maturity each year is on the average 
of 250 million per year, then the average age of each one of these trees is about 
4 years. Similarly, the average number of years a tree remains as a highly 
productive tree is equal to the ratio between the stock of trees in this group (HPTR) 
and the average rate at which trees leave that group, i. e. the obsolescence rate 
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(TOBR). Thus, the average age of a tree being obsoleted is then the addition of 
the years during which it was productive enough and the age it had when it first 
reached maturity. In the equations below, AAMT is the current average age of 
the maturing trees, and A APT stands for the current average age of the produc­
tive trees. The second term of AAPT simply is the average number of years a 
tree remains as productive, while the first term, SMOOTH(AAMT. K, MATD) is 
an estimation of the age of the productive tree when first reached maturity 
(equation 43). Similar expressions hold for the average age of the obsolete trees, 
(AAOT). The reader should go through the following equations, with the under­
standing that they represent gross approximations to the real average age of the 
trees in each one of the three groups. What matters here, on the other hand, 
is not to be too precise about the age of the trees, but rather to be accurate on 
how the average age of each tree group compares with each other. Certainly, 
the same type of approximations have been made in regard to each tree-group, 
which implies that the age differential among them may be accurate enough for 
our purposes. 
A AMTRR. K=SMOOTH(MTRR. JK, 1) (39) 
A A TOBR. K=SMOOTH(TOBR. JK, 1) (40) 
A ATRR. K=SMOOTH(MTRR. JK, 1) (41) 
A AAMT. K=MATR. K/AMTRR. K (42) 
N AAMT=MATD(=4 Years) 
A AAPT. K=SMOOTH(A AM T. K, MA TD)+HPTR. K/ATOBR. K (43) 
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N AAPT=MATD+l/NOBF(=16 Years) 
A AAOT. K=SMOOTH(AAPT. K, PROTD. K) +OBTR. K/ATRR. K (44) 
A PROTD. K=HPTR. K/ATOBR. K (45) 
N AAOT=AAPT+l/NORRF (= 32 years). 
AMTRR - Average Maturing Rate (Trees/year) 
A TOBR - Average Trees Obsolescence Rate 
(Trees/years) 
ATRR - Average Tree Removal Rate (Trees/years) 
* AAMT - Average Age Maturing Trees (Years) 
MATD - Maturing Delay (Years) 
* AAPT - Average Age Productive Trees (Years) 
* AADT - Average Age Obsolete Trees (Years) 
Note the input given to the initial values for the three ages. The constants 
NOBF and NORRF will be explained later, in the sections describing the Obsoles­
cence and Removal Rates. 
11. Average Yields (AYMT, A YPT, AYOT) 
The yield obtained from coffee trees depends among several other things 
on the age of the tree, the number of years the land has supported coffee plants, 
the characteristics of the soil, the quality and quantity of the fertilizer used, and 
the cultivation and procedures used by the farmer, and the variety of tree used. 
Furthermore, the yield of the tree is subject to frequent year to year variations, 
most of which are motivated by the biological cycle of the coffee tree and also, 
by changes in the environment and weather. Despite all of these factors, the 
yield of the coffee tree, on the average, can be best represented as primarily 
determined by the age of the tree. Generally, the yield rapidly grows until about 
the time the tree is eight years old, then reaches a plateau which may last another 
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eight years, after which the yield gradually decays. By the time the tree is 
forty years old, its yield may be one third of the maximum yield. The yield 
pattern exhibited in Figure B6 and equations 46 to 48 is the type of yield rendered 
by most arabic species. The ordinate of the curve shows the number of bags of 
green coffee annually produced by the tree. Each bag weighs 60 Kg. (~ 132 U. S. 
pounds). 
Yiefd Bags/Tree/Year 
(years) • • • • j 
Age of the Tree 
Figure B6. Yield of the Coffee Tree. 
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A AYMT. K=TABHL(TPTY, AAMT. K, 0,40,4)*10 (46) 
-3 
A A YPT. K=TABHL(TPTY, AAPT. K, 0,40,4)*10 (47) 
A AYOT. K=TABHL(TPTY, AAOT. K, 0,40,4)*10~ 3 (48) 
T T P T Y = l / 2 / 4 / 6 / 6 / 5 . 4 / 4 . 5 / 4 / 3 . 5 / 3 / 2 . 5 / 2 
* AYMT - Average Yield Maturing Trees 
(Bags/Tree/Year) 
* A YPT - Average Yield Productive Trees 
(Bags /Tree/Year) 
* AYOT - Average Yield Obsolete Trees 
(Bags/Tree/Year) 
12. Effective Yields (EYMT, EYPT, EYOT) 
A farmer can upgrade his yields per tree with proper use of fertilizer and 
careful cultivation procedures. On the other hand, those who neglect or abandon 
their coffee crop are bound to receive low yields regardless of the youth of the 
plantation. Rowe[23 p. 37] describes widely different yields in two closely 
located farms in the state of Parama. In one farm, the agricultor followed culti­
vation practices recommended by the IBC, but did not add to the land fertilizer, 
as the land seemed to be in proper condition. In the other, the farmer was unable 
to pay enough labor to crop the trees, which forced him to provide a limited care 
to his trees, plus the fact that he had never used adequate shading procedures. 
Figure B7 depicts graphically Rowe's description. Given proper cultivation and 
care to the tree, yields may be almost twice as large as those with poor cultiva­
tion practices. 
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Yields in Two Farms of the State of Parama 




1 0 2 0 
years 
3 
Age of Trees 
Figure B7. Effect of Cultivation Procedures on Yields. 
The above illustration points out the salient effects of coffee cropping technology 
and the intensity of tree care to enhance coffee yields. Coffee growing technology 
includes such things as production of new seeds; the adequate control of shade 
and size of the tree; and the use of fertilizer, among others. As shown by 
equation 49 and Figure B8, most of these agricultural innovations have generally 
advanced pari-passu with the economic progress of the coffee nations, although 
Development Index of 
Coffee Producer Nations 
Figure B8. Technological Effects on Yield. 
CARE ' "' 
'4 8 12 16 20 ?M S/bag 
Average Domestic Price to the Farmer 
Figure B9. Effect of Intensive Care on Yield. 
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the coffee farmer only gets the benefit several years later, the period ot time 
required to perform field tests and to establish elaborate educational programs. 
This is the reason to 'smooth' the Technological Effects on the Yield (TECHEY) 
in equations 50 to 52. Furthermore, most technological advances together with 
the farmer's attitudes in favor of high yield trees give priority to new and younger 
trees. Obsolete trees very rarely benefit from this type of developments. Thus, 
equations 50 to 52 also assume that most types of technological improvements 
affect first the newly maturing plants and last the stock of obsolete trees. This 
is the reason to use the average age of the three tree groups (AAMT, AAPT, AAOT) 
as smoothing delays in these equations, respectively. 
Equation 53 and Figure B9 describe the intensity of care (CARE) with which 
a farmer attends his plantation, as a function of the average (domestic) price 
(ADPR) he receives for the crop. As price rises the farmer owner tends to up­
grade the quality of his labor intensive procedures and management of his piece 
of land. Human labor and managerial capabilities as well, have a limit beyond 
which further price increases will not suffice to bring about additional efficiency 
in the farm operation. Hence, the curve describing CARE gradually bends to level 
off at high domestic prices. 
Equations 54 to 56 describe the effective yields for each one of the three 
tree groups. The equations show the average yields multiplied by the technological 
5) 
multipliers and by the intensity of care provided by the farmer. 
The listing of equations at the back of the appendix shows several other factors 
affecting the effective yields: BIOP stands for biological cycle effects; FROST 
5) 
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A TECHE Y. K=TABHL(TECH, DEVIN. K, 50, 100, 5) (49) 
T TECH=1/1. 02/1. 04/1. 06/1. 08/1. 11/1. 14/1. 18/1.23/1.28/1.34 
A TECHM. K=SMOOTH(TECHE Y. K, AAMT. K) (50) 
A TECHP. K=SMOOTH(TECHE Y. K, AAPT. K) (51) 
A TECHO. K=SMOOTH(TECHEY. K, AAOT. K) (52) 
A CARE . K=TABHL(TC AR, ADP R. K, 4, 24, 2) (53) 
T TCAR=0. 8 /1 /1 /1 /1 . 05/1. l / l . 15/1. 18/1 .2 /1 .21/1 .21 
A EYMT.K=AYMT.K*TECHM.K*CARE.K (54) 
A EYPT. K=AYPT. K*TECHP. K*CARE. K (55) 
A E YOT. K=A YOT. K*TECHO. K*CARE. K (56) 
* TECHEY - Technological Effects on Yield 
(Dimensionless) 
* TECHM Technological Improvements on 
Yield, Maturing, Productive and TE C HP 
Obsolete Trees Respectively 
* TECHO (Dimensionless) 
* CARE - Intensity of Tree Care (Dimensionless) 
ADPR - Average Domestic Price ($/Bag) 
* EYMT . Effective Yields, Maturing 
* EYPT | - Productive and Obsolete 
* EYOT Trees (10~ 3Bags/Tree/Yr.) 
AYMT Average Yield, Maturing 
AYPT j - Product!ve^and Obsolete 
A YOT Trees (10~ Bags/Tree/Yr.) 
is an input test to check effects of adverse weather conditions; LFMP is low 
frequency random noise and YTEST is a parameter to test the model sensitivity 
to changes in average yield per tree. These are omitted here to make the text 
simpler. 
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13. Tree Obsolescence Rate (TOBR) 
An old tree with low and declining yields is an obsolete tree. If all the 
trees in a farm were able to produce the same yield regardless of age, soil and 
fertilizer used, then the farmer would probably never complain about his older 
and obsolete capacity. Unfortunately, trees get older, and the older they get 
the less productive and costly they become; at the same time young trees and 
new species with higher yields constantly open to the farm owner attractive ways 
to get higher returns on investment and growth potential. Therefore, as more 
efficient young plantations develop, the farmer is apt to judge his more mature 
and older trees as a burden to his economic operation. Thus, in the face of 
newly and highly productive plants, older but still efficient trees will tend to be 
obsoleted faster. 
The number of trees which are obsoleted per year is the Tree Obsolescence 
Rate (TOBR). With no technological advances, addition of fertilizer or intensive 
cultivation, the yield of a mature tree generally declines by the time the tree is 
sixteen years old. During the first four years, the plant was maturing; thus, on 
the average, a tree will remain as a highly productive tree (HPTR) for twelve 
years more, the period after which the tree will be considered by the farmer as 
an obsolete tree. If, on the other hand, there were say, 6 billion productive trees 
with varying ages, then about 0.5 billion trees (6?-12 or 6 x 0. 0833) on the average, 
would be obsoleted each year. 
The obsolescence multiplier (OBM) adjusts the speed at which matured trees 
are obsoleted. With newly matured stock, higher yield trees are added to the 
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total amount of the more productive trees (HPTR), therefore the average yield 
of trees in this group (E YPT) tends to become much larger than the average 
yield of the older obsoleted capacity (EYOT). Hence, trees which not long ago 
seemed to the farmer productive enough to warrant careful cultivation, will now 
appear as non-efficient and costly trees to support. These trees will tend to be 
neglected and soon will pass to enlarge the normal flow of capacity being 
obsoleted. 
The above concepts are described below in equations 57 to 59. The Obso­
lescence Multiplier (OBM) is presented as an increasing function of the yield ratio 
between average yields of the productive and obsolete capacity groups (POYR). 
The Tree Obsolescence Rate (TOBR) depends on both the normal fraction of 
productive trees which each year surpass the 16th birthday (NOBF=8.33% = 
1 ^ 12 years) and the Obsolescence Multiplier (OBM), given by equation 58. 
A POYR. K=EYPT. K/EYOT.K (57) 
A OBMI.K=(l-OBSLP)+OBSLP*POYR.K/NYR . 









POYR - Productive to Obsolete Yield Ratio 
(Dimensionless) 
OBMI - Obsolescence Multiplier Indicated 
(Dimensionless) 
OBM - Obsolescence Multiplier (Dimensionless) 
OBSLP - Obsolescence Multiplier (Dimensionless) 
NYR - Normal Yield Ratio (Dimensionless) 
TOBR - Tree Obsolescence Rate (Trees/year) 
HPTR - Highly Productive Trees (Trees) 
NOBF - Normal Obsolescence Fraction 
(Percent per Year) 
14. Tree Removal Rate (TRR) 
Each year, a flow of newly obsoleted trees (TOBR) enlarge the stock of 
obsolete capacity (OBTR). At the same time, a fraction of the older and more 
obsolete trees are removed from the coffee plantation. A tree is removed be­
cause it is too old to bear profitable yield at low prices and the farmer wants to 
use the area for other purposes or simply because the tree has died, either 
naturally or because of adverse weather conditions. 
Generally, a tree entering the obsolete capacity group is older than sixteen 
years. Thereafter, the tree's yield gradually decays until it dies at about forty 
years of age. Therefore, the tree will remain standing as obsolete capacity for 
a long period of around 24 years. On the other hand, and due to several economic 
and climactic factors, the farmer may decide to uproot his tree several years 
earlier. On the average, obsolete trees may stand during some 16 years as 
suggested by several sources in the literature review. Thus, the tree Removal 
Rate (TRR) given normal conditions, is a fraction of the Obsolete Capacity as 
given by equation 60 (OBTRxNORRF, NORRF=l/16). 
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As the reader may suspect, the cost of removal of trees is a costly 
operation. The wealthy farmer may use mechanized equipment to uproot the 
trees, or if he owns cattle he may allow it to knock down the trees, and enable 
the area to become pasture more quickly. The small farmer, on the other hand, 
does not have as many alternatives open to him. He can not afford to pay high 
removal costs, unless he decided to use his family members for this purpose, 
and be willing to neglect the cultivation of the complementary crop he normally 
produces to maintain his sustenance income. Furthermore, year to year price 
fluctuation creates obstacles to uproot excess and obsolete capacity, which the 
farmer held on the assumption that it provides a 'safety stock of trees' from 
which profits could be obtained, in case a sudden increase in price occurs, as 
frequently happens in the coffee market. Then, although the level of coffee 
prices may have an effect on the normal fraction of trees to remove per year 
(NORRF), the direction of this effect is not clear, Arak [ l , p. 2151 Large and 
wealthy farmers will tend to react differently from the way the smaller peasants 
would under similar price developments. For this reason the Tree Removal 
Multiplier (TRRM) below equation 60 has a constant value equal to one. ^ 
R TRR. KL=OBTR. K*NORRF*TRRM. K (60) 
C NORRF=0.0625 
A TRRM. K-1 
The purpose to include this multiplier within the model was to perform sensi­
tivity tests to check the model response to an environment mostly dominated 
by large farmers, in which case, TRRM decreases as prices rise. 
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* TRR - Tree Removal Rate (Trees/Year) 
NORRF - Normal Removal Fraction (%/Year) 
TRRM - Tree Removal Multiplier 
(Dimensionless) 
15. Abandoned Fraction of Trees (ABFRT) 
Abandoned Trees are trees which are not cultivated, their surrounding 
area not cleared of weeds and their yield of matured berries not picked. At 
lower prices the farmers may find it beneficial to abandon a fraction of their 
obsolete capacity whose declining yield does not suffice to cover labor cultiva­
tion costs and fertilizer expenditures. Conceptually, at each level of prices, 
there exist an 'optimal' age, beyond which it is not profitable to cultivate and 
harvest older trees. Thus, the rational farmer will tend to cultivate only trees 
whose dollar-yield is larger than the tree's maintenance and cultivation costs. 
This is illustrated in Figure BIO. Each broken line shows the dollar-yield 
(yield x price) of trees at different ages, given an established price. At higher 
prices the dollar-yield will appear shifted toward the top of the diagram, thus, 
the dollar-yield is a function of both the age of the tree and the domestic price 
to the former, i.e. dollar-yield = Py(a). 
The solid line represents the average annual cost per tree at each different 
age. Younger trees normally require extensive labor care, while older trees 
with declining yields require similar labor but higher fertilizer expenditures; 
hence, under normal conditions, cost is primarily a function of age, <f>(a). At a 
price P , farmers will abandon trees older than a years of age, trees whose 
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Figure BIO. Abandonment Age. 
dollar yield does not cover the additional cost of cultivation, i.e. for a > a Q 
$(a) > PQy(a). Therefore, at a given price, there exists an age beyond which 
it is not profitable to cultivate the older trees. Thus, an abandonment age a 
can theoretically be obtained from: 
$ (a ) = Py(a) 
The Abandoned Fraction of Trees (ABFRT) depends on the age of abandon­
ment a. Generally, the age composition of the stock of trees owned by the 
farmers, varies in response to past price developments and the farmer's previous 
planting and removal decisions. During periods of high and increasing prices a 
farmer tends to cultivate most of his trees and also, will plant new trees more 
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frequently and in larger quantities; hence, the proportion of young and productive 
trees tends to be higher during these years than the proportion of older and low 
yield trees, i.e. the average age of the total stock of trees will look younger. 
On the other hand, as prices decay, the planting of new trees gradually dimini­
shes while the removal of old trees does not suffer major change. Thus, with 
low prices, the average age of the total stock of trees tends to get older. There­
fore, during the whole 32 year price cycle the average age of the trees shifts 
from young to older ages. The two diagrams below show both the frequency 
distribution and the cumulative distribution of the stock of trees at varying prices. 
In Figure Bll-a P^ is a high price which has prevailed during several years; 
therefore, a larger fraction of the trees tends to be young. On the other hand, 
as prices decrease to P ^ and P »̂ a n d stay there for some time, age distri­
bution shifts to the right and shows peaks at older ages a ^ and a , respectively. 
Furthermore, the cumulative distribution of trees in Figure Bl l -b gives the 
proportion of trees which are younger than a certain age a. At sustained high 
prices (the P Q curve) it is more likely to find a higher fraction of younger trees, 
than say,at a lower price P . However, as one covers all the spectrum of 
different ages, the total proportion of trees with these ages should approach 
100%, i.e. the total stock of trees. This is why all the curves shown cluster 
together as they reach the 100% limit. 
Figure Bl l -b , admits a further and important interpretation. If a is the 
abandonment age at a level of prices P , then the segment AB is the proportion 
of trees whose age is older than the abandonment age a . A rational farmer 
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Age of Trees 
(a) 
Age of Trees 
(b) 
Figure B l l . Distribution of Trees by Age at Varying Prices. 
will not cultivate this fraction of trees. Thus, AB is the Abandoned Fraction of 
Trees (ABFRT). 7 ) 
Thus, far, the theoretical development of the abandonment function would be 
as follows: 
Let w (a) = the number of trees of age a, given a price P. 
Py(a) = the dollar-yield of each tree in this group. 
<£(a) = the cultivation cost (labor and fertilizer) per tree of age a. 
a = the 'optimal' abandonment age. 
Also, if the farmer only abandons trees whose yield is declining, as claimed 
by Arak [ l ,p. 212] and others, 
w (a) < 0, y(a) < 0, $(a) > 0 (a) 
Then, the profit n during each year becomes: 
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Figure B12 combines the previous concepts in order to graphically develop 
a meaningful abandonment function. At a price P^ there is an abandonment age 
a^ and also a fraction of trees to neglect, given by point A. Similarly, at lower 
prices P and P , these correspond to abandonment ages a and a and — I — Z — l — Z 
abandonment fractions given by points B and C, respectively (Figures B12 c and 
b). The solid line on Figure B12-b shows the abandonment function as one reads 
the ordinate scale from top to down. Tipping off the figure, he gets the percent 
7) a 
R TT = j Pw^(a)y(a)da - j ^(a)w^(a) da (b) 
— = P w (a)y(a) - <fc(a) w (a) = 0 (c) 
da p 1 
and Py(a) = <t(a) (d) 
2 ~2 
which is a maximum, in view of d ir/da < 0, after using assumptions 
(a). 
From (d) one can get a, and obtain the number of abandoned trees as 
follows: 
oo 
R Abandoned Trees = | w (a)da. 
o P 
Further, in Figure BIO, 3(a) cuts the dollar-yield in two points. The 
younger age may not be an optimal point; in this case, y > 0, 4< 0, but 
w may be positive or negative depending on the frequency distribution 
of the trees age; hence - — could have any sign. 
da 
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% F r e q u e n c y D i s t r i b u t i o n 
, o f T r e e s b y A g e . 
a.^ a_ / a„ A g e 
(c) 
Figure B12. Construction of Abandonment Function. 
282 
of abandoned trees as a function of the abandonment age, as in Figure B12-d. 
Figure B12-a shows the frequency distribution of the trees' age, together 
with the average age of the total stock of trees, i. e. a ,̂ a etc. At high prices 
(P curves) the abandonment age a ^ is too far from the average age a .̂ However, 
as price declines, the abandonment ages rapidly approach the average age of the 
total stock of trees. In particular, the diagram shows, that at the lowest price 
P , the abandonment age a is less than the average age a Very unlikely, 
a farmer will be willing to abandon average age stock of younger and productive 
trees. Therefore, as the abandonment age approaches the average stock age, 
the percent of abandoned trees rapidly bends toward the left as shown by the 
dotted line on Figure B12-d. Consequently, it will make more sense to repre­
sent this variable as a function of the difference between the abandonment age 
and the average age of the stock of obsolete capacity, as presented in Figure B13, 
where ABAGE is the abandonment age and AAOT is the average age of the older 
stock. 
Equations 61 to 64 present the DYNAMO formulation of the process just 
9) 
described in this section and graphically presented in Figures B12 and B13. 
Geer [13,p. 52] claims that abandonment rates in Brazil run as high as 50% 
of the obsolete trees, during period of low prices. This abandonment fraction 
would correspond to an abandonment age less than the average age of the 
total stock of trees. 
9) 
The price-yield is approximated by the product of the domestic price to the 
former ADPR and the average yield (AYTT). Thus, MSCOST ~ $ (a) . There­
fore, it follows a = ABAGE « f(MSCOST) as given by [62], The rest of 
the equations follow in a straightforward way. 
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A MSCOST. K=ADPR.K*AYTT.K*10~ 3 (61) 
A ABAGE. K=TABHL(TABA, MSCOST. K, 0. 032, 0. 0945, 0. 0125)7 (62) 
T TABA=17/20/25/30/35/40 
A RAGD.K=(ABAGE.K-AAOTK)/AGSD (63) 
C AGSD-1 
A ABFRT. K=TABHL(TABT, RAGD. K, -20,20, 5) (69) 
T TABT=0. 7/0. 65/0. 60/0. 55/0. 50/0. 40/0. 20/0. 18/0. 15 
* MSCOST - Maximum Supportable Cost ($/Tree/year) 
AYTT - Average Yield of Total Trees 
(10~ 3 Bags /Tree/year) 
ADPR - Average Domestic Price ($/Bag) 
* ABAGE - Abandonment Age (Years) 
RAGD - Relative Age Differential 
(Dimensionless) 
AGSD - Age Significant Difference (Years) 
* ABFRT - Abandoned Fraction of Trees (%) 
16. Production Rate (PRR) and Producer Stocks of 
Green Coffee (PCSGC) 
The annual production of green coffee is the sum of the production supplied 
by the maturing trees (MATR), the highly productive trees (HATR) and the non 
abandoned obsolete trees (OBTR(l-ABFRT)). This is shown in equation 65, 
where production rate (PRR) is given in Million of Bags per year as it usually 
appears in coffee bulletins. 
Coffee which is produced in a year, is not immediately distributed to con­
sumer centers. Before distribution, the picked berries are washed, dried, 
selected by quality and shape, packed in bags and finally mounted on mules or 
equivalent transportation means, to deliver at several warehouse centers. This 
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is the meaning attached to the variable called Distributed-Production-Rate 
(DPRR) in equation 66 where a distribution delay of one year elapses before 
the green coffee passes to enlarge the marketable stocks. 
Several groups and institutions held stocks of green coffee. The farmers 
themselves may retain a portion of his crop if they think prices will go up; the 
domestic processors and roasters have to maintain adequate coverage to nor­
mally perform their operations; also and more importantly, private export 
houses and official institutions as well normally tend to hold large stocks. The 
aggregation of all of these stocks is given by the variable defined as Producer-
Countries-Stocks-of-Green-Coffee (PCSGC). The level of stocks at the end 
of a year, is equal to the level of stocks one year before, plus the production 
added to the stocks (DPRR) minus the exports and domestic usage during the 
year (GCER + GCDUR) as shown by equation 67. ^ 
R PRR. KL= uVLATR. K*E YMT. K+HPTR. K*E YPT. K+ 
OBTR. K*E YOT. K*(1-ABFRT. K) ] * 10 (65) 
R DPRR. KL=DEDAY3(PRR. JK, CDDD) (66) 
C CDDD=1 
10) 
A sizeable portion of these stocks is owned by the official coffee institutions 
of Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and other countries. The purpose has been to 
diminish the influence of the private exporter, thus creating favorable con­
ditions to administer nationwide policies. 
"^The listing of equations at the back of the appendix includes two additional 
rates in the equation for stocks. These were included there to test a 
buffer stock policy. They are omitted here to make the text simpler. 
2 8 5 
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1 7 . Green Coffee Domestic Usage Rate (GCDUR) 
Domestic annual usage of green coffee has two components. One, the 
domestic consumption rate, is simply the product of the population sector of the 
producer nations and the average consumption (of green coffee equivalent) per 
head. (First term of equation 6 8 ) . The second component reflects the volume 
of coffee which each year is destroyed (to maintain world prices) or which after 
being stored during almost four years, becomes non usable. Equation 6 9 insures 
that stocks do not become negative, during periods of abnormally low stocks and 
very high domestic consumption. 
During times of lower and declining prices, Brazil and the larger producer 
may destroy sizable amounts of their stocks with the purpose of supporting prices 
at the current level. This effect has been captured in the Coffee-Destruction-
Multiplier (CDEM) as exhibited in Figure B14. In the diagram, rising or decaying 
prices lead to lower or higher quantities to destroy, respectively. At high prices 
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Figure B14. Coffee Destruction Multiplier as a Function of World Prices. 
when the multiplier has reached a plateau, the nations do not have any strong 
motivation to eliminate coffee from the stocks; quite the contrary, they may 
even attempt to sell coffee of low quality in view of the general scarcity existing 
in the market; on the other hand, at the lowest prices, there always will be a 
maximum amount of coffee to destroy, beyond which the depressed cash position 
12) 
of the nation does not suffice to cover abnormally high destruction costs. 
(See equation 20.) 
12) ~ 
Price change as well, may influence destruction of coffee. The listing of 
equations at the back of the appendix includes the effect of price change as 
PCHDEM, 'Price Change Destruction Multiplier.' Omission of this variable 
from the model did not alter behavior. 
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A GCDURI. K=TLABF. K*AUPCU+PCSGC. K*CDEM. K/NDED (68) 




A CDEM. K=TABHC(TCDE, AWPR. K, 6,24,2) (70) 
T TCDE=1. 3/1 . 2 /1 /1 /1 /1 /0 . 98/0. 96/0. 95/0. 95 
* GCDURI - Green Coffee Domestic Usage 
Rate Indicated (MBags/Yr) 
T L A B F - T o t a l Labor F o r c e (Men) 
A UPLU - Average usage per Labor Unit 
(MBags/men-yr) 
PCSGC - Producer Countries Stocks (MBags) 
* GCDUR - Green Coffee Domestic Rate 
(M!Bags/men-yr.) 
NDED - Normal Deterioration Delay (Years) 
* CDEM - Coffee Destruction Multiplier 
(Dimensionless) 
AWPR - Average World Coffee Price (£/lb.) 
18. Desired Producer Countries Stocks of Green Coffee 
(DPCSGC) and Desired Export Quantity to Sell (DEXQS) 
The producer nations have several good reasons to keep a target level of 
inventories such that stocks do not become too high and costly or too low to 
jeopardize efficient customer service, market share and foreign income. In 
the commodity market, and the coffee market in particular, stocks are kept to 
play several key roles. To list a few, there is a working stock to maintain the 
current volume of business. Second, there is a safety stock to insure proper 
customer service and income against sudden upsurges in demand. Not being 
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able to supply a customer properly and timely would mean a loss in market share 
and penetration. Third, increasing quantities of coffee supply and stocks would 
be required to increase market share penetration and income—a market strate­
gic stock. Fourth, keeping additional reserves of green coffee will insure 
increased funds in case adverse weather or other random events damage some 
other country's crop—speculative stocks. Therefore, the total level of stocks 
kept by the producer nations could be described by the following composite 
function: 
Target Stocks = Working Stock + Safety Stock + Market Strategic Stock 
+ Speculative Stocks 
or S = WS(X) + SS(Cr ) + MS(pX) + SP(0* ) 
A p 
where 
WS is a function of X, the average usage per year. 
SS is a function of the expected usage fluctuation, ô . 
MS is a function of desired income, PX, where 
p is price. 
SP is a function of expected price fluctuations. 
Furthermore, at each level of stocks there exist an associated level of required 
investment and expenditures; these tend to grow very rapidly at higher levels 
13) 
of inventory. Therefore, the above equation can be recast as follows: 
13) 
Costs of building new and larger warehouses, and equipment; the larger the 
warehouse, the higher the holding and maintenance costs. Furthermore, to 
increase market share penetration and sales, a flexible distribution network 
ought to be built, and stocks have to be decentralized to give proper service to 
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S = $ ( X , p , o a ;cost) 
A p 
where increases in usage X or price p,or both, bring about funds requirements 
to increase the stocks held and expand the stocking facilities. Similarly, larger 
values of usage and price are normally associated with larger fluctuations in 
14) 
both demand and price. On the other hand, the increasing cost to support the 
additional stocks, present a restraint to further expansion. Hence, our postulated 
equation can be simplified as follows: 
S = $ (Xp - cost) 
where Xp is the foreign income received from coffee, and 'cost' is the expenditure 
required. 
The above equation is a theoretical but realistic abstraction. The same 
equation translated into managerial language simply tells that the establishment 
of a desired level of stocks depends on the foreign income earned from coffee 
13) 
the market. Decentralization of stocks is one of the primary causes of 
inflated costs. 
14) 
Coffee data confirms this hypothesis. Our explanation to this situation follows: 
As prices rise, speculators are attracted to the market. Too many speculators 
in the future market generate additional short term fluctuations in daily quo­
tations. (See Appendix C) As price fluctuation increases (cr is higher), traders 
will wish to increase their speculative stocks, therefore ordering larger 
quantities of green coffee. As prices decline, (one, two, or three years 
later) the trader would want to reduce again his level of stocks; he will order 
less quantities, thereby creating a fluctuation in demand to the producer. 
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exports, and also on the expenditures realized to support the coffee market 
share—the foreign cash position. Certainly, the foreign cash reserve is one of 
the variables which administrators look more closely at, before advancing inven­
tory coffee policy. Thus, the dynamic version of the above relation would in­
clude in addition to income and expenditures, the previous performance of cash 
availability. Hence, 
S = $(FCR t ) 
FCR t = FCR + (Income - Expenditures). 
where FCR^ is the foreign cash reserve at the beginning of year t. 
The establishment of a desired level of stocks in important factor to 
administer and coordinate pricing and foreign income policies by the producers; 
policies which are, nonetheless, very different for both small and larger pro­
ducers, as we can see shortly. 
Equations 71 to 73 show the annual averages of domestic usage of green 
coffee, total world usage and production rates, respectively. The Desired-
level-of-stocks (DPCSGC) is then, the product of the average total world usage 
(AGCUR) and the fraction of years the producer wants to cover with his stocks 
(equation 74). This number is the Desired-Producer-Year-Supply (DPCYS), 
a value which varies through time, but which on the average appears to be about 
0.5 years for coffee (NPCYS=0.5). Stated in a different way, a 0.5 years supply 
in coffee means that if production were to be stopped for some reason, the 
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producer nation still could supply coffee for half a year more, assuming demand 
stays constant. 
Equation 75 shows the normal year supply (NPCYS) as influenced by a 
function of RFCRS, the Relative Foreign Coffee Reserve Supply. This is 
simply the name given to the countries' coffee foreign cash reserves. Figure B15 
displays two possible relationships for this function, one indicates the effect cash 
position has on desired stocks if the producer is a small nation unable to alter 
price formation; the other curve depicts the response of a large producer, 
like Brazil. The curve followed by the small producer shows that as the foreign 
reserve deteriorates, perhaps as a result of low prices and high expenditures, 
Desired Year Supply 
D P C Y S 
large 
producer 
sm al 1 
low h i g h | R F C R S 
Figure B15. Effect of Foreign Cash Reserves on Coffee Policy. 
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the small producer, unable to alter world prices would tend to reestablish its 
cash position by selling more, thereby keeping less stock in the warehouses. On 
the other hand, a large producer nation, conscious of its ability to increase world 
prices by supplying less quantities to the market, will tend to increase the level 
of stocks, i.e. increasing the target years of supply. 
Furthermore, the fact that at extreme values of foreign reserves, there 
always will be a minimum stock below which the producers would not be able to 
operate, and an upper limit to the stock accumulation beyond which the countries 
would be unable to store the grain in the limited size of their warehouses or get 
funds to build up enough of them., give weight to our hypothesized shape for both 
functions. 
The Desired Export Quantity to Sell (DEXQS), is the amount of green 
coffee the producer nations would be willing to sell. It is then, equal to the 
exportable quantity plus or minus adjustments made on the stocks to achieve the 
desired level of stocks (DPCSGC). This is shown in equation 76. The first two 
terms (APRR-AGCDUR) show the exportable quantity, the amount left after sub­
tracting the domestic usage from the average production. The second term shows 
the adjusting stock term. If stocks are greater than the target value, additional 
coffee will be offered to the customers; otherwise lesser quantities will be 
supplied. PCT is the correction time. A correction time equal to one year indi­




Under International Coffee Agreements the Desired Export Quantity (DEXQS) is 
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A A GCDUR. K=SMOOTH(GCDUR. JK, 1) (71) 
A AGCUR. K=SMOOTH(GCER. JK+GCDURI. K, 1) (72) 
A APRR. K=SMOOTH(PRR. JK, 1) (73) 
A DPCSGC.K=AGCUR.K*DPCYS.K (74) 
A DPC YS. K=NPCYS*TABHL(TDYS, RFCRS. K, 0,2, 0.2) (75) 
T TDYS=1. . . . 1 (Constant in the standard model). 
C NPCYS=0.5 
A DEXQS. K=APRR. K-AGCDUR. K+(PCSGC. K 
-DPCSGC.K)/PCT (76) 
A DPEXQ.K=DEXQS.,K*QUOTA.K (77) 
AGCDUR - Average Domestic Usage 
(MBags/Yr.) 
AGCUR - Average Usage (Domestic and 
Foreign) (MBags/Yr.) 
APRR - Average Production (MBags/Yr) 
DPCSGC - Desired Producer Countries Stocks 
of Green Coffee (MBags) 
DPCYS - Desired Producer Countries Year 
Supply (Years) 
NPCYS - Normal Prod. Countries Year 
Supply (Years) 
RFCRS - Relative Foreign Coffee Cash 
Reserve (Dimensionless) 
DEXQS - Desired Export Quantity to Sell 
(MBags/Yr) 
PCT - Producer Stocks Correction 
Time (Years) 
DPEXQ - Desired Producer Export Quantity 
(MBags/Year) 
further affected by establishing quotas in response to prices. The new 
desired quantity would be DEXQS*QUOTA as shown in the listing of equations 
at the back of the appendix. The new variable is called DEXPQ = DEXQS* 
QUOTA. See the description of the 1967 ICA in Geer [13, p. 20], or 
Rowe[24, p. 186]for generalities of the 1962 ICA. 
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QUOTA - Export Quota (%) 
19. Green Coffee Export Rate (GCER) and World Coffee Price (AWPR) 
Meadows' Dynamic Commodity Cycle Model (DCCM) [42] assumes an 
inverse relationship between stock levels and prices. In particular, the DCCM 
describes prices as depending on the current inventory coverage, the current 
years supply for the commodity in question. This type of relation seems to 
hold most commodities, including coffee. A review of the patterns of behavior 
exhibited by coffee production, producer stocks, exports and coffee prices in 
chapter will reveal to the reader the fact that increasing and higher stocks 
normally result in lower and declining prices and vice versa. 
Meadows' model, on the other hand, tacitly assumes that all the existing 
stock is 'saleable' in the sense that a producer, unable to directly affect price 
developments, will always sell as much as he can at the time, and then will 
adjust his production to maintain his desired stock coverage. In the case of 
coffee, this assumption is not correct. The larger producers acting independently 
or jointly with smaller producers have frequently held a portion of their stocks, 
to force an increase in prices, and then have sold a reduced amount at a much 
higher price. Therefore, although the price-inventory coverage relationship 
appears a statistically correct relation for coffee, it seems that it does not 
fully capture the underlying mechanisms by which both producers and traders meet 
together to pact how much to export and at what price. We hope that adding detail 
to the model will serve its purpose in designing stabilization policies. 
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The quantity of coffee to be exported, together with its price, are both 
agreed jointly and at the same time by each producer and user. Each producer 
offers to sell a certain quantity, say DPEXQ, while each user-traders, roasters, 
processors, etc. offers to buy an amount (DTIMQ) at the current prices. If the 
two quantities are the same, the deal will close and the amount will be sold at 
actual prices. However, if supplies exceed demand, producers will offer dis­
counts to induce traders to buy more; the larger the excess, the higher the 
discount. Therefore, as traders buy more, prices decline. On the other hand, 
if production has been low or high quotas are enforced, traders' demand can be 
higher than supplies. Hence, traders will be willing to pay a premium on the 
price to get their full requirements; thus prices will tend to rise, on the con­
dition that producers gradually release higher quantities from their stocks to 
the traders. Thus, the quantity 'pacted1 should lie somewhere in between the 
original offer and the original demanded quantity, a simple average between the 
two may be a good approximation (Equation 78). Similarly, the 'pacted' price 
depends on the difference between the two original quantities, as shown in 
Figure B16 and equations 79 and 80. 
As shown in the figure, the shape of the World Price Multiplier (WPRMA) 
may take several forms, depending on how sensitive is the market to different 
levels of under/over supply. The solid line shows the function used in the basic 
computer runs. 
A GCERI. K=SMOOTH {(DPEXQ. K+DTIMQ. K)/2,1) ^ j (78) 
R GCER. KL=MIN(PCSGC.K/DT, GCERI. K) 
WPRMA 
i 1 i i i I —i 1 r » 1 i 
-15 -10 - 5 . 0 5 10 15 20 
RCOAV 
Figure B16. Relative Coffee Availability 
and World Price Multiplier. 
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A RCOAV. K+(DPEXQ. K-DTTMQ. K)/AVSD (79) 
C AVSD=$1 
A WPRMA. K=TABHL(TWPR, RCOAV. K,-20 ,20 , 5) (80) 
T T W P R = 2 . 6 / 2 . 5 / 2 . 2 / 1 . 6 / 1 / 0 . 6 / 0 . 5 / 0 . 4 5 / 0 . 4 
A WPRI. K=NORPRI*WPRMA. K*WPRMFP. K (81) 
C NORPRI=12 
A AWPR.K=SMOOTH(WPRI.K, 1) (82) 
GCER - Green Coffee Export Rate 
(MBags/Year) 
DPEXQ - Desired Producers Export 
Quantity (MBags/Year) 
DTIMQ - Desired Traders Import 
Quantity (MBags /Year) 
RCOAV - Relative Coffee Availability 
(Dimensionless) 
AVSD - Availability Significant Difference 
(MBags/Year) 
NORPRI - Normal World Price (£/pd) 
WPRMA - World Price Multiplier from 
Availability (Dimensionless) 
WPRMFP - World Price Multiplier from Future 
Market Price (Dimensionless) 
AWPR - Annual Average World Price (C/lb.) 
20. Domestic Price to the Farmer (ADPR) 
The price paid to the farmer in return for his bags of green coffee is a 
fraction of the current world average price. To carry out domestic price policy, 
the governments have established a wide range of complex mechanisms whose 
common purpose is to allow the official institutions to collect a portion of the 
foreign coffee earnings to implement various developmental programs throughout 
the nation. A brief description of the three most frequently used mechanisms 
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follows. 
The exchange rate procedure is a system whereby the foreign receipts 
to the farmer (i.e. in dollars) are officially exchanged into domestic currency 
at a rate lower than the international current exchange rate. The tax in 'especie' 
ask the farmer to submit to the official coffee institutions a bag of coffee or a 
portion of it, for each bag sold in the international market. Finally, the estab­
lishment of a floor price on all excess output which the official institutions would 
buy if no other purchaser appears, has the effect of tuning domestic prices above 
and around this minimum price. Each one of the above regulations together with 
16 
several others, have been used by most producer nations at one time or another. 
Despite the frequent and erratic changes in domestic price policy and com­
plex apparatus, analysis of data clearly shows a well established pattern of domes­
tic prices with respect to world prices. Geer [13, p. 59 and 8l] has studied the 
relationship between the two prices during the Fifties for the Brazilian and 
Colombian cases. More recently Keith [21, p. 304]has analyzed the net returns 
traditionally received by the Colombian coffee farmer with respect to the world 
coffee price, after proper consideration of the taxes, and cultivation costs paid, 
and over a longer period of years (1918-1973). The two analyses clearly show a 
1 6^The reader may find a fairly complete description of the type of regulations 
most frequently used in Geer [13, p. 57-65]. Rowe [24], [25] gives a des­
cription of the evolution of these coffee policies since the beginning of the 
century, in most of the coffee producer nations. Netto [21, p. 76-105] pre­
sents coffee policy within the Brazilian context. Kalmanoff [16, p. 65] des­
cribes the regulations established by the Colombian governments during the 
last twenty years. 
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direct relationship between Average Domestic Price (ADPR) and Average World 
Price (AWPR), and present evidence that as the world price rises to high values, 
domestic prices increase at a lower rate, as shown in Figure B17. 
Figure B17. Relationship Between World Price and Domestic Price 
to the Farmer (The Domestic Price Multiplier). 
In the figure, the horizontal axis shows a normalized world price, the World-
Price-Fluctuation-Index (WPRFI) which is the ratio between the average world 
price (AWPR) and the normal world price (NORPRI); the vertical axis is the 
Domestic-Price-Multiplier (DPM), Equations 83 and 84. 
The Domestic Price (DPRI) is given in $/Bag, and is the product of the 
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average world price (AWPR) and a fraction given by the product DPM x NDPM 
(NDPM = 0 . 5 ) . This fraction converts world price in $/Bag, (AWPR x 1.32) 
into domestic price; it could be as low as 0 . 6 x 0 . 5 = 0.3 or as high as 1 . 6 x 0 . 5 
= 0.8 (See Figure B17). The annual Average Domestic Price is given by the 
smooth operator in equation 86., Equation 87 presents the fractional change in 
domestic price, a variable required to get one of the two land multipliers 
(LPCHM) in section 4 of this appendix. 
A WPRFI.K=AWPR.K/WORPRI (83) 
A DPM.K=TABHL(TDOP, WPRFI.K, 0 .6 ,3 ,0 .4) (84) 
T TDOP=0. 6 / 1 / 1 . 2 / 1 . 3 / 1 . 4 / 1 . 5 / 1 . 6 
A DPRI.K=AWPR.K*1.32*DPM.K*NDPM (85) 
C NDPM=0.5 
A ADPR. K=SMOOTH(DPRI. K, 1) (86) 
A DPRCH. K=(DPRI. K-ADPR. K)/ADPR. K (87) 
WPRFI - World Price Fluctuation Index 
(Dimensionless) 
* DPM - Domestic Price Multiplier 
(Dimensionless) 
DPRI - Domestic Price Indicated ($/Bag) 
WDPM - Normal Domestic Price Multiplier 
(Fraction) 
* ADPR - Average Domestic Price ($/Bag) 
* DPRCH - Domestic Price Change (Fraction) 
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21. Foreign Coffee Cash Reserves (FCR) 
The Foreign-Coffee-Cash-Reserves at the end of a year equal the amount 
held one year before, plus the foreign coffee income (FCEAR) earned during the 
year, minus the expenditures made over the same period (FCRDR), Equation 88. 
Foreign-Coffee-Earnings (FCEAR) is the product of the Average World Price 
(AWPR) and the Annual Average of Green Coffee Exports (AGCE), Equation 89. 
The representation of the total expenditures during the year (FCRDR) is 
somewhat more complex. As indicated by equations 90, it consists of two terms. 
The first one is the normal amount of disbursements (FCRNE) which depends on 
both the total expenditures required to support the total population of the country(s) 
i .e. TLABF*NEXLU; and the fraction of these expenditures provided by coffee 
(COFP). Furthermore, the Expenditures per Labor Unit (NEXLU) increase as 
the country develops. Thus, the normal expenditure (FCRNE) is a rising function 
of the Development Index (DEVIN). The second term in equation 90 adjusts the 
available cash to a normal (target) value. The target value is the amount of cash 
normally kept as countries' foreign reserves; a 0.3 years of cash supply appears 
to be a reasonable choice. This latter term can be at times positive, at times 
negative. If cash reserves are below the target value, expenditures will be cur­
tailed until balance could be reestablished. On the other hand, if cash availability 
surpasses the target, pressures will develop to use the excess, thereby expendi­
tures will tend to rise. The Foreign Reserve Correction Time (FRCT) indicates 
the velocity at which administrators want to achieve a balanced cash position. 
302 
L FCR. K=FCR. J+DT*(FCEAR. JK-FCRDR. JK) 
A AGCE. K=SMOOTH(GCER. JK. 1) 
R FCEAR.KL=TLABF.K*AGCEF.K*1.32*10 6 
A FCRNE. K=TLABF. K*COF P. K*NEXLU*DEVIN. K/50 





FCR - Foreign Coffee Cash Reserves ($) 
AGCE - Annual Average Green Coffee Export 
Rate (MBags/Yr) 
FCEAR - Foreign Coffee Earnings Rate ($/Yr) 
AWPR - Average World Coffee Price (£/lb.) 
1.32x10 - AWPRxl. 32 to get price in $/Bag; 
10 to convert AGCE in Million Bags/ 
yr. to Bags per year. 
FCRNE - Normal expenditures ($/Yr) 
TLABF - Total Labor Force (men) 
COFP - Percent of Coffee Participation in 
Expenditures (%) 
NEXLU - Normal Expenditures per Labor 
Unit ($/Men) 
DEVIN - Development Index (Dimensionless) 
50 - Initial Development Index Used to 
Normalize DEVIN 
FCRDR - Disbursement Rate (Total Expenditures) 
($/yr) 
NFCRYS - Normal Foreign Coffee Reserves 
Year Supply (Years) 






22. Development Index (DEVIN) and Coffee Participation (COFP) 
The Development Index (DEVIN) of the coffee producing nations represents 
the level of economic and industrial progress of these nations. During the early 
years of the century the coffee nations had to import almost all the required 
capital to generate sustained growth. Thus, foreign earnings from coffee were 
of salient importance to progress. However, as the countries develop, the 
influence of coffee, although still very important, gradually tends to diminish, 
in view of newly created alternative sources of foreign income and a higher level 
of technical capability. 
Equations 91 and 92 show the Averaged-Foreign-Coffee-Earnings (AFCER) 
and the Total-Foreign-Earnings (TFEA), respectively. This variable is the 
ratio between the former, (AFCER) and the percent of total foreign earnings pro­
vided by coffee exports (COFP). Initially, this percent is made equal to 70%, 
gradually as the countries develop, it will decay to 40% by the seventies. 
Equation 95 shows the Relative-Foreign-Earnings-per-Labor unit (RFEPLU). 
This research assumes that a larger amount of foreign earnings per head, tends 
to impulse the purchase or development of capital to enhance industrial progress. 
This is the meaning attached to the variable Foreign-Earnings-Growth-Multiplier 
depicted by equation 94 as a linear function of the earnings per head and 
1 7 ) 
This function, FEGMI= <P(RFEPLU), can conceptually have many different 
shapes. It could be exponential or TS' shaped; each country may as well 
exhibit a different pattern. However, the linear assumption taken here does 
not imply that the development index (DEVIN) to be explained later, follows 
a linear pattern. Quite the contrary, the index follows the exponential pattern 
observed in most nations (See equation 96), i.e. 
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then smoothed in equation 95. Here a delay of four years has been assumed to 
account for the selection, purchase and proper use of the imported (or internally 
developed) technologies. 
The Development Index (DEVIN) at the end of a year t, is equal to the 
index at t - 1, plus the change occurred during the year (DEVR). DEVIN = 50 
means that at the beginning of the century a level of development of 50 'units' 
prevailed throughout the coffee nations, equation 96. 
The Development Rate (DEVR) depends on the current development index 
(DEVIN) and also on the Foreign Earnings Growth Multiplier (FEGM), equation 97, 
simply shows that at higher levels of development, additional development tends 
to be self induced which results in exponential growth. The effect of the FEGM 
multiplier is then to adjust the normal exponential growth of the development 
index to lower or higher rates, depending on both, the amount of foreign coffee 
earnings and the population needs. 
Figure B18 shows the participation of coffee in the total foreign earnings 
of the producing countries. Initially, at low levels of development, coffee plays 
a key role in promoting growth. Also, at these initial phases of development, 
the country is not able yet to generate enough industrial products of high quality 
to export and earn additional foreign income. Thus, Coffee Participation (COFP) 
1 ? ) d 
— (DEVIN) = k(DEVIN) 
kt 
DEVIN = C o e 
where k includes the postulated linear relation, among other things. 
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stays high enough while the Development Index (DEVIN) gradually rises. Later, 
further increases in the index, brings about the resources, capital and techno­
logical capability to produce a variety of alternative exports which increase the 
total foreign receipts and make the nation less dependent on coffee to achieve its 
development goals. Hence, COFP decays to lower values (equation 98). The 
values attached to COFP have been adjusted from figures provided by the Pan 
American Coffee Bureau [29, 30, 3 l ] . 
I " " "1 1 I 1 ' " I 9 I 
50 60 70 80 90 100 
DEVIN 
Figure B18. Percent of Foreign Earnings Provided by Coffee as a 
Function of Development Index. 
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A AFCER. K=SMOOTH(FCEAR. JK, 2) (91) 
A TFEA. K=AFCER. K/COFP. K (92) 
A RFEPLU. K=TFEA. K/(TLABF.K*NFEPLU) (93) 
C NFEPLU=70 
A FEGMI. K=TABHL(TFEG, RFEPLU. K, 0. 8, 2, 0.2) (94) 
T TFEG=0. 5 /1 /1 . 05/1. l / l . 15/1. 2 / 1 . 2 5 / 
A FEGM.K=SMOOTH(FEGMI.K,4) (95) 
C DEVIN. K=DEVIN. J+DT*DEVR. JK (96) 
N DEVIN=50 
R DEVR. KL=DEVIN. K*FEGM. K*NGRW*GROWTH. K (97) 
C NGRW=0.007 
A COFP. K=TABHL(TCFP, DEVIN.K, 50, 100, 10) (98) 
T TCFP=0. 70/0. 68/0. 60/0.40/0. 25/0. 20 
AFCER - Average Foreign Coffee Earnings ($/yr) 
TFEA Total Foreign Earnings ($/yr) 
* RFEPLU - Relative Foreign Earnings per 
Labor Unit (Dimensionless) 
TLABF - Total Labor Force (men) 
NFEPLU - Normal Foreign Earnings per Labor 
Unit ($/men-yr) 
FEGMI Foreign Earnings Growth Multiplier 
(Indicated) (Dimensionless) 
* FEGM Foreign Earnings Growth Multiplier 
(Dimensionless) 
* DEVIN Development Index (Dimensionless) 
* DEVR Development Rate (Fraction/year) 
NGRW Normal Growth (Fraction/year) 
GROWTH - A Test Variable to Introduce Growth 
After 1890 
* COFP Coffee Participation (Fraction) 
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23. Attraction to Urban Centers (ATUC) 
Section 1 of this appendix described the Migration Rate from rural areas 
to urban centers as depending on both the total pool of agricultural workers 
(ALABF) and also on the attractiveness posed to the peasant by the living condi-̂  
tions in the city (ATUC). We have assumed that the peasant Attraction-to-Urban 
Centers (ATUC) rises with the Development index (DEVIN) as displayed by 
Figure B19. The assumption is reasonable, in the sense that developmental 
policies are normally tuned to generate industrial growth, which require the 
concentration of individuals in cities to fill the new manufacturing jobs. This in 
turn requires the expenditure of sizeable investments in housing, schools, and 
Figure B19. Attraction to Urban Centers as a Function 
on Development Index. 
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many other services, factor whose effect is to attract labor to the cities, as 
confirmed by demographic sources. 
The shape of this relationship may be exponential tending to level off, 
i.e. the Sao Paulo area, or exponential but almost linear as may occur in several 
African cities. The shaded area in the figure shows a possible region of operation 
for this variable. The solid line is the function assumed in this research. 
A ATUC. K=TABHL(TMUC,DEVIN.K, 50, 100, 10) (99) 
T TMUC=1/1. 05/1. 08/1. 1/1. 12/1. 14 
Figure B20. Production Sector DYNAMO Model. 
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APPENDIX B-II 
THE COFFEE TRADE AND FUTURE 
MARKET SECTOR 
DESCRIPTION OF EQUATIONS 
ASSUMPTIONS AND SUPPORT 
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II. TRADE AND FUTURE MARKET SECTOR 
1. Traders' On-Hand and On-Order Stocks (TOHSGC, TOOSGC) 
The stock of green coffee physically inside the traders' warehouse is on-
hand stock. The amount of coffee already purchased but not arrived is on-order 
stock. The amount on order at the end of a period of time is then equal to the 
amount in the pipeline one period ago, plus the amount purchased (GCER) minus 
the amount physically entering the warehouse (AGCER) over the period in question 
(DT); in our case DT = 0. 015625 years. Similarly, the stock on hand (TOHSGC) 
at the end of week t is equal to the stock on hand at the end of week t-1, plus the 
amount arriving during the period (AGCER), minus the quantity sold (PUR) over 
the same period (equations 100 and 101). 
The quantity sold per year, or Process or-Usage-Rate (PUR) is given by 
the Indicated-Usage-Rate (ICUR). This variable is the input to the World Coffee 
Model, which grows exponentially, as illustrated by world coffee consumption 
rates. ^ In addition, weekly sales are limited by a maximum sales rate which 
depends on the current stocks on hand (TOHSGC/DT). If stocks account, say to 
4 million bags of green coffee, the maximum possible sales rate is 4 million bags 
per week or 4 x 0. 015625 = 256 million bags per week (1 week ~ 0. 015625 years). 
Therefore the Processor-Usage-Rate is then the minimum between the indicated 
Chapter VI assumed a step function for consumption, but only as a convenient 
means of testing the 6 year cycle on the trade and futures market sector. 
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usage (ICUR) and this maximum sale rate (equations 102, 103 ). 
The amount of green coffee bought during a year, i.e. imports, is given 
by the Green-Coffee-Export-Rate (GCER), a variable defined previously in the 
production sector, and equal to the average between the Desired-Producer-
Export-Quantity (DPEXQ) and the Desired-Traders-Import-Quantity (DTUVtQ). 
This type of relation results from our assumptions about the Supplier-Trader 
price-quantity bargaining decision process. (See BI-19. ) . The quantity impor­
ted (GCER) does not immediately arrive into the trader's warehouse; a time 
delay of about three months (DTOO) will be required before the purchased coffee 
is ready to be used as on hand stock. A third order delay simulates this effect 
(equation 104 ) . 
L TOHSGC. K=TOHSGC. J+DT*(AGCER. JK-PUR. JK) (100) 
L TOOSGC. K=TOOSGC. J+DT* (GCE R. JK-AGCE R. JK) (101) 
R PUR. KL=MIN(TOHSGC. K/DT, ICUR. K) (102) 
A ICUR. K=MODEL INPUT (103) 
R GCER.KL= defined in production sector (equation 78) 
R AGCER. KL=DE LA Y3 (GCER. JK, DTOO) (104) 
C DTOO=0.25 
TOHSGC - Traders on Hand Stocks of Green 
Coffee (million bags) 
TOOSGC - Traders on Order Stocks of Green 
Coffee (million bags) 
PUR - Processors Usage Rate (million bags/year) 
ICUR ~ Indicated Usage Rate (million bags/year) 
(input to World Coffee Model) 
313 
GCER - Green Coffee Export Rate (million bags/year) 
AGCER - Arrival Rate of Exports) (million bags/year) 
DTOO - On Order Delay (years) 
2. Green-Coffee-Required-Imports (GCRI) and Desired-Stock Level (PETS) 
Sales tend to deplete stocks. If sales of green coffee were constant 
throughout the year, and i£ in addition, there were no replenishment delays 
(DTOO) within the coffee distribution channels, the trader would always buy ah 
amount equal to his sales to maintain a certain level of stocks. But sales do 
change and fluctuate throughout the year, and delays create uncertainty about 
the arrival of supplies. Hence, a trader will always tend to keep his stocks at 
a level high enough to cover and protect his business against these and other 
unpredictable events. A rational replenishment inventory policy is to 
order an amount equal to the average sales over a certain period of time, and 












where TCT, Traders-Correction-Time, is the period of time required to drive 
the level of stocks to its desired value; it is a parameter established by manage­
ment, perhaps half a year (TCT = 0.5) to one and a half years at most (TCT ~ 1.5). 
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On the average, a value of 0.8 years may provide a good compromise between 
the two extreme situations (equation 105). Average Sales (Average-Processor-
Usage-Rate APUR) is given by equation 106. 
Current stocks in expression (a) refer to both on hand and on order 
stocks of green coffee (TSGC = TOHSGC + TOOSGC). Omission of the amount 
in the pipeline (On Order Stock, TOOSGC) from the inventory replenishment 
policy results in unstable stock behavior with wide oscillations, as described 
by Forrester [57, Chapter 17] and shortly explained in page 122- of this research 
(See equation 107). 
Finally, the Desired-Traders-Stock (DETS) is then equal to the product 
of the Average-Processor-Usage-Rate and the desired coverage (the Desired-
Traders-Year-Supply DTYS) as depicted by equation 108. 
A GCRI.K=APUR.K + (DETS. K-TSGC. K)/TCT (105) 
C TCT=0.8 
A APUR. K=SMOOTH(ICUR. K, TAPP) (106) 
C TAPP=0.5 (107) 
A DE TS. K=DTYS. K*A PUR. K (108) 
APUR - Average Processor Usage Rate 
(million bags/years) 
TAPP - Time to Average Usage Rate (years) 
TSGC - Total Trader Stocks of Green Coffee 
(million bags) 
GCRI - Green Coffee Required Imports 
(million bags/year) 
TCT - Traders Correction Time (years) 
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DETS - Desired Traders Stock Level 
(million bags) 
DTYS - Desired Traders Year Supply (years) 
3. Desired-Traders-Year-Supply (DTYS) and Supply- of-Storage-Multipliers 
(TSOSM and TSHE) 
The desired inventory coverage is given in years supply (Desired-
Traders-Year-Supply, DTYS). Traders will adjust their desired coverage to 
low or high years of supply in response to anticipated expectations about price 
trends the the coffee market, as hypothetical by the theory of Supply of Storage 
previously described in an earlier chapter. Figure B H-a presents several 
curves of supply of storage as given by Weymar [45, p 39). hi the absence of 
a future market, the trader would be unable to carry a portion of his stocks 
in futures; hence, he will tend to keep years of coverage. Nevertheless, 
as the potentialities to use a future market as a hedging device rise, the trader, 
able to maintain a larger stock of coffee in hedged future contracts, would re­
quire less coverage to conduct his business. Hence, desired coverage falls to 
C, and C , while the volume of hedged contracts rise to H and H . 
1 2 1 2 
Figure BII-1-a shows the traditional way in which literature refers to the 
supply of storage; Desired Coverage is given as a function of both expected price 
change and volume of outstanding contracts. Thus, 
DTYS = -£(AP,H) - ^'(AP) x \E (H) 
j. £ 
Equations 109 present the Desired-Traders-Year-Supply as the product 
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Figure BII-1. Supply of Storage at Different Levels of Hedging. 
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igure BII-2. Supply of Storage Multipliers. 
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of a normal coverage in years (NDTVS=0.5) and two multipliers, one the 
Traders-Supply-of-Storage Multiplier (TSOSM = ^(AP) ) and a second whose 
effect is to reduce the coverage when larger volume of stocks are carried in the 
form of hedged contracts (DTSMFH = % (H)). The SMOOTH operator in (109) 
introduces a time delay of half a year in the formation of the Desired-Traders-
Years-Supply (DTYS). Equations 110 and 111 describe the two supply-of-storage 
multipliers as functions of price change (RWPRCH) and fraction of Stocks 
hedged (FRFSH) respectively. See Figure BII-2. 
A DTYSI. K= NDTYS*TSOSM. K*DTSMFH. K 
C NDTYS=0.5 | (109) 
A DTYS. K=SMOOTH(DTYSI. K, TADTYS) 
C TADTYS - 0.5 
A TSOSM. K-TABHL(1. RWPRCH. K, -0 . 05, 0. 05, 0.01) 
T TSOS 0. 94/ 0. 95/ 0. 96/ 0. 97/ 0. 98/1/ 1. 04/ 1. 12/ 1. 16/ 1. 18/ 1.19 (110) 
A DTSMFII. K=TABHL(TSHE, FRTSH. K, 0, 2, 0.2) 
T TSHE-1. 25/1. 22/1. 18/1. 12/1. 05 /1 /0 .98 /0 .95 /0 .92 / 
0.91/0.90 (111) 
DTYSI - Desired Traders Year Supply 
Indicated (years) 
NDTYS - Normal Traders Year Supply 
Indicated (years) 
DTYS - Desired Traders Year Supply 
(Years) 
TRDTYS - Time to Average Desired 
Year Supply (Years) 
TSOSM - Traders Supply of Storage Multiplier 
(dimensionless) 
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RWPRCH - % World Price Change (dimensionless 
DTSMFH - Desired Traders Stocks Multiplier 
from Hedging (dimensionless) 
FRTSH - Fraction of (Trader) Stocks Hedged 
(dimensionless) 
4. Relative-Aggressiveness-of-Buyers-over-Sellers (RABS) and Average 
World Futures-Price (AWFPR) 
World futures price tends to move together with world spot prices over 
the long run. Generally, however, futures prices tend to quote below the spot 
price, although during certain periods of high prices they may quote above it, 
i .e. the coffee future market has been traditionally an 'inverted' market. How 
far futures prices quote below or above the spot price depends on the needs of 
both buyers and sellers. If buyers are more urgent to buy than sellers, futures 
quoted prices will tend to rise, otherwise they will fall or stay unchanged. In 
turn, the difference between the intended (desired) purchases and the intended 
(desired) sales establishes which of the two groups is more urgent to act. 
When intended purchases rise above intended sales, buyers tend to dominate 
the market; hence, Dominance-of-Buyers-over-Sellers (DOBS) rises, which 
creates pressures on the buying side and then higher future-price quotations. 
On the other hand, when intended sales rise above intended purchases, the 
market exhibits pressure on the selling side, pressures which tend to depress 
prices. This effect is depicted in Figure BII-3, where RABS is the Relative-
Aggress ivenes s - of - Buye rs - over-Seller s. 
The relationship shown in the figure by the subject line is but one, among 
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Figure BII-3. Relative Aggressiveness of Buyers over Sellers and 
Future-Price Formation. 
several other possibilities. The shape of the relation depends, however, on the 
way the market responds to excess of buying over selling or vice versa, 
equation 113. 
Equation 112 shows the world future price as the product of the current 
spot price and two multipliers. The first, the Relative-Aggressiveness-of-
Buyers-Over-Sellers (RABS) was already described. The second effect is called 
Future-Price-Multiplier-from-Selling-Distants over nexts (FPMSD); the nature 
and functioning of this multiplier is described in the following paragraphs. 
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The futures coffee market has traditionally been an inverted market; the 
price of the less distant futures tends to be higher than the price of more distant 
futures [18]. Gray [13, p. 307, 309] describes the coffee market in the following 
terms: 
. . .the fitted regression lines show unequivocably that price changes in 
the distant future tended to be greater, not less, than in the near future. . . . 
Spreads have tended to widen more after they have already widened relative 
to the previous delivery month; and to narrow more after they have narrowed. 
I infer that spreads have tended to widen owing to the pressure of hedge sales 
in the distant future. On the assumption that it is the initiative or lack of 
initiative of selling hedgers that tends to dictate the spread pattern (which 
widens on price declines and is stable or narrows slightly on price increases), 
then this tendency of spread movements to continue suggests that the selec­
tive hedging of importers is successful. The short hedges, that is to say, 
tend to cost more when they are worth more. That the hedger does use dis­
tant futures is indicated in the fact that the concentration of open interest by 
delivery months is further removed from the current date in coffee than in 
other futures markets... 
Consider first the behavior of hedgers. Assume Bl and B2 are the basis, 
i.e. spread, at times t l and t2 respectively. The profit or loss rendered by a 
(short) hedge established at t l and lifted at t2 is given by Bl - B2. When the basis 
widens on a price decline, Bl tends to be larger than B2 (See Figure BII-4). The 
fact that the price of more distant futures tends to decay faster than the price of 
less distants implies a higher likelihood of a profit hedge when the hedge is estab­
lished in the more distant futures (when Bl - B2 is larger). Therefore, when the 
basis widens, hedgers are anxious to sell distant futures in preference to next 
futures. 
Spread speculators, on the other hand, will tend to purchase the distants 
offered to keep their long position, as usual (Gray [14], Coffee [18] ) . Price 
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FPfoSD 
Figure BII-4. Future Price Multiplier from Selling 
Distants over Nexts. 
Table BII-1. Rising Prices (Basis Narrowing, AB > 0) 
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The basis narrows. The pressure 
to buy distants and sell nexts explains 
why the spread between nexts and di 
distants narrows. 
The basis widens. Pressure to 
sell distants over nexts pushes 
the spread down, Aj8 < 0; selling 
pressure due to oversupply pushes 
price down even more. 
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trend speculators, however, will seek to establish a short position in distants, 
as distants generally fall faster than next futures (they sell at high price and 
later buy at the lowest price to cancel their commitment). Therefore, when the 
basis widens (A,8= # 9 - is negative) the market exhibits a net pressure from 
hedgers and price trend speculators to sell distant futures. (See Table BII-1.) 
Then when the basis widens, the average futures price tends to fall. 
When the basis narrows (A j8 > 0-) on a price rise the selling pressure on 
the distants is relieved. In this case, Bl is lower than B2 and there is a likeli­
hood that the hedge results in a loss. Over this period hedgers tend to use the 
market in a selective manner to minimize their losses. Both types of speculators, 
on the other hand, tend to buy distants to establish long positions. The two effects 
of hedgers and speculators combine to create a net buying pressure on the average 
future price (See Table BII-1 and Figure BII-4). 
A WFPFJ. K=WPRI. K*RABS. K*FPMSD. K 
A AWFPR. K=SMOOTH(WFPRI. K, TRW PR) 
C TAWPR=1 
A RABS. K=TABHL(TABS, DOBS. K, - 5 , 5,1) (113) 
325 
T TABS=0. 9/0. 91/0. 92/0. 95 /0 .98 /1 /1 . 02/1. 05/1. 07/ l . 09/1. 1 
A FPMSD. K=TABHL(TSDN, RBASCH. K, - 0 . 05, 0. 05, 0. 01) (114) 
T TSDN=0. 84/0. 85/0. 86/0. 88/0. 9 /0 .95/0 . 98 /1 /1 . 02/1. 04/1. 05 
WFPRI - World Future Price Indicated (£/lb) 
WPRI - World (Spot) Price (£/lb) (link) 
defined in Production Sector, eqn. 
AWFPR • - Average Future World Price (£/lb) 
TAW PR - Time to Average World Future Price 
(£Ab) 
RABS - Relative Aggressiveness of Buyers 
over Sellers (dimensionless) 
DOBS - Dominance of Buyers over Sellers 
(million bags/yr) 
FPMSD -- Future Price Multiplier from Selling 
Distant Futures over Nexts (dimensionless) 
RBASCH -- Percent Basis (Spread) change 
(dimensionless) 
5. World-Price-Change (WPRCH) and Spot Price-
Multiplier-from-Future-Price (WPRMFP) 
A change in price (spot or future) is the difference between current quoted 
price and average price; the fractional change in price is the ratio of this dif­
ference to average price. Equations 115 show the fractional price change for 
both spot (WPRCH) and futures price (FPRCH). A new established rate of price 
change throughout the market place is perceived only after a certain period of 
time; this is the reason to SMOOTH the two actual price changes in equations 
116. More importantly, traders tend to form their expectations about future 
price movements on the basis of the average rate of price change, that is, 
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average price trend. 
In general, different markets and different traders may respond dif­
ferently to a certain rate of price change. While some may overreact to a 
small price fluctuation, others may wait until a stronger price movement 
3) 
develops. The purpose of equations 117 is to model this response. 
Loop T3 in Chapter VI showed an effect of future-price change on spot 
world prices. More precisely, loop T3 postulated that expectations about future-
price trends have a direct effect on spot price formation. Thus, 
World (Spot) price = normal price x ^(Relative Coffee Availability) 
x ^(average future-price change). 
This equation appears in the Coffee Production sector (Appendix B-I). The 
function <£ is called the World-Price-Multiplier-from-Future-Price (WPRMFP), 
and is depicted by Figure BII-5 and equation 118. The curbing of the function 
as future-price-change approaches too high or too low values, reflects the 
traders' concern that well established coffee price trends, rising or falling too 
2) 
The SMOOTH operator in DYNAMO is exponential smoothing. In this type 
of average, recent events are given a larger weight than older ones. Com­
modity analysis seems to confirm the hypothesis that traders form expecta­
tions about the future, on the basis of historical smoothing averages 
(Meadows, DCCM [43, p. 25], section on expectations). 
3) 
The entire trade and future market sector can be totally omitted from the World 
Coffee Model by making WPSD, WFPSD in (127)and TCT in equation 105 equal 
to a very large number. This allows running the simulations on the Production 
Sector alone. 
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Figure Spotj Price Multiplier 
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fast, may soon reverse to follow the characteristic wave pattern. 
A WPRCH. K=(WPRI. K - AWPR. K)/AWPR. K 
} ( H 5 ) 
A FPRCH. K=(WFPRI. K-AWFPR. K)/AWFPR. K 
A AWPRCH.K=SMOOTH(WPRCH.K,TAPCH) 
A AFPRCH. K=SMOOTH (FPRCH. K, TAPCH) * 1 1 6 ) 
C TAPCH=0.5 
A RWPRCH.K=AWPRCH.K/WPSD 
C WPSD=7.5 j (117) 
A RFPRCH. K=A FPRCH. K/WFPSD 
C WFPSD=7.5 
A WPRMFP.K=TABHL(TFPR, RFPRCH. K, -0 .05 , 0.05, 0.01) 
j ( H 8 ) 
T TFPR=0. 8/0. 8 /0 .9 /0 .95 /0 .98 /1 /1 . 05 /1 .1 /1 .15 /1 .2 /1 .2 
FPRCH - World Futoe } M c e C h a n g G < d i m e n s i <>nless ) 
AWPRCH - Average World (Spot)l„ . , , . . , 
AFPRCH - Average Future JPrice C h a n g e (^mensionless) 
TAPCH - Time to Average Price Change (Years) 
RWPRCH . . . „ u . , v 
RFPRCH -J R e ^ a * l v e P r i c e Change (dimensionless) 
ŵ -̂rk 1 Price Significant Change (dimensionless) 
WPRMFP - World Price Multiplier from Future Price 
(dimensionless). See equation 81 in 
Production Sector. 
6. Open-Interest (OPIN) and Fraction-of- Stocks-Hedged (FRTSH) 
Open Interest in the future market is the total number of unliquidated con­
tracts at the end of each period of time. It is also called open commitment. Open 
Interest at the end of a period t is equal to the open interest at the end of period 
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t - 1 plus the net variation of commitments during the period. When a trader 
who is short in the futures market sells a contract, he increases his own open 
commitment by one contract. If the buyer of the contract is also short, he has 
reduced by one contract his open commitment. Therefore, total open interest 
in the market has not changed. If, on the other hand, the buyer of the contract 
is long (or has no position), he has increased his own long position by one con­
tract. Thus, in this case open interest in the future market rises by two con­
tracts. Figure BII-6 presents the total number of possible combinations; the 





Position Short Long N.P 
Short No Change ? ? 
Long I No Change No Change 
NP No Change t 
Figure BII-6. Open Interest Behavior. 
Consider the first row of the previous figure. When 'shorts' sell contracts 
to 'longs' the open interest rises. This is a case in which shorts have sold and 
longs have bought 'new' contracts. Rising open interest tends to be caused by 
New-Selling and New-Buying-Rates (NSR and NBR). A similar description holds 
4) A paper by Beveridge [35] presents readable material about this topic. 
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for the third row in Figure BII-6. 
When 'longs' sell contracts to 'shorts' (second row in the figure), both 
long and shorts cancel a portion of their commitments. Thus, open interest falls. 
A long who sells contracts is in fact 'liquidating' a portion of his outstanding 
contracts; similarly, a short who buys contracts is 'covering' a portion of his 
outstanding contracts. Then, declining open interest tends to be caused by Long 
Liquidation and Short Covering Rates (LLR and SHCR). These are the reasons to 
use plus signs for NSR and NBR, and negative signs for LLR and SHCR in 
equation 119. . 
Equation 120 represents the average level of open interest (AOPINS). 
Recall that the total short position in the market is equal to the total long posi­
tion and both equal to the open interest. Thus, the average open interest mea­
sures the average short position held in futures over a period of time. In turn, 
the fraction of stocks hedged (FRTSH) indicates the level of protection received 
by traders when they use the future market as a hedging device. Thus, it can 
be approximated by the ratio between their average short position (AOPIN) and 
the total amount of stocks held by the trader (TSGC), equation 121. 
L OP1N. K=OPlN. J+DT*(NSR. JK-LLR. JK+NBR. JK-SHCR. JK) (119) 
A AOPIN. K=SMOOTH(OPIN. K, TAOPIN) (120) 
C TAOPIN=0.5 
A FRTSH. K=AOPIN.K/TSGC.K (121) 
N FRTSH=0.5 
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OPIN - Open Interest (million of bags) 
NSR - New Selling Rate (million bags/yr) 
LLR - Long Liquidation Rate (million bags/yr) 
NBR - New Buying Rate (million bags/yr) 
SHCR - Short Covering Rate (million bags/yr) 
AOPDNT - Average Open Interest (million bags) 
TAOPIN - Time to Average Open Interest (years) 
FRTSH - Fraction of Stocks Hedged (fraction) 
7. New-Selling-Rate (NSR) and Short-Covering-Rate (SHCR) 
New-Selling-Rate and Short-Covering-Rate are actions taken by traders 
whose position is short, as described in the previous section. Depending upon 
the outlook of the coffee economy some traders and speculators will be willing 
to establish larger or lower short positions. If the desired short position is 
larger than the current open commitment, traders will be induced to sell new 
contracts to increase their interest. On the other hand, if the desired short 
position is lower than the current commitment, traders will buy contracts to 
cancel out a portion of their interest, hi the first case, New-Selling-Rate was 
high, in the second, short covering rates tend to be large, equations 122 and 
123. Generally, not all of the Indicated-New-Sale-Rate (INSR) or Indicated-
Short-Covering-Rate (ISHCR) can be purchased or sold during each period of 
time. If traders wish to sell too many contracts and just happen that there are 
few buyers, the actual net sales rate will tend to be lower than initially. For a 
similar reason, not all of the indicated short covering rate (ISHCR) will be sold. 
Hence, equation 124 gives the New-Selling-Rate (NSR) and the Short-Covering-
Rate (SHCR) as the product between the two indicated values (INSR and ISHCR) 
and fractions lower (or equal) 1, respectively. These two fractions (FSM and 
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FPM) vary through time, depending upon the volume of trade in the market. (See 
Section 9.) 
A PRSH. K=(ADVSH. K-OPIN. K)/SHCT 
C SHCT=0.5 
A INSR. K=MAX(PRSH, K, 0) 
A ISHCR. K=MAX(-PRSH. K, 0) 
R NSR. K L=INSR. K*FSM. K 
















Desired Short Position (million bags) 
Open Interest (million bags) 
Pressure to Establish Short Position 
(million bags /yr. ) 
Shorts Correction Time (years) 
Indicated New Selling Rate (million bags/yr) 
Indicated Short Covering Rate (million bags/yr) 
New Selling Rate (million bags/yr) 
Short Covering Rate (million bags/yr) 
Fraction Possible of Sales to Make (fraction) 
Fraction Possible of Purchases to Make (fraction) 
8. New-Buying-Rate (NBR) and Long-Liquidation-Rate (LLR) 
Equations 125, 126 and 127 are counterparts of equations 122, 123, and 
124 respectively. These equations were described in the previous section. Repeti­
tion of a similar explanation is omitted here. 
A PRLO.K=(ADVLO. K-OPIN. K)/LOCT (125) 
C LOCT=0.5 
A INBR. K=MAX(PRLO. K, 0) 
A ILLR. K=MAX(-PRLO.K, 0) 
} (126) 
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R NBR. KL=INBR. K*FPM. K 
} (127) 








PRLO Pressure to Establish Long Position 
(million bags/yr) 
Longs Correction Time (years) 
Indicated New Buying Rate (million bags/yr) 
Indicated Long Liquidation Rate (million bags/yr) 
New Buying Rate (million bags/yr) 
Long Liquidation Rate (million bags/yr) 
Fraction Possible of Sales Made (fraction) 
Fraction Possible of Purchases Made (fraction) 
9. Volume-of-Trade (P7QT) and Dominance-of-Buyers-
Over-Sellers (DOBS) 
The total amount of indicated purchases in the futures market is equal 
to the sum of indicated purchases by both longs and shorts, hi other words, 
it is the addition of the Indicated-New-Buying-Rate and the Indicated-Short-
Covering-Rate (INBR + ISHCR). Similarly, total indicated sales in the future 
market is then, the addition of Indicated-New-Sales-Rate and Indicated-Long-
Liquidation-Rate (INSR + ILLR). The SMOOTH operator in equation 128 gives 
the average indicated purchases and sales respectively, over a period of time. 
Volume of trade (P70T) is thus the minimum between the Total-Indicated-
Purchases (TIPEM) and the Total-Indicated-Sales (TISFM), as given by 
equation 129. The Fraction of Purchases and sales actually made in the market 
(FPM and FSM) are then given by the ratio between volume of trade and the indi-
5) 
cated purchases and sales, respectively, equation 130. 
5) 
In the computer printout of the model equations, the denominators of 
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Equation 131 gives the excess or shortage of indicated purchases with 
respect to indicated sales. If there exist an excess of the first amount over the 
second, buyers tend to dominate the market, otherwise sellers will dominate it. 
DOBS is then, Dominance-Of-Buyers-Over-Sellers. This variable is used to 
establish price in the future market (See Figure BII-3). 
(128) 
(130) 
A TIPFM.K=SMOOTH(INBR.K+ISHCR.K, 0.5) 
A TISFM. K=SMOOTH(INSR. K+ILLR.K, 0.5) 
A IVOT.K=MIN(TISFM.K, TIPFM.K) 
A FPM.K=IVOT.K/TIPFM.K 
A FSM.K=IVOT.K/TISFM.K 
A DOBS. K=(TIPFM. K-TISFM. K)/BSSD (131) 
C BSSD=1 
TIPFM - Total Indicated Purchases in the Future 
Market (million bags/yr) 
TISFM - Total Indicated Sales in the Future Market 
(million bags/yr) 
IVOT - Indicated Volume of Trade (million bags/yr) 
FPM - Fraction of Purchases Made (Fraction) 
FSM - Fraction of Sales Made 
DOBS - Dominance of Buyers over Sellers 
(million bags/yr) 
equations 130 appear as (TIPFM + 0.001) and (TISFM + 0.001) respectively. 
This was done to avoid division by zero when performing runs to test the 
sensitivity of certain parameters. Specifically, when one increases to high 
values, the level of quota controls, speculation tends to disappear, and then 
hedging too. Thus, intended purchases and sales both approach zero. 
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-5 -3 -2 -1 0 12 3 if % Figure BII-7. Desired Short Position. 
BSSD - Buyers-Sellers Significant Difference 
(million bags/yr) 
10. (BASIS) and Expected Basis Change (ABASCH) 
The indicated basis is the difference between the World-Future-Price 
(WFPFJ) and the World-Price (WPRI). The current change in basis is the 
difference between the indicated basis and the average basis (BASIS); a fractional 
basis change (BASCH) is given by the ratio between the above difference and the 
average basis (BASIS), equations 132 and 133. 
Hedgers and Spread Speculators base their decisions to increase or de­
crease short positions on expectations about the direction of future movements in 
the basis, that is, the expected change in basis. Some traders will tend to fore-
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cast a possible basis change, higher than the most recent average change in 
basis; others, lower. On the aggregate, traders would expect the basis to 
change at about a rate equal to the most recent rate given by the Average-Basis-
Change (ABASCH), equation 134. Note the initial value given to the basis change 
(BASCH=0). Initially, when the system is at rest, both spot and future prices 
stay constant, and thus, the basis does not change. 
Equation 135 describes the Relative-Expected-Basis-Change (RBASCH) 
as a ratio between the expected basis change and a parameter, the Basis-Signifi­
cant-Difference (BASD). This equation together with the parameter, were intro­
duced into the model to test the sensitivity of the model to different fractional 
changes in basis. 
A BASISI. K=WEPRI. K-WPRI. K 
) (132) 
A BASIS. K=SMOOTH(BASISI. K, TABAS) 
C TABAS=0.25 
A BASCH. K=(BASISI. K-BASIS. K)/BASIS. K (133) 
A ABASCH. K=SMOOTH(BASCH. K, TPBCH) 
C TPBCH=0.25 } (134) 
N BASCH=0 
A RBASCH. K=ABASCH. K/BASD (135) 
C BASD=2 
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BASISI - Basis (Spread) Indicated (CVlb) 
BASIS - Basis (Spread) (C/lb) 
TABAS - Time to Average Basis (yrs) 
BASCH - Basis Fractional Change (fraction) 
ABASCH - Average Basis Change (fraction) 
TPBCH - Time to Perceive Basis Change (years) 
RBASCH - Relative Basis Change (fraction) 
BASD - Basis Significant Difference (CVlb) 
11. Desired-Volume-of-Short-Position (ADVSH) 
In the futures market hedgers generally take a short position. Chapter VI 
of this research described the hedgers1 desired short position as a function of 
the current level of physical stocks held and the trader's expectations about 
future changes in the basis. Thus, 
Hedgers' desired Short Position = Stocks x <[> (Average Basis Change) (a) 
The function $ is given by equation 136, where SHBM is the Short-
Basis-Multiplier, a multiplier which adjusts the target short position above or 
below a normal value. Under normal conditions, with very low fluctuations in the 
basis, a trader will tend to hedge a fraction of ;his stocks, say 50%. (NFRSH = 
0.5.) Figure BII-7 depicts the Short-Basis-Multiplier (SHBM) as a function of 
the expected basis change. As explained in Chapter VI, a positive basis change 
occurs in the coffee futures market when prices are rising, that is, when the 
basis narrows. Furthermore, a hedger who routinely maintains a short posi­
tion in the coffee market tends to lose money in his transactions; the amount 
lost tends to grow with higher rates of change in the basis [14] . Therefore, 
when the basis narrows, traders will tend to hedge a lower fraction of stocks 
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in view of the diminished protection rendered by the futures market. On the other 
hand, as prices fall, the basis (in the case of coffee) tends to widen, and a hedger 
who maintains a short position tends to reduce his losses, hedging a larger frac­
tion of his physical stocks. The Short-Basis-Multiplier (SHBM) tends toward a 
limit as expected basis change approaches an extreme high or low value. Con­
sider first a situation in which the basis is widening too fast (negative basis 
change). In this case, the market tends to offer the best protection to the hedger, 
in which case he may hedge at most 100% of his stocks (SHBM=2). Nevertheless, 
not all of the traders use the futures market, and those who use it, tend to be 
less anxious to maintain a short position when prices are falling very fast. This 
explains the gradual saturation of the Short-Basis-Multiplier at the lowest and 
negative change in basis (SHBM=1.35) is equivalent to hedge about 67.5% of the 
total traders' stocks). 
On the other hand, when the expected change in basis is large and positive, 
traders will always tend to keep at least a portion of their stocks in hedged future 
contracts (SHBM = 0.8, ~ 40% of their stocks) as protection against adverse price 
movements. 
As prices fall, professional price-trend speculators will also tend to 
establish a short position; it has been assumed to depend on both the total 
desired level of long speculation in the coffee market (the level of amateur 
speculators who normally hold a long position), and the speed at which prices 
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fall. Furthermore, the volume of desired short speculative position tends to 
decrease as stronger quota controls are enforced over the spot market. 
Therefore, 
Speculators' Desired Short Position = Desired Speculative Long Position 
Function $ is the broken line shown in Figure BII-7; it is called Short-
Price-Multiplier (SHPM) in equation 137. Equation 138 presents the total 
desired short position (DVSH) as the addition of two terms of the hedgers' and 
speculators' desired short positions respectively (expressions (a) and (b)). 
Hedgers' and speculators' expectations about price trends and basis change 
do not immediately produce a variation in the traders' short target. Under a 
sudden fluctuation in prices or basis, traders will tend to adjust their new target 
position gradually, giving time to cancel out established commitments in case 
their initially formed expectations turn out to be false. Therefore, the current 
desired short position at the futures market (ADVSH) can be best represented by 
the SMOOTH operator in equation 139. 
A SHBM. K=TABHL(TSHB, RBASCH. K, -0 .05 , 0.05, 0.01) (136) 




T TSHB=1.35/1. 3 /1 . 2 /1 . 15/1. l / l / 0 . 9 / 0 . 85/0. 82/0.81/0. 8 
A SHPM. K=TABHL(TSHP,RFPRCH. K, - 0 . 05, 0, 0. 01) (137) 
T TSHP=0. 25/0. 23/0. 20/0 .15/0 . 05/0 





A ADVSH. K=SMOOTH(DVSH.K, TASHP) (139) 
C TASHP=0.5 
N DUSH=OPIN 
SHBM - Shorts Basis Multiplier (dimensionless) 
SHPM - Shorts Price Change Multiplier (dimensionless) 
DVSH - Desired Volume of Shorts (million bags) 
TSGC - Trader Stocks of Green Coffee (million bags) 
NFRSH - Normal Fraction of Stocks Hedged (fraction) 
ADVLO - Desired Volume of Longs (Average) 
(million bags) 
SPEC A - Market Speculative Attraction (fraction) 
A DVSH - Desired Volume of Shorts (Average) (million bags) 
TASHP - Time to Average Desired Volume of Shorts (years) 
OPfN - Open Interest (initial value) (million bags) 
12. Desired-Volume-of-Long-Position (ADVLO) 
Figure BII-8 exhibits two multipliers to adjust the desired long position 
speculators at the future coffee market. The Long-Basis-Multiplier (LOBM) is 
given by the solid line in the figure, and displays the effect of expected basis 
movements on spread speculators. As it was explained in Chapter VI, these 
speculators normally want to maintain a long position, a position which tends 
to rise when the basis widens and to decay as the basis narrows (Gray [14]). 
The broken line in the same figure shows the Long-Price-Multiplier (LOPM). 
This function describes the behavior of price-trend speculators when they want 
to establish a long position as prices rise, equation 141; the lower portion of 
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Figure B-II 8 i 
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Desired Long- Position by Speculators 
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the price multiplier represents the Short-Price-Multiplier (SHPM) described 
in the previous section. 
Both price and basis multipliers gradually saturate at the two extremes 
of the diagram. Consider the broken line first. When prices tend to rise or 
fall, more traders are attracted toward the coffee market; new traders normally 
mean a wider differential between the maximal and the minimal daily quoted 
price. This in turn, implies rapid and wide short-term price fluctuations, 
which means that speculators would have to absorb a higher level of risk. There­
fore, if prices rise or fall too fast, short-term price fluctuations will tend to 
become too wild and rampant, a fact which acts as a deterrent to some specu­
lators, who will seek profits in less volatile markets. This is the reason to 
postulate the two speculators' multipliers as having a shape which saturates at 
extreme values of price change. A similar explanation could be given to des­
cribe the shape of the Longs-Basis-Multiplier (LOBM). This is omitted here. 
Equations 142 and 143 describe the desired volume of long position in the 
7) 
future market as the product of desired short position (ADVSH), the addition 
of the two long multipliers (LOBM + LOPM) and a third element (SPECA, 
Charts on future coffee price at the New York Coffee and Sugar exchange show 
wider short-term price fluctuations when prices rise or fall too fast 
(Commodity Year Book [2]) . 
'Equation 142 suggests a rise in the speculative long position as traders tend 
7) 
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Speculators-Attraction) which depends on the level at which price regulations 
and quota export controls dominate the spot market. This variable is defined by 
equation 144. A rise in the quota fraction tends to allow exports to flow more 
freely into the spot market; this in turn attracts a higher number of speculators 
toward the future coffee market.. 
A LOBM. K=TABHL(TLOB, RBASCH. K, - 0 . 05, 0. 05, 0. 01) (140) 
T T LOB= 1. 15/ 1.14/ 1. 13/ 1 .12/1 .08/1 /0 .92/0 .87/0 . 84/ 0 .82/0.8 
A LOPM. K=TABHL(TLOP, RFPRCH.K, 0,0. 05, 0. 01) (141) 
T TLOP=0/0. 05/0 .15/0 .20/0 .23/0 .25 
A DVLO.K=ADUSH.K*(LOBM.K+LOPM.K)*SPECA.K (142) 
A ADVLO. K=SMOOTH(DVLO. K, THLOP) (143) 
C TALOP=0.25 
A SPECA.K=NSPECA*QUOTA.K (144) 
C NSPECA=1 
A QUOTA. K=Market export quota controls (defined in 
Chapter IX 
LOBM - Longs Basis Multiplier (dimensionless) 
LOPM - Longs Price Change Multiplier (dimensionless) 
DVLO - Desired Volume of Longs (million bags) 
ADVLO - Desired Volume of Longs (Average)(million bags) 
TALOP - Time to Average Desired Volume of Longs (years) 
to increase their short position. Equation 138 on the other hand, assumed the 
converse. The two equations taken together postulate, in fact, that both hedging 
and speculation support each other in the commodity future market. See 
Working [46,47], Gray [ 14]. 
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AVVSH - Desired Volume of Shorts (million bags) 
SPECA - Market Speculation Attraction (fraction) 
N SPEC A 2. Normal Market Speculation Attraction (fraction) 
QUOTA - Market Export Quota Controls (dimensionless) 
13. Input to the World Coffee Dynamic Model: 
Coffee-Usage-Rate (ICUR) 
The listing of equations at the end of the Appendix describes annual usage 
of coffee (ICUR) with exponential growth. The printouts exhibited in the Produc­
tion Sector and in Chapter VII use this type of function as an input to the World 
Coffee Model. In those printouts ICUR is plotted with the letter U. The values 
produced by the exponential function are close to the actual consumption figures, 
as the reader may confirm it by visual comparison of data with simulated output. 
The equations used to generate this type of input appear at the end of the 
listing of equations, and under the name INPUT. The name of the variables are 
as follows: 
FCPOP Foreign Countries Adult Population (men) 
FPGR Foreign (Adult) Population Growth Rate (men/year) 
GCUPC Equivalent Green Coffee Usage per Capita (million of bags/ 
men-year) (an exponential function) 
ICUR Indicated Coffee Usage Rate in Green Coffee Equivalent 
(million bags/year) 
Thus, 
ICUR.K= FCPOP. K*GCUPC.K (145) 
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To test the performance of the Coffee Trade and Future Market in Chapter 
VI, equation 145 was substituted by a STEP function. In that chapter, simulated 
plots also show the letter U to indicate ICUR. The variable FROST at the 
end of the listing of equations was used to simulate the effects of adverse weather. 
Figure BII-9 . Trade Sector DYNAMO Model. £ 
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APPENDIX C 
THE SPECTRAL TECHNIQUE 
A. Spectral Method 
The following is a brief summary of the power spectral procedure I have 
used to study the behavior of the coffee economy. 
1. Definitions 
a. A series is second order stationary when its mean and variance do not change 
with time. The theory of spectral analysis requires the use of stationary 
series. If a series of time exhibit sustained growth, it is good practice to 
'detrend1 the series. 
b. Autocorrelation Function. Measures the degree of relatedness between a 
value at time t and a value at time t + r. If r is zero, autocorrelation is 
equal to the variance of the time series. 
1 N 
C(7) = - — £ x + x, N-r . t t-T 
r=l 
x̂  = time series at time t. (stationary) 
N = number of data points. (years, etc.) 
r = Lag. (in years) 
c. Power Spectra. If a time serie has oscillations, the series can be decomposed 
into a series of sin and/or cosine terms. The spectral technique shows the 
contribution to the overall serie-variance of each one of the frequencies 
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contained in the original data • 
M 
P(w.) = ̂ - { X 0 C ( 0 ) + 2 VxC(7)Cos277f; 7T} 
T=l 
r = lag in years. 
M = number of lags. 
A^= spectral window, 
d. Spectral Window. As one increases the number of data points, the mean of 
the estimated spectra approaches the true spectral value; nevertheless, the 
spectral power is not a consistent estimator: its variance does not decrease 
with a larger number of data points. A useful way to reduce the variance of 
the estimated spectra is to take a weighted average of adjacent spectral 
estimators. The number of estimators to smooth, and their weight are 
given by the 'spectral window.1 
A too wide spectral window, i.e. too many adjacent estimators to weight, will 
produce a rather smooth spectra (high stability); on the other hand, this type 
of spectra tends to omit some of the frequency bands embodied within the 
time series, which gives a too low fidelity. Therefore, a way to obtain a 
good spectral estimator is to choose a window not too wide as to lose fidelity, 
and not too narrow as to lose stability. This is the purpose of the 'closing 
window technique,' outlined later. 
There are several types of spectral windows. In this research I have used 
two different windows. One, the Parzen window has given a more stable 
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response to very low frequencies. The other, the Bartlett window produced 
very good response at high frequencies, but it lacked resolution at very low 
frequencies. I used the two techniques to improve credibility at very low 
frequencies (more than 15 years of period). 
Parzen window: 
2 3 
= 1 - 6(r/M) + (r/M) 0 < T/M < 0.5 
X { = 2(1 - (T /M) 3 ) 0.5 < T / N < 1 
= 0 T / N > 1 
Bartlett window: 
r = 1 0 < T < M 
X { 
7 - t r = 0 , M. 
e. Spectral Plot. The spectral estimators appear at equally spaced frequencies 
going from 0 to 0.5 cycles per year. The presence of a peak indicates the 
possible existence of a cycle in the time series. Spectral estimators follow 
2 1) 
a x distribution with k degrees of freedom depending upon the number of 
data points N, and the number of lags M: k = 2N/M. Therefore, confidence 
bands can be plotted to check for the significance of each peak. For example, 
2 r 2 
T, _J ^ X l -o /2 
r I k - ^ - k 
J 
1) If the serie is stationary and follows a Gaussian process; practitioners of 
Spectral Analysis claim that the estimators closely follow a $ distribution even 
in the case in which the process does not follow a Gauss (normal) distribution. 
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where $ is the True spectra and >J> is the estimated spectra. The confidence 
band in a semilog paper is then given by: 
x2 x2 
log*. - 7 - ^ 2 > > log^ + - f = ^ 2 . 
J k - ] - ] k 
f. Number of Lags M. A very crude spectral plot could be obtained with 80 
data points. Jenkins suggests at least N=100; generally, a good spectra 
could be obtained with N=200 points. 
For the Bartlet window the number of lags M should be not more than N/3, 
and not less than N/6. 
The selection of lags M when one uses the Parzen window should be made as 
follows: N >2M> 3F, where F is the number of frequency bands used to 
calculate the spectral. 
B. The Closing Window Technique 
a. Make the band-width of the spectral window progressively smaller. This is 
done by increasing the number of lags (M) used. With 150 years of coffee 
prices, I chose lags varying from 20 to 50 years. 
b. The power spectra will change strongly at first, then as the number of lags 
are augmented the spectra will tend to settle down. Further narrowing of the 
window will tend to create a too noisy pattern. With yearly coffee data the 
plot generally settles down at about 35 or 40 lags. 
c. The proper number of lags to start the process may be selected from the 
autocorrelation function. If there are cycles in the series, this function will 
356 
exhibit oscillations at some lags. Coffee data showed these oscillations at 
20, and 35 lags. 
C. Harmonic Frequencies 
A good method to gain confidence about the presence of a cyclic movement 
is to look for harmonics of the suspected frequency. Harmonic cycles have a 
frequency which is a multiple of the frequency sought. On the spectral plot, a 
harmonic has a frequency of 'around1 a multiple of the other fundamental fre­
quency. However, a frequency (peak) is a harmonic if its power spectra is less 
2) 
than the power at the fundamental. 
* If a peak at a frequency f is not statistically significant, but harmonics 
2f, 3f, . . . exist, the frequency component f may be really in the data 
time series. 
* It is extremely unlikely that a time series will contain a frequency f 
with no harmonics. 
* The confidence bands drawn upon the spectral plot, test the significance 
of each one of the different frequencies. To my knowledge, there is no 
available statistical test to show how significant is a fundamental fre­
quency and its harmonics when taken together at a time. 
The previous notes on spectral techniques have been summarized from several 
authors. The references are given in the Bibliography, section on Spectral 
Analysis. 
Not totally true for certain modulated radio waves. See [49]. 
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Units Years Region(s) Source 
Annual 1900-1973 World; producers [2]; fc]; fc] 
Annual 
Annual Exports (Bags) 
Export Value ($US) Annual 
Domestic Usage Annual 
Annual Producers' Stocks 
(Carry-Over) 
U.S. Stocks 
1900-1973 World; producers 
1910-1973 World; producers 
1947-1973 World; producers 
1948-1973 Brazil, Colombia 
1948-1973 World, Brazil, 
Colombia 
Quarterly 1958-1974 U. S. A. 









European Consump. Annual 1931-1946 
(Imports) 1947-1972 
World Capacity 1942-1972 
(Trees/Land) 
Avg. Price (£/pd.) Annual 1825-1973 
(Spot at N. Y. ) Monthly 1930-1973 
Avg. Future Price Monthly 1930-1973 
(at N . Y . ) 






(partial data) } 
Labor Force in 
Coffee 
Men 1946-1970 
Average Yields Kg/Tree/Yr 
Producer Costs $/Yield 
Total avg.; 
per type of coffee 
Santos type 
' C contract 








[2l C5]; [8] 
[2]; [5]; [s] 
[13] 
[5]; [8] 
[ 5 1 [ 8 1 [13] 







[ 2 ] ; [5] 
[2] 
[5] 







Variable Units Years Region(s) Source 
Volume of Trans­
actions at New York 
Coffee and Sugar 
Exchange Annual 1955-1972 U.S.A. [2] 
360 
APPENDIX E 
THREE-AT-A-TIME EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
361 
APPENDIX E 
THREE - A T- A- TIME EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Response 
Simulation Parameters Period, 
Run No. PI P2_ P3_ PI x P2 PI x P3 P2 x P3 PI x P2 x P3 Amplitude, etc 
1 - - - +1 +1 +1 -1 
2 + - 1 - 1 + 1 +1 
3 - + - - 1 + 1 - 1 +1 
4 + + +1 -1 -1 -1 
5 + +1 -1 -1 +1 
6 + - + - 1 + 1 - 1 -1 
7 - + + -1 -1 +1 -1 
8 + + + + 1 + 1 + 1 +1 
9 N V N V N V O O 0 0 
1. Note: (+,-) ~ ( + X % > ~ X % ) > X is fixed percent change in all parameters. 
NV. ~ Normal Parameter Value 
2. Regression to determine % explained by the main effects 
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